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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

High-Level Executive Summary
The Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI) prepared a Scoping Study on
Securing Adequate Legal Defense in Proceedings under International Investment Agreements (Scoping Study) for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. The primary
research question that the Scoping Study was requested to address is: How can adequate legal defense for parties in proceedings under International Investment Agreements (IIAs) be better secured? The information provided in the Scoping Study is intended to contribute to discussions on the desirability and feasibility of creating or expanding
an assistance mechanism or mechanisms to assist states and other users of the IIA and
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) system to more effectively participate in and
benefit from this system. Throughout the study, and reflecting our broad approach, which
catalogues a wide range of issues and options, we refer to possibilities for support as
“Assistance Mechanisms.” We use that term to encompass a broad range of potential
models and options. The term is not meant to reflect any single approach.

The Scoping Study provides a broad and inclusive
overview of issues, concerns, empirical evidence,
opinions, lessons learned, and proposed solutions
as they relate to potential or expanded Assistance
Mechanisms for international investment law. This
Scoping Study reflects input received on a confidential
basis from: government officials (of all World Bank
Group economic development levels); individuals who
have experience establishing or working for existing
or attempted Assistance Mechanisms; individuals who
have experience working for an arbitral institution;
academics who have written on and/or advised states
with respect to international investment law; private
practitioners; representatives of non-governmental
organizations; and representatives of private sector
foreign investors. While this study captures the
perspectives of each and all of these categories of
individuals (but perspectives are naturally reflective
only of individuals actually interviewed), it is the
perspective of those who are experiencing and
articulating capacity challenges that should serve
as the primary guide for both identifying critical
areas where assistance is needed, and in developing
potential solutions.
6 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT

Identifying Challenges
CCSI’s consultations conducted for the Scoping Study
revealed that the concerns about IIAs and ISDS are
much more fundamental than only the financial costs
of participation in this system. Interviewees relayed
challenges from investment policy formulation at
the domestic level through and including effective
engagement in formal ISDS proceedings. As such,
the Scoping Study considers the range of problems
that states and other actors have in engaging with
and benefiting from international investment law
and in participating effectively in investor-state
dispute settlement processes. The Scoping Study
does so through the lens of “capacity challenges,”
capturing different challenges related to: investment
policy-making; IIA negotiation; implementation and
management of their IIAs and associated policies;
dispute prevention; and pre-dispute management and
consultations. It then considers in depth the capacity
challenges that arise in the context of managing actual
ISDS disputes, including: case staffing; anticipating,
and potentially resolving, ISDS cases at an early phase;
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appointing arbitrators; dealing with uncertainty and
ambiguity; working with experts; and engaging in
discovery of and managing information.
Some identified challenges are acknowledged and
shared by all or many states, and some differ, based on
a state’s economic development level, its experience
with ISDS claims, and its role as a capital importer or
exporter (or both) particularly vis-a-vis its investment
treaty partners, among other factors. States expressed
different priorities in addressing these challenges,
some of which seem to be loosely held preferences
in light of anticipated resource constraints, and some
of which reflected more fundamentally held policy
priorities or mandates.

•

•

•

Identifying Potential Ways of Easing
Capacity Challenges
Following the identification (and prioritization) of
capacity challenges, it will be necessary to consider the
model(s) that an Assistance Mechanism could take in
order to help address them. The Scoping Study surveys
a wide variety of models that Assistance Mechanisms,
both with respect to international investment law as
well as those employed in other legal fields, have taken
and may take to address various concerns. Models that
are explored in depth in the Scoping Study include:
•

•

•

Institutionalized, multi-service support
including legal representation of client
governments. Examples that are discussed in
this category include the Advisory Centre on
WTO Law, the African Legal Support Facility,
and the International Development Law
Organization’s Investment Support Programme
for Least Developed Countries, as well as an
investment law “hotline”.
Institutionalized, multi-service support not
including legal representation of client
governments. Examples that are discussed
in this category include the kinds of support
provided by international organizations (such as
UNCTAD, the OECD, and the World Bank Group),
arbitration centers (such as ICSID, the PCA, and
the SCC), and academic and non-profit centers
(such as CCSI and IISD).
Financial or in-kind inputs. Examples that are
discussed in this category include arbitration trust
funds (such as that provided by the PCA), thirdparty funding, contingent fee representation,

•

insurance products, and loans.
Pro bono, ad hoc legal and expert support.
Examples that are discussed in this category
include IDLO’s ISP/LDCs program along with
other NGO and university-based programs (e.g.
TradeLab) that deliver services to states on a nocost basis.
Intergovernmental knowledge-sharing hubs.
Examples that are discussed in this category
include formal opportunities for government
officials to share knowledge (e.g. IISD’s Annual
Forum of Developing Country Investment
Negotiators) as well as ad-hoc treaty-based or
other networks.
Discrete capacity-building networks. Examples
that are discussed in this section include trainings
and discrete capacity building offered by various
Assistance Mechanisms, academic and non-profit
institutions, law firms, and other governments, as
well as Massive Open Online Courses.
Legal assistance and resource clearinghouse.
Finally, a very basic form of Assistance
Mechanism may provide great value by simply
compiling, organizing, and disseminating
information about existing resources to relevant
government officials.

Key Considerations in Identifying
Feasible and Desirable Options
Various cross-cutting issues emerged from analysis of
and experience with existing Assistance Mechanisms.
These cross-cutting issues should be considered by
policy-makers as they consider the breadth and depth
of services as well as the model(s) that an Assistance
Mechanism could follow. The cross-cutting issues that
are explored in depth in the Scoping Study include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Quality, reliability, reputation, and trust;
Funding of an Assistance Mechanism and scope
of services;
Costs of support and who bears them;
Stakeholder tensions;
Identifying the client/beneficiary;
Location, staffing, and remuneration;
Institutionalized vs. ad hoc mechanisms;
“Politics” surrounding the role of an Assistance
Mechanism; and
Intersection with other reforms.
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Interviews and desk research reflect a great diversity
of perspectives as to how capacity challenges should
be prioritized and addressed, and highlight how
each of these categories of issues can have crucial
implications for the buy-in regarding and viability of
any potential Assistance Mechanism.
Furthermore, interviews and research confirm the
perhaps not unsurprising conclusion that capacity
challenges in the ISDS system are often distinct
from other legal systems, and that models used to
address challenges in some systems are not readily
transferrable to the ISDS context, at least as the
ISDS system operates at present. For instance,
features such as the asymmetrical nature of treatybased ISDS cases (with states always respondents),
and the significant number of legal and expert hours
typically spent on ISDS disputes, distinguish ISDS
cases from those under the WTO. These differences
in capacity challenges, priorities in addressing
them, the practicality and feasibility of doing so,
and at what cost, raise questions about the model
of Assistance Mechanism that is best suited to the
investment law context.
Notably, and as the Scoping Study discusses, there
have been several previous attempts to establish an
advisory center on international investment law. A
key theme that emerged from interviews with those
involved in or knowledgeable about these efforts
was that policy-makers should not underestimate
large (such as how a mechanism will be financed)
and, perhaps moreso, small policy differences
among and between states (such as the location
of a mechanism), as an unanticipated difference of
opinion can stall or halt efforts, even when the finish
line seems near. Identifying such issues at an early
stage is important for ensuring that paths pursued
are possible and promising.

8 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT

SME Capacity Challenges and Options
for Addressing Them
Finally, the Scoping Study includes a section devoted
to investors, with a focus on small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) as potential beneficiaries of any
Assistance Mechanism. The Scoping Study revealed that
although SMEs and states face some of the same issues
with respect to their participation in ISDS, the rationales
for, considerations regarding, and optimal modes of
supporting each group may vary significantly.
The Scoping Study explores evidence related to SME
use of ISDS, as well as the hurdles that SMEs are having
in effectively relying on IIAs and ISDS as a method to limit
risk and resolve disputes. The Scoping Study explores
how one might determine the scope of beneficiaries
who may benefit from an Assistance Mechanism, and
identifies how some Assistance Mechanisms that are
or could be made available to states are, or could be,
available to SMEs to a greater or lesser extent than
government respondents.
Overall, based on the hurdles experienced and concerns
expressed, the Scoping Study considers the forms of
an Assistance Mechanism that may best assist SMEs
in overcoming ISDS access issues. These include an
ombuds-type office, pre-dispute technical assistance,
market-based Assistance Mechanisms, capacity-building
models, and a model incorporating institutionalized
defense and legal representation. Depending on the
type of assistance that would be offered to investors,
consultations suggested fairly widespread hesitation of,
or even strong opposition to, also including investors as
beneficiaries of an Assistance Mechanism that is created
or expanded to benefit states, especially with respect to
an Assistance Mechanism focused on supporting ISDS
litigation.

SECURING ADEQUATE LEGAL DEFENSE IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS A SCOPING STUDY

Ways Forward in the Currently
Evolving Context
International investment law and ISDS are evolving,
and outcomes of that evolution remain uncertain.
Those developments must be kept in mind when
assessing needs, and the options for addressing them,
as each may change in the short-, medium-, and longterm. An Assistance Mechanism developed to be
sustainable will need to be flexible to accommodate
these developments. It will be important to consider
whether and to what extent concerns regarding IIAs
and ISDS are best resolved through reforms to treaties
and dispute settlement mechanisms thereunder, and
whether and to what extent the costs of concerns that
are not addressed should be shifted from beneficiaries
of an Assistance Mechanism (e.g. certain respondent
states and/or SMEs) to an Assistance Mechanism’s
funders (e.g. other states and their taxpayers).
With respect to both states and investors, this
scoping study has set forth a wide variety of existing
capacity challenges and detailed existing Assistance
Mechanisms that are available. Depending on the
issue, robust, some, or no assistance is currently
available. Any creation or expansion of an Assistance
Mechanism should take into account existing support,
building upon and using it, and complementing it as
necessary and desirable.

In UNCITRAL’s most recent 38th Session, government
delegates commenced a substantive discussion on
the contours of an Assistance Mechanism (referred to
in that context as an “advisory center”). While general
support was expressed for establishing an Assistance
Mechanism, particularly as such a mechanism could
complement other reform options being developed
by WGIII, preliminary thoughts and consideration
of questions regarding the establishment of such
a mechanism revealed much work yet to be done.
Delegates discussed a wide range of possibilities as
they relate to: potential beneficiaries of a mechanism,
the potential scope of services that a mechanism could
provide (with those outlined in Secretariat Note A/
CN.9/WG.III/WP.168 providing a good basis for further
discussion), the possible structure of an Assistance
Mechanism and how it could be financed, and other
considerations and issues that must be born in mind
(e.g. quality and reliability of services, staffing and
remuneration, stakeholder tensions, a mechanism’s
impact on the ISDS system as a whole, and long-term
sustainability of an Assistance Mechanism).
The Working Group provided guidance to the
UNCITRAL Secretariat in conducting certain
preparatory work to assist the Working Group in
these considerations. Requested information related
to potential conflicts of interest and burdens on an
Assistance Mechanism (particularly as they relate to
the scope of its mandate), information on Assistance
Mechanisms that are already providing services,
criteria that may be applied to determine beneficiary
states and services, how capacity building may apply
to various elements of investment treaty practice
and dispute settlement proceedings, and options for
financing and staffing an Assistance Mechanism.
As the content and contours of any Assistance
Mechanism take shape, the authors are grateful
for the opportunity to contribute the evidence and
perspectives in this Scoping Study to that discussion.
The challenges are varied and issues complex,
requiring a close and realistic look at the problems
being articulated and the strengths and weaknesses
of different options for ameliorating them.
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Categories of Capacity Challenges Related to International Investment Law & Policy
and Select Service Providers Profiled in Scoping Study

Investment Policymaking (Section
2.2.1)

International
Investment
Agreement
Negotiations
(Section 2.2.2)

United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD)

x

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD)

Domestic
implementation of
treaty obligations
(Section 2.2.3)

Dispute
Prevention
(Section 2.3.3)

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

World Bank Group (not
ICSID)

x

x

x

x

International Development Law Organisation
Investment Support
Programme for Least
Developed Countries
(IDLO ISP/LDCs)

x - outsourced

x - outsourced

x - outsourced

x - outsourced

x

x

Broad Categories of
Capacity Building
Services →

"hotline"
(Section 4.1.4)

Select Existing Service
Providers ↓

x - outsourced

International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
The Arbitration Institute
of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC)
Permanent Court of
Arbitration (PCA)
International Institute for
Sustainable Development (IISD)

x

x

x

x

x

Columbia Center on
Sustainable Investment
(CCSI)

x

x

x

x

x

TradeLab

x

x

x

x

International Senior
Lawyers Project (ISLP)

x - outsourced

x - outsourced

x - outsourced

x - outsourced

Ad hoc or treaty based
state-to-state networks

x

x

x

x
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x - outsourced

Categories of Capacity Challenges Related to International Investment Law & Policy
and Select Service Providers Profiled in Scoping Study

Broad Categories of
Capacity Building
Services →

Treaty Engagement
and Management
(Section 2.2.4)

Dispute
settlement
- claimant/
complainant

Dispute settlement
- respondent
(Section 2.3)

Opinions (Section
4.1.1.3)

"capacity
building"
trainings
(Generally
discussed
throughout
Scoping Study)

Select Existing Service
Providers ↓
United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD)
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD)

x

x

World Bank Group (not
ICSID)
International Development Law Organisation
Investment Support
Programme for Least
Developed Countries
(IDLO ISP/LDCs)

x

x - outsourced

International Centre for
Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID)

x - outsourced

x - outsourced

x - (dispute guidelines)

x

The Arbitration Institute
of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC)

x

Permanent Court of
Arbitration (PCA)

x

International Institute for
Sustainable Development (IISD)

x

x

Columbia Center on
Sustainable Investment
(CCSI)

x

x

TradeLab

x

International Senior Lawyers Project (ISLP)

x - outsourced

Ad hoc or treaty based
state-to-state networks

x

x - outsourced

x - outsourced
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Section 1. Introduction
1.1 Overview			12
1.2 Methodology		13
1.2.1 Interviews		
13
1.2.2 Desk research 13

This Scoping Study on Securing Adequate Legal Defense
in Proceedings under International Investment Agreements
(Scoping Study) has been prepared for the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Netherlands.
The primary research question that this Scoping Study was
requested to address is: How can adequate legal defense
for parties in proceedings under International Investment
Agreements (IIAs) be better secured?

1.1 Overview
The question of adequate legal defense for
respondent states in investor-state dispute
settlement (ISDS) proceedings is a timely and
important one.1 The number of claims against states,
and defense costs incurred by them, continue to
grow, and absent serious and systemic changes
to the underlying treaties and national investment
laws, or the dispute settlement mechanism
provided for therein, show no signs of abating.
Even if structural interventions to attempt to control
costs of ISDS proceedings succeed, the costs of
participation in any IIA-based, international dispute
settlement mechanism are likely to remain financially
challenging for many states, claimants, and others
who engage in and with ISDS disputes. The issue of
cost is also closely linked with quality, control, and
trust, three other criteria participants in this legal
system prioritize.
In undertaking this Scoping Study, CCSI has
sought information that will assist policy-makers in
understanding what is meant by “adequate legal
defense” from the perspective of respondent states
and other users of and stakeholders in the system
of IIAs and ISDS, and the hurdles (financial and
other) that respondent states and other users face in
achieving this objective.

12 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT

The paper follows the outline of our inquiry: As a first
step, the study unpacks and provides greater clarity on
what challenges states face in developing, advancing,
implementing, and enforcing their investment law
policies. Next, the study analyzes how and where
existing organizations or programs are available to
assist, financially or otherwise, states and other users in
more effectively engaging in and with the IIA system,
including in and with the ISDS mechanism (each
such organization or program is generally referred to
herein as an Assistance Mechanism), and where there
are or seem to be assistance gaps. This is followed
by an analysis of the different models any Assistance
Mechanism (or Assistance Mechanisms) that could
be developed or expanded upon may follow, again
using and building on existing Assistance Mechanisms
supporting investment policies, but also drawing on
mechanisms used in other substantive legal areas, such
as international human rights and criminal law.2 This
section is extensive as identifying what is needed first
necessitates an analysis of what is already available,
and benefits from an understanding of initiatives,
considerations, and approaches in analogous contexts.
The study then considers certain “cross-cutting” issues,
or areas of consideration that apply to all models of
Assistance Mechanism and should be considered and
addressed during the process of creating (or expanding)
any new Assistance Mechanism.

SECURING ADEQUATE LEGAL DEFENSE IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS A SCOPING STUDY

Finally, a section is devoted to investors, namely small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), as potential
beneficiaries of any Assistance Mechanism. The
Scoping Study revealed that although SMEs and states
face some of the same issues with respect to their
participation in ISDS, the rationales for, considerations
regarding, and optimal modes of supporting each
group may vary significantly. Moreover, much less is
presently known about the particular experiences,
needs, and priorities of SMEs with respect to ISDS
than states.
Throughout all sections, CCSI’s analysis draws heavily
on advice and anecdotes provided during the course
of consultations conducted for this Scoping Study,
seeking to imbue lessons learned and advice provided
throughout.

1.2 Methodology
1.2.1 Interviews
For purposes of this Scoping Study CCSI conducted
in-person or phone consultations with a wide variety
of individuals who engage in the IIA/ISDS system or
who otherwise have experience relevant to Assistance
Mechanisms available to states in international legal
fora. CCSI prepared a consultation protocol and list
of questions, attached as Annex A. This protocol
served as the basis for each consultation, although
depending on the nature and experience of the
interviewee, certain questions were deemed more
relevant and thus prioritized. In all cases, interviewees
were encouraged to elaborate on responses beyond
the scope of the question, and to provide information
that the interviewee deemed relevant to the issue
of potential Assistance Mechanisms even if such
information did not respond to a specific question
asked. The objective was to gain broad perspectives
on the concerns that states and other stakeholders
have regarding the ability of the current IIA/ISDS
system to meet treaty-party objectives, broadly catalog
what resources are currently available to address these
concerns, identify where and to what extent there are
gaps in support, and understand lessons learned from
other Assistance Mechanisms (or failed attempts to
establish Assistance Mechanisms).

Such individuals or groups can best identify and
articulate the concerns and hurdles experienced and
are best placed to suggest or evaluate how a potential
Assistance Mechanism may respond to any identified
problem.
One or more members of CCSI staff conducted each
consultation. Consultations ranged from bilateral,
to small groups, to larger groups of up to roughly
thirty individuals (although bilateral or small group
interviews greatly predominated). All consultations
were conducted under the Chatham House Rule, and
thus while information received from consultations is
included in this Scoping Study, neither the identity
nor the affiliation of the interviewee is specified. CCSI
has, however, identified interviewees by the following
general categories:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Government officials3
Individuals who have experience establishing
or working for existing or attempted Assistance
Mechanisms
Individuals who have experience working for an
arbitral institution
Academics who have written on and/or advised
states with respect to international investment
law
Private practitioners4
Representatives of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs)5
Representatives of private sector foreign
investors.

While consultations were conducted among a broad
range of stakeholders, and the authors attempted
to obtain input from a diverse range of individuals
familiar with investment law and/or existing Assistance
Mechanisms, the discussion below is reflective of the
particular sample of interviewees, complemented by
desk-based research.

1.2.2. Desk research
In addition to interviews conducted for this Scoping
Study, CCSI staff undertook desk-based research in
the English language.

While all perspectives that were expressed during
interviews were taken into account and are reflected
in this Scoping Study, CCSI deemed it of particular
importance to attempt to understand and reflect the
concerns expressed by and from the perspective of
potential users of a possible Assistance Mechanism.
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT | 13
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Section 2.
Contours of the Current International Investment
Agreement Regime

2.1 Identifying capacity challenges
2.2 Stocktaking: Identified concerns and existing Assistance
Mechanisms available to states in IIA-related areas other
than disputes			
2.2.1 Investment policy-making
2.2.2 IIA negotiation			
2.2.3 Domestic implementation of IIA obligations
2.2.4 Ongoing engagement and treaty management
2.3 Stocktaking: Challenges in managing ISDS proceedings,
and existing mechanisms to overcome those challenges
2.3.1 Case staffing			
2.3.2 Staffing of defense claims:
		
Issues of cost, quality and control
2.3.3 Anticipating, and potentially resolving,
		
ISDS cases at an early phase			
2.3.4 Appointing arbitrators		
2.3.5 Handling cases - dealing with inconsistency,
		
uncertainty and incorrectness
2.3.6 Handling cases - working with experts
2.3.7 Handling cases - engaging in discovery, 		
		managing information

14 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT

15
18

18
22
28
30
32
32
38
39
42
42
44
44

SECURING ADEQUATE LEGAL DEFENSE IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS A SCOPING STUDY

Many governments around the world are thinking
critically about their IIAs, the ISDS mechanism that is
frequently contained in them, and, more broadly, the
role that IIAs are playing, and should be playing, in
states’ broader investment policy and development
objectives. This critical analysis has stemmed from
a confluence of factors. In recent years ISDS claims
have dramatically increased. The resolution of these
cases, whether by pre-award settlement agreement
or through issuance and payment of an award, can
involve extremely high sums. These include costs of
the arbitration proceedings (legal fees, expert fees,
arbitrator fees, institutional fees, and other arbitration
costs) and damages.
In addition to direct costs that IIAs and ISDS claims
can impose on states through claims and awards,
other indirect costs can also pose challenges. For
example, states may suffer reputational damage
as a safe destination for foreign investment from
the mere filing of an ISDS claim.6 In addition, states
are increasingly aware of the value and necessity of
keeping abreast of developments in investment law,
participating as non-disputing state parties in claims
involving a state’s treaties, and entering into joint
interpretations regarding, or unilaterally clarifying,
their treaty language and intent. These efforts create a
resource burden for states, and in some cases remain
insufficient to ensure that development of investment
treaty law and practice align with states’ investment
policy and legal preferences and intentions.
Efforts to better align IIAs with broader investment
policy objectives are occurring in various fora and are
based on uni-, bi-, pluri-, and multilateral efforts. For
example, states have developed and are negotiating
new model agreements, have entered into joint
interpretations to clarify existing treaties, and have
terminated treaties that no longer meet policy
objectives or legal obligations.
However, despite these efforts, fundamental disparities
between and among states will likely persist, many
stemming from the significant costs of the IIA regime
and ISDS mechanism.7 ISDS remains a costly endeavor,
and those costs are disproportionately felt by
developing country states and the stakeholders within
them. Developing countries are more commonly
on the receiving side of claims than developed
countries;8 and the same amount expended on
defense and/or liability awards represents a greater

share of government revenue and expenditures than
for developed country respondents in absolute terms,
on a per capita basis, and as a share of GDP.9
It is against this background that Assistance Mechanisms
to help countries that may find participation in the
IIA/ISDS system difficult have been proposed and
are currently being explored. In its 37th Session,
UNCITRAL’s Working Group III (WGIII) the potential
was raised for an advisory center to be established
as part of the various solutions that it will develop to
address concerns about ISDS, and in its most recent
38th Session WGIII discussed in greater depth the ways
in which the creation of an Assistance Mechanism may
be advanced, and tasked the UNCITRAL Secretariat
with conducting further research to assist the WGIII in
further advancing this objective.10

2.1 Identifying capacity challenges
A consistent and recurrent theme that emerged in
Scoping Study consultations with government officials,
in particular, and within all categories of interviewees
more generally, was the issue of capacity; the lack of it,
the desire for more of it, and, the potential role for an
Assistance Mechanism to assist with its development.
The lack of sufficient capacity was identified as a
particular problem in the context of actual defense
of ISDS claims – with respect to either managing the
defense in-house or managing outside counsel – but
was also a concern identified with respect to a wide
spectrum of investment-law related areas, such as
policy development, treaty negotiations, dispute
prevention, and the management of and decisions
required to be taken in the context of actual disputes.
For example, many interviewees noted that some
countries do not have a critical mass of officials who
possess sufficient technical knowledge about treaties
and disputes required for informed decision-making
with respect to treaty negotiations,11 investment
policy-making,12 or to effectively engage with and
manage outside counsel during the course of ISDS
disputes. They cite difficulties in inter-ministerial
coordination and agreement. They are unaware
of, or unable to effectively seize, opportunities to
participate as non-disputing treaty parties. Even when
a country has coherent investment policy objectives,
implementation, at international and domestic levels,
can present insurmountable hurdles.
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Figure 1 Total Government Expenditure per capita ($PPP)
Total government expenditures across all levels of government. Expenditures include intermediate consumption, compensation of employees, subsidies, property income, and social
benefits.

Source: OECD Factbook
2015-2016 https://www.
oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/
oecd-factbook-2015-2016/
general-government-expenditures-and-revenues-per-capita_factbook-2015-79-en;jsessionid=uKq6khJ2ZwN59gk9ilXYt_Xw.ip-10-240-5-23.

Several interviewees stated that “capacity” is a vague
term, and what is needed is actual knowledge transfer.
Achieving actual knowledge-transfer in the context
of legal assistance requires dedicated thought and
planning, and a nuanced understanding of the
context in which “capacity building” is intended to
occur, and what the specific needs are of the intended
beneficiaries.13 It was suggested in CCSI’s consultations
that abstract and more general technical “capacity
building” trainings may have a certain value but are
insufficient, without more, to achieve even narrow
capacity objectives.14
Particularly with respect to disputes, several
interviewees described the minimum desirable level of
required capacity on the part of government officials
engaged in investment law disputes as something
beyond a general understanding of the substance of
treaties and procedure of an arbitration. Rather, the
minimum desired level of capacity was described as
officials possessing the ability to effectively engage
with outside counsel on a technical level, and,
importantly, to have the confidence to “say no” to
such outside counsel. In other words, the ability to
take the advice of counsel to supplement an official’s
16 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT

own knowledge and ability to make informed decisions
in the interest of the state was the minimum amount of
capacity deemed to be sufficient.
The ability to internalize knowledge sufficient to make
informed decisions and effectively manage cases has
both substantive and financial implications for a state.
On the substantive side, states, as masters of their
treaties, and whose practice and opinio juris contribute
to customary international law, place a high value
on controlling interpretation and application of their
international legal obligations. On the financial side,
“the less sophisticated the local government officials,
the more work a private firm can and will bill because they
have to do everything. A sophisticated team inside the
government leaves less work to be done and less billing
to be had for outside counsel.”15 In order to effectively
manage outside counsel, government officials must fully
understand substantive and procedural elements of
disputes to ensure that the matter does not escape from
their hands, “and even then, this is not easy.”16 Even if
countries continue to rely on outside counsel and other
experts to represent them in investment law issues,
including disputes, internal capacity development
required to be able to effectively engage with and
manage outside counsel is a critical issue for states.
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However, many individuals consulted during the course
of this Scoping Study described capacity challenges
that went far beyond the technical ability to engage
with outside counsel during the course of disputes.
Thus, the question of what, exactly, is meant by
capacity in different contexts, and how such capacity
can be “built” is important to the consideration of an
Assistance Mechanism for international investment
law. While it may be that states decide that it is not
the objective nor role of an Assistance Mechanism
to address any or all capacity challenges, it is at least
a purpose of this Scoping Study to identify them for
consideration by policymakers when developing or
expanding an Assistance Mechanism.
Contributors to Pauwelyn and Wang’s 2019 edited
volume, “Building Legal Capacity for a More Inclusive
Globalization” perceive capacity in different yet
interrelated ways, each of which has implication for
the identification of capacity challenges, and for any
potential efforts to foster capacity building.17 For
example, capacity can be dichotomized into broad
or narrow categories, where narrow capacity refers to
technical expertise in a specific substantive area, and
broad capacity considers the ability of governments
to be aware of and promote their national interests
and effectively participate in an international legal
system.18 Capacity can also be temporally-categorized,
looking at short- and long-term pillars, where a shortterm need may simply and urgently be prevailing in an
ISDS dispute.19
Capacity can also be viewed through the lens
of intersecting and interdependent levels of the
professional development of individual government
officials, as well as the capacity of organizational and
institutional levels to effectively shape and manage
investment policy objectives,20 or at the inter-related
categories of international legal, political, and
economic capacity necessary to participate in a rulesbased global economy.21
The capacity necessary for a state to effectively and
efficiently participate in international, economic rulesbased systems is nuanced, context dependent, and
multidimensional. In a 2009 study assessing capacity
challenges in the trade context, Busch, Reinhart
and Shaffer found that general proxies commonly
used to categorize “capacity,” including per capita
income and GDP, were inaccurate and generally did
not correlate to a more rigorous assessment of state

capacity in the WTO context, as those proxies did not
capture or measure areas where governments actually
have capacity challenges in participating effectively in
the WTO system.22
Underscoring the unique contexts of sovereigns
participating in an international legal system, Jeremy
Sharpe has linked capacity directly to the legitimacy
of the investment law system itself. The legitimacy of
ISDS “rests in part upon states’ ability to understand
and comply with their legal obligations, effectively
defend against investor claims, and keep the law on
a sensible track. Capacity thus is an integral part of
the legitimacy and viability of international investment
arbitration.”23
Throughout this Scoping Study, concerns identified
by states, and by other interviewees, are identified,
and existing Assistance Mechanisms surveyed.
Various forms that an Assistance Mechanism in
international investment law may take are discussed.
Depending on the desires of policy-makers in this
context, any Assistance Mechanism may respond
to narrow or broader needs of beneficiaries, and
either approach may involve trade-offs, which ideally
would be assessed and understood ex ante.24 Narrow
approaches to addressing capacity challenges may
be inadequate or irrelevant to address broader
development needs in the context of investment
policy.25 At the same time, a narrow approach may fill
a gap or complement or build upon other Assistance
Mechanisms, or may more effectively respond to an
urgent and immediate need of the beneficiary. States
may decide that capacity building should be a pillar
of any Assistance Mechanism or may decide that
an Assistance Mechanism is not intended to fill or
develop all gaps in capacity, but to address limited
areas of concern and narrow capacity challenges.
The question of what is meant by capacity is thus
critically important. The identified concerns of users
of the IIA/ISDS system can be characterized in
many ways by different conceptions of capacity. A
nuanced consideration of the “capacity needs” from
the perspective of intended Assistance Mechanism
beneficiaries is thus critical to unpack and understand
because it forms the basis for identifying the problem
that any Assistance Mechanism might seek to remedy.26
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2.2 Stocktaking: Identified concerns
and existing Assistance Mechanisms
available to states in IIA-related areas
other than disputes
Various existing Assistance Mechanisms provide
legal and/or policy advice to states to support
them in areas of: investment policy-making, IIA
negotiation, implementation and management of
their IIA policies, dispute prevention, pre-dispute
management and consultations, management
of notices of intent, and management of active
disputes. Existing support available to states
at each of these phases of investment policymaking, short of management of notices of intent
and active disputes are discussed in this section,
whereas management of notices of intent and
disputes, the more formalized steps in the dispute
process, are discussed separately in the following
section. Satisfaction, criticisms, or gaps identified
by interviewees with respect to specific Assistance
Mechanisms or general topical areas are also
identified and discussed.

2.2.1 Investment policy-making
International investment law responds to, and
raises, myriad policy questions: What do states want
from international investment (inward and outward)?
What are the policy tools they can use to achieve
those objectives? What are the costs and benefits of
different policy tools, and how are those costs and
benefits distributed across stakeholders within and
across countries?
These issues are being discussed in different fora at
national and international levels. The field is busy
and multifaceted. The Financing for Development
agenda is, for instance, bringing governments, the
private sector and others together to identify ways
to increase international investment (including
FDI) in the places and with respect to activities
necessary to advance sustainable development,
and to prevent such capital movements and
interests from undermining achievement of the
Sustainable Development Goals;27 there are
structured discussions on investment facilitation
taking place at the WTO; there are national,
regional, and international policy-assessment
and -making initiatives on investment screening,
18 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT

with governments and other stakeholders examining
and updating policies on whether and how to review
inward and outward flows of capital; there are domestic
reviews of IIA policies and practices, including efforts by
legislatures/parliamentarians and others to investigate
the aims and performance of those treaties; and there
are corresponding discussions on IIA policy and reform
taking place at United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL),
and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), albeit with varying levels of
formality, breadth, and inclusivity. With respect to policyformulation, as discussed below, these international
organizations’ mandates are broad and there is high
potential for any additional Assistance Mechanism to
duplicate efforts or create other tensions with existing
mandates.
It is important to recognize the multidimensional aspects
of and interlinkages among these fora and issues, and
the difficulties government officials and other actors
may consequently encounter both in staying abreast of
the developments that do or may affect them, and in
ensuring policy coherence across relevant issue areas.
The complications are substantive as well as logistical.
Relevant discussions are taking place across issue areas
and fora, meaning that they are not being exclusively
handled by officials in government capitals, or permanent
delegations sitting in one place, such as New York or
Geneva. Governments with limited resources to staff
investment policy teams and to travel to conferences,
meetings, and negotiations may struggle to follow and
engage in the relevant dialogues and processes, much
less find the time and resources to proactively develop
positions with other government officials, agencies, and
stakeholders at home, and then articulate and advance
(or defend) their country’s interests, concerns and
priorities at the international level.
The resources, knowledge, and skills required for
these policy formulation and articulation activities are
essential ingredients for the other activities discussed
throughout this Scoping Study including IIA negotiation
and ISDS defense. While there are various initiatives
to support countries in these activities – reviewing,
assessing, and developing investment policies – there
are limitations and gaps. Content, for instance, may fail
to reflect the diversity of perspectives on investment
policy, options for policy-makers, or implications for
different issues and actors. Additionally, support may
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target some actors within government (e.g., treaty
negotiators), but not reach others (e.g., civil society,
parliamentarians, state and local officials, officials
responsible for other relevant areas of domestic law
and policy) with a stake in the content of investment
(and IIA) policy, and whose understanding, buy-in,
and acceptance of policy decisions may be crucial
for ultimate policy effectiveness. Moreover, even if
legal or other financial assistance is available, some
governments have turned down offers of policymaking support because of perceived conflicts of
interests on the part of the service provider (i.e. that
the advice would not necessarily be in the state’s best
interest) or divergences in ideology between the state
and service provider as to the role that investment
policy-making should play in advancing the state’s
development objectives.28
Some of the gaps in resources, knowledge and skills are
partially filled by materials that academics and others
have produced. Research and writing on investment
law and policy has ballooned over roughly the last 15
years in particular. But much of that remains behind
paywalls,29 and much is produced only in English.
Non-English-language sources are also infrequently
translated, making it difficult to share resources,
knowledge, and insights across language barriers.
The subsection below profiles the major existing
investment policy-making initiatives and publicly
available resources identified through this Scoping
Study that are most relevant to IIAs and ISDS.

2.2.1.1 Existing investment policy-making
initiatives
2.2.1.1.1 UNCTAD
UNCTAD is an intergovernmental organization with
key mandates related to investment policy-making.
For example, the UN Financing for Development
Conference has requested UNCTAD to continue its
program of meetings and consultations with Member
States related to investment agreements, and the
UNCTAD 14 Conference (July 2016) mandated
UNCTAD to develop and promote a new generation
of investment promotion and facilitation strategies,
institutions, and best-practice policies to align
investment with inclusive and sustainable development
objectives.30

UNCTAD’s work is based on three activity pillars:
research and analysis, international consensus building,
and technical assistance and advisory services. These
services are discussed in greater depth here and in
other sections of this Scoping Study.
UNCTAD has comprehensive resources available to
all states with respect to investment law policymaking.
UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Framework for
Sustainable Development, launched in 2012 provides
guidance for investment law policymakers moving
toward a new generation of international investment
agreements.31
The Investment Policy Framework consists of Core
Principles that frame three different action menus
focused on: national investment policies, international
investment agreements, and investment promotion
for sustainable development.32 These Core Principles
set forth a set of “design criteria” that can assist
states in integrating investment policy into overall
sustainable development strategies.33 The National
Investment Policy Guidelines then translate the Core
Principles into concrete guidelines applicable at the
national level in order to ensure that investment policy
is coherently integrated into other policy areas.34
Finally, the Policy Options for IIAs translate the Core
Principles into concrete options for those international
instruments.35
Based on the Investment Policy Framework, UNCTAD
provides on-demand reviews of a country’s model
investment treaties and IIA network. Since 2012,
seventy-five countries and regional economic
organizations have benefitted from such reviews.36
UNCTAD has also provided comments or inputs into
the development of regional investment treaties, such
as the African Continental Free Trade Agreement’s
investment protocol and the Common Market for
Eastern and Southern Africa Investment Area.
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UNCTAD also has an Investment Policy Review (IPR)
program that provides developing countries and
countries with economies in transition concrete
recommendations to improve policies, strategies
and institutions for attracting and benefiting from
FDI.37 The IPR process is country-specific and
involves:
1. The review of the policy, regulatory and
institutional environment for investment;
2. The identification of strategic investment
priorities consistent with the SDGs and in line
with national development objectives; and
3. A set of concrete recommendations.38
UNCTAD offers follow-up support with respect to
implementing its recommendations.39 In the past 20
years, UNCTAD has conducted IPRs in more than
fifty countries.40
UNCTAD also supports policy engagement,
dialogue, and knowledge sharing at its World
Investment Forum, conferences, and other
intergovernmental meetings,41 as well as in trainings
it organizes and attends. As part of its technical
assistance activities, UNCTAD has built on its policy
research and analysis and has trained approximately
500 government officials on key IIA and ISDS issues
(mostly as a part of regional training courses).
UNCTAD makes publicly available a wealth of
information on international investment law,
including UNCTAD’s own work and analysis as
well as publicly available investment laws, treaties,
awards, and other related materials, through its
Investment Policy Hub, which is described further in
Section 4.2.1.42
Key to UNCTAD’s success is its unique ability to
reinforce its work through its three interdependent
pillars of research and analysis, technical assistance,
and
intergovernmental
consensus
building.
Through expert meetings, workshops and regional
conferences (all with capacity building elements),
training materials, advisory services, and providing
access to databases, best-practices, and online
fora (e.g. blogs) UNCTAD has been successful in
improving the institutional capacity of beneficiary
countries, technical capacity of officials, and in
raising the role that international investment can take
in pursuit of the SDGs.43 Beneficiaries of UNCTAD’s
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support report high satisfaction rates, but acknowledge
that for ensuring the sustainability of project activities,
challenges lie in the level of institutional capacity, which is
largely the responsibility of national governments.44 The
sustainability of UNCTAD’s project results is impacted
by the institutional capacity of the applicable country.45
Country beneficiaries of UNCTAD’s support have stated
satisfaction with the UNCTAD policy-option menu
and for the comprehensive guidance on investment
policymaking for sustainable development.46

2.2.1.1.2 OECD
Under the direction of its Investment Committee,
the OECD advances investment policy reform and
international co-operation in a number of ways with
the unifying aim of improving the contribution of
international investment to growth and sustainable
development worldwide.
The OECD’s Policy Framework for Investment (PFI) forms
the basis for national Investment Policy Reviews (IPRs).47
IPRs reflect the OECD’s mission to help governments
enhance their investment climate through peer learning
and sharing best practices. Some IPRs are undertaken as
a part of the adherence process to the OECD Declaration
on International Investment and Multinational
Enterprises.48 In other cases, non-member countries,
including major emerging economies, undertake IPRs to
benchmark their investment policy against OECD best
practices. While it is possible for a country to undertake
its own self-assessment based on the PFI, in practice the
assessment is typically conducted by an inter-ministerial
task force in coordination with the OECD.49 Completed
IPRs involving around fifty countries are available on
the OECD’s website.50 The OECD’s IPR unit is currently
working on IPR projects with Egypt, Myanmar, Thailand,
Indonesia, Georgia, Morocco, Uruguay and Bulgaria.
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The OECD’s PFI looks at twelve different domestic
policy areas that have a particular impact on
investment (including with respect to investment
treaties): investment policy, investment promotion and
facilitation, competition, trade, taxation, corporate
governance, finance, infrastructure, developing human
resources, policies to promote responsible business
conduct, investment in support of green growth,
and public governance.51 The PFI is structured as a
checklist setting out key elements in each policy area
permitting policy strands to be considered together in
order to ensure policy coherence.52
The PFI has been used for capacity building and
private sector development strategies by bilateral and
multilateral donors.53 It has also been used as a basis for
dialogue at a regional level for countries in the Middle
East and North Africa (MENA) region, Southeast
Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean.54 OECD
regional programs on investment involve strategic
partnerships between OECD-member and nonmember governments to share knowledge, expertise
and good practices with the aim of contributing to the
development of inclusive, sustainable and competitive
economies across the regions involved.55
The OECD Investment Committee also hosts
the Freedom of Investment (FOI) Roundtable, an
intergovernmental forum that brings together sixtytwo economies from around the world together with
representatives from the private sector, civil society
and other stakeholders, to support countries’ efforts
to maintain and extend open, transparent and nondiscriminatory policy frameworks for international
investment. Through analysis and regular multilateral
dialogue, the Roundtable promotes the sharing
of experiences with investment policy design and
implementation. It also helps countries to address
policy concerns that international investment may
raise. Policy monitoring by Roundtable participants
promotes observance of countries’ international
investment policy commitments, including those
taken under the OECD investment instruments and
in the context of the G20. The OECD Secretariat
also produces extensive, technical research support
and analysis for the FOI Roundtable – primarily on
investment treaties and investment policies related to
national security – which is made publicly-available
on a dedicated webpage together with summaries
of discussion from meetings of the FOI Roundtable.56
Recent FOI Roundtable discussions have focused on

the balance of investor protection and governments’
right to regulate in investment treaties; arbitrators,
adjudicators and appointing authorities; and the
societal benefits and costs of investment treaties.
The OECD’s Investment Committee and its subsidiary
bodies also provide fora for policy dialogue and
analysis on a wide range of other topics related to
investment policy, including responsible business
conduct, green finance, investment promotion and
facilitation, linkages between trade and investment,
infrastructure investment, MNE divestment decisions,
sustainable development indicators, and FDI statistics.
The OECD Secretariat publishes all of its analytical
work on investment policy on a dedicated webpage.57

2.2.1.1.3 World Bank Group
The World Bank Group’s (WBG) Investment Policy
& Promotion Team (part of the Investment Climate
Practice Group under the Trade and Competitiveness
Global Practice), supports client countries in attracting,
facilitating, and retaining different types of FDI, as well
as maximizing positive spillover effects.58 The WBG
provides direct technical assistance to governments
in developing an FDI strategy and reform map,
improving the effectiveness of policies and efforts
aimed at attracting and facilitating FDI, promoting
good practices and improving the effectiveness of
investment incentives, and promoting a legal and
regulatory environment that reduces investment
risk, including by focusing on reducing investor risk
through IIAs and national investment laws.59 The
World Bank also helps countries to establish dispute
prevention policies and practices (discussed further in
Section 2.3.3).60
The WBG’s work on investment law forms a part of
its broader approach of “Maximizing Finance for
Development.”61 Pursuant to this initiative, WBG
institutions including the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development,62 the International
Development Association,63 the International Finance
Corporation,64 and the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency,65 work in concert to achieve the
development objectives by improving the investment
enabling environment, developing regulatory
conditions, building domestic capacity, putting in
place standards related to investment, financing initial
investments (a first mover or innovator), and reducing
risk.66 This represents a shift toward a much more
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coordinated approach to the public and private
sides of development, using four WBG institutions
to consider a broader spectrum of solutions,
consider public and private opportunities and risks,
and facilitate financing opportunities.67

2.2.1.1.4 Ad hoc Investment law trainings,
workshops, and dialogues
While a multitude of trainings on investment
law aimed at boosting technical knowledge and
understanding are available to government officials,
several of these trainings focus more specifically
on investment law policymaking. Initiatives in this
category include (among others):
•
•

•
•
•

International Institute for Sustainable
Development (IISD) Annual Forum of
Investment Negotiators68
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
(CCSI) Executive Training on Investment
Treaties and Arbitration for Government
Officials69
Trainings held around and focused on specific
treaty or policy negotiations
UNCTAD’s various training workshops and
other events focused on technical knowledge
(see Section 4.2.1)
OECD events, including Freedom of Investment
(FOI) Roundtables, annual conferences on
investment treaties and investment policies
related to national security, Investment Treaty
Dialogues and other events.70

2.2.1.1.5 Other ad hoc technical assistance
Some technical ad hoc investment policy-making
assistance provided directly or indirectly by several
non-profit organizations is available to states at a
no or low-cost basis. Certain organizations, such as
the International Development Law Organization’s
Investment Support Program for Least Developed
Countries71 (described further in Section 4.2.3), and
TradeLab72 (described further in Section 4.6.2) are
available to address discrete or general policy issues
or questions upon request by states or other parties
or stakeholders by matching appropriate support
providers with the requesting beneficiary. Other nonprofit and/or academic organizations, such as CCSI
and IISD, among others, provide this kind of specific
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technical assistance directly to requesting governments.
Unless a government is able to finance the time and
expense of the non-profit service providers, these
organizations require a sufficient level of outside grant
funding. Even if the services provided are limited to
matching governments with law firms or other service
providers, funding is needed for staff and overhead
necessary to perform those tasks.

2.2.2. IIA negotiation
Activities related to formulation of investment law
and policy are a broad category and overlap with IIA
negotiation activities. But negotiation activities represent
a discrete subset imposing particular and often timesensitive demands on governments. Negotiation needs
often involve translating policy objectives into specific
language or reacting to specific language proposed
by a negotiating counterparty. Adequate internal
government policies and procedures must be in place
to ensure a coherent and effective approach to these
activities.
Desk research and consultations conducted for this
Scoping Study demonstrate that “capacity” in the
context of treaty negotiation is multifaceted and hints at
both gaps in ability to identify and articulate concerns,
organizational hurdles to doing so, and systemic
obstacles to overcome to ensure policy priorities are
reflected in treaty outcomes.
While narrow, in-house technical capacity is deemed
insufficient to address all of these issues, it is nonetheless
considered to be an important objective. A certain level
of in-house capacity was deemed important because
it was recognized by interviewees that in many cases
negotiation assistance is not neutral assistance, but
rather comes from the perspective of the assisting party
(and its interests) and not necessarily the interests of the
negotiating state. Treaty negotiation support offered
by private sector law firms was specifically identified as
cause for hesitation, although international organizations
were also highlighted as having their own mandate that
does not necessarily mirror the interests of the state.
One interviewee who was involved in establishing an
existing Assistance Mechanism stated bluntly “I will
say this: firms are terrible at giving advice on treaties.
Generally speaking, they are private litigants and that is
a really big risk you run.”73 Another noted an automatic
tendency of both private-sector as well as international
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organization advisors to include standard arbitration
provisions in treaties without considering the state’s
broader investment policy interests or priorities.74
Government officials interviewed for this Scoping
Study who noted these issues stated that it was one
distinct cause of concern when support is offered (or
provided) that is not (or not perceived as) “neutral”
or in the state’s interest, but that the mere availability
of this kind of support can also cause separate but
related concerns. It was stated that an official making
the decision to turn down outside assistance (for this
or other reasons) must then be personally accountable
domestically for that decision, and all of its implications,
and “many officials will not take that risk” and will
accept assistance offered even if it is not perceived
to be in the state’s best interest.75 These dynamics are
important when considering where and from whom
external assistance is offered, and it is thus important
that potential users of an Assistance Mechanism
manage decision-making over the structuring and
placement of an Assistance Mechanism.76
However, it was stressed that even when advisors may
have conflicts of interest, it cannot be assumed that
the advice given will not be in the state’s interest,
and more importantly, in many negotiations highly
technical and skilled legal and/or policy advisors can
be extremely valuable to the state and its decisionmaking process. Therefore, at a basic level, it was
expressed in consultations there must be a minimum
level of technical capacity within the government to
be able to evaluate the advice and determine whether
it is in the interest of the state, and accept, reject, and/
or use it accordingly.77
Some existing Assistance Mechanism models
specifically focus on treaty negotiation support for
government officials. These initiatives (which, as
discussed below, are only available to a limited extent in
the investment treaty context) include timely assistance
to negotiators with legal and policy questions about
issues under negotiation; and supporting negotiators’
travel to and attendance at negotiations.

Other initiatives that in some cases extend support
beyond treaty negotiators are also viewed as important
for helping ensure that negotiators (and other officials)
are able to effectively identify, and make the case to
negotiating counterparties, what the country’s needs
and priorities are, what is, and is not, negotiable,
and what needs to be specially addressed through
non-conforming measures provisions, annexes, and
exceptions.
While at least one high-income government official
interviewed felt that existing Assistance Mechanisms
provide sufficient investment law negotiation support
for developing countries,78 this sentiment was not
echoed among low and middle-income government
officials. For example, one official from a lower middleincome economy that does not have well-developed
and consistent approach to investment policy,
and which has not developed a model investment
agreement, stated that the country’s negotiators
“accept most of what the negotiation counterparty
brings to the table.”79 One interviewee noted “copy
and pasted sections” from one treaty to another.80 One
interviewee with experience working at an arbitration
center, noting that treaty negotiation support can
greatly impact ISDS dispute outcomes, commented
on certain very poorly drafted treaties that have and
can lead to confusion among policy-makers and can
exacerbate issues surrounding disputes.81
Relevant IIA-negotiation-related activities for an
Assistance Mechanism may include support for
analysis of potential social, environmental, and
economic impacts of particular agreements under
negotiation; and support for intra-governmental and
multi-stakeholder consultation and engagement
on negotiating objectives and priorities (which
can also be crucial for subsequent ratification and
implementation of agreed texts). For example, one
upper middle-income government official said that
its country’s negotiators struggle with finding the
adequate balance of protection of foreign investors
and ensuring that local companies retain comparable
rights, because it is difficult to anticipate, and analyze,
treaty impacts on domestic SMEs.82
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Similarly, in addition to understanding and
communicating the country’s needs and priorities
at the required level of detail during the course of
negotiations, it may be important for negotiators
to have support in development of negotiation
strategies and tactics and forming alliances.
Performing well in all of these areas may be difficult
for many states. One reason may be that treaty
negotiation is not necessarily the primary focus of
certain officials’ jobs, or they transition between
subject areas and are unable to gain sufficient
expertise in the specifics of investment law.83
Another is that ultimate decision-makers may agree
to or sign an agreement containing provisions with
which treaty negotiators disagree or do not support,
particularly when a political decision has been taken
to sign a particular IIA.84

low or middle income countries may be able to maintain
stronger adherence to their own models, or certain
elements within their models, many low and middle
income economies are not similarly situated. Evidence
of this effect may be gleaned from the continued
dominance of developed-country treaty models, which
tend to incorporate developing country interests only
when the developed country revises its own model in
a host-friendly way.90 To the extent resources exist to
help developing countries identify and articulate their
interests, these resources may be insufficient to address
these systemic hurdles.91 Moreover the inability of
developing countries to achieve successful negotiation
of their models has systemic effects as it perpetuates the
pervasive fragmentation and patchwork of obligations
that characterize developing country treaties and may
make compliance more difficult.92

Broader structural concerns were also identified
during interviews. For example, one official from
a lower middle-income state felt that technical
capacity at the negotiating table can be critical
in negotiations and lead to successes in certain
discrete areas.85 However, in instances in which the
negotiating power of the parties is significantly
disproportionate (e.g. negotiations between
primarily capital exporting/importing states), this
and several other government officials agreed that
regardless of technical negotiating capacity on the
part of specific officials, at the end of the day, politics
and power-dynamics will prevail.86 Higher income
economies may simply be unwilling to move from
a certain position, even with respect to issues the
lower-income economy has identified as a particular
concern, and even when that country is negotiating
from a technically skilled capacity.87 While all countries
likely have certain non-negotiable positions, there
was concern among some interviewees that some
states become particularly rigid when broader
power (im)balances are factored in.

An example of these issues is potentially reflected in
the variation in how different countries are identifying,
articulating, and protecting existing and future nonconforming measures in their treaties, with developed
countries in a number of treaties carving out more from
these types of treaty obligations than their developing
country counterparties. Table 1 shows outcomes from
the bilateral investment treaties that Canada has signed
with countries over roughly the past five years (from
1 January 2014 - 1 January 2019). Table 1 indicates
the number of reservations that Canada and its treaty
parties each included in their respective annexes to
shield certain sectors and policy areas from restrictions
on pre- and post-establishment national treatment
obligations, restrictions on performance requirements,
and/or restrictions on requirements relating to boards of
directors, senior management, and entry of personnel.
These disparate practices may be due to any of a number
of factors, including disparities in negotiating parties’
respective mandates from other domestic actors;
abilities to identify the issues and sectors for which it is
useful to retain policy space; understanding of whether/
when a carve-out is necessary to retain that policy space;
and/or other capacity to achieve a successful negotiated
outcome.

Looking broader still, VanDuzer has identified
systemic barriers that may prevent developing
countries from adopting new and better approaches
to IIAs that go well beyond the negotiating table.88
Noting that unlike in trade negotiations, where there
may be a more balanced give and take because
developed countries also need to compromise, the
objective of a developed country in an IIA negotiation
may be much simpler – maintain a model as close to
the developed country’s as possible.89 While certain
24 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT

This example also demonstrates that the texts of treaties
themselves may impose asymmetrical obligations,
which has implications for: the costs and benefits that
each treaty party will experience from the treaty, the
nature and flow of costs and benefits that accrue to each
treaty party from the concluded agreements, and treaty
parties’ exposure to and ability to manage exposure
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to ISDS cases.93 However, even in instances where
the language of a treaty formally imposes identical
obligations on each treaty party, the (nearly or
completely) unidirectional flow of investment between
the parties may mean that the commitments are not of
equal practical significance for the states.94
The challenges in closing power and capacity gaps
in the negotiation context is likely exacerbated by
the relatively decentralized nature of international
investment law. In contrast to other negotiations, such
as negotiations under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, and under the World
Trade Organization, there is no central hub of activity
or Secretariat. Instead, separate bilateral, plurilateral,
and multilateral (e.g., the Energy Charter Treaty and
other negotiations between overlapping states)
negotiations on IIAs, which may be stand-alone
agreements or chapters in larger trade agreements,

can proceed in parallel. Without attention to this
aspect of investment law it may be difficult for an
Assistance Mechanism to help states close capacity
gaps related to negotiations. The decentralized
nature of investment law also makes it challenging
to document and map the existing support providers
and efforts directed at supporting investment treaty
negotiation in particular.
Section 2.2.2.1 below offers some examples of relevant
initiatives pertaining to investment treaty negotiation.
The text boxes also provide some illustrations of
support for negotiators in other processes that could
be useful to consider in the context of IIA negotiations
(Box 1, Box 2, Box 3). Then, Section 4.2.1 provides
more detailed information on another institution, the
Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL), that provides
negotiation support in the WTO context.

Table 1 Reservations Protecting Non-Conforming Measures in Sectors & Policy Areas
Canada – reservations for
existing and future nonconforming measures
in specified sectors and
policy areas

Negotiating party –
reservations for existing
and future non-conforming
measures in specified
sectors and policy areas

Canada - 9

Moldova - 1

12 June 2018

Canada – 9

Mongolia – 6

8 September 2016

Canada – 9

Hong Kong, China SAR - 4

10 February 2016

Canada – 9

Guinea – 0

27 May 2015

Canada – 9

Benin – 4

12 May 2014

Canada - 9

Burkina Faso - 8

20 April 2015

Canada - 9

Côte ‘d’Ivoire – 5

30 November 2014

Canada - 9

Mali - 4

28 November 2014

Canada – 9

Senegal – 0

27 November 2014

Canada - 9

Serbia - 4

1 September 2014

Canada - 9

Nigeria – 7

6 May 2014

Canada – 9

Cameroon - 7

3 March 2014

Date of signature
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2.2.2.1 Existing and past investment law
treaty negotiation initiatives
Several existing and past initiatives provide or
have provided technical support surrounding
negotiations, whereas others provide or have
provided financial support to allow negotiators to
travel to relevant conferences and negotiations.
One lower middle-income government official said
that in accepting financial support, particularly in
the context of negotiations, conflicts of interest can
easily arise, and that as a government it is important
to accept that you cannot attend without the
assistance, but remain intellectually divorced from
the support provider and ensure that negotiations
proceed with only the best interests of the state in
mind.95

2.2.2.1.1 UNCTAD facilitation rounds
In the late 1990s through mid-2000s, UNCTAD organized
“facilitation rounds” to support negotiation of IIAs.96
These facilitation rounds brought country officials
together to sign agreements. UNCTAD promoted
the process by bearing the costs of travel, full board,
and lodging for developing country officials as well
as organizing the necessary facilities and substantive
support. The process began in 1999, when UNCTAD
organized a negotiation round after G-15 governments
had encouraged UNCTAD to help them conclude BITs
to ‘further promote economic cooperation and FDI’.
The round was sponsored by the Swiss government and
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
Since around 2012, with the launch of UNCTAD’s
Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable
Development, UNCTAD has focused its research,
policy analysis, and technical assistance on activities
that make the IIA regime more sustainable and
development friendly. While providing policy options
for treaty elements, UNCTAD draws attention to the
strategic decisions policy-makers need to make when
designing a “new generation” of investment policies,
such as embedding investment policies into national
development strategies, considering the pros and cons
of signing IIAs, and options for terminating treaties that
are no longer serving development objectives.
UNCTAD provides technical assistance in the form of
model treaty and IIA reviews for states as well as for
regional economic integration organizations.97
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Box 1 Government-funded, think-tank/civil
society/academically delivered, support for
climate negotiators

Box 3 CONNEX Support Unit – government
funded, government/private-sector supported,
support on investor-state contract negotiations

The European Capacity Building Initiative (ecbi), launched
in 2005, aims to support the UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations by building
and sustaining capacity among developing country
negotiators, and by fostering trust and understanding
between industrialized and developing countries.

The CONNEX Support Unit756 assists developing
countries and economies in transition in the preparation
and implementation of (re)negotiations of large-scale
investment contracts with foreign investors. It provides
requesting governments with “rapid, independent, highquality and multidisciplinary support.” CONNEX support
is meant to establish a level playing field, which results
in mutually beneficial deals and a durable Governmentinvestor relationship.

The ecbi has three main areas of work. One is a Training
and Support Programme (TSP), which is led by the
International Institute for Environment and Development.
The TSP has three main elements: “capacity building of
junior negotiators to the UNFCCC through regional and
pre-Conference of the Parties (COP) training workshops;
capacity provision to the Group of Least Developed
Countries (LDC Group); and bursaries for negotiators from
LDCs, to ensure their continued participation and capacity
development in UNFCCC processes.”
The second area of work is an annual week-long trustbuilding initiative, the Oxford Seminar & Fellows
Colloquium. The first half of the week brings senior
developing country negotiators together to discuss
controversial and timely issues in preparation for annual
COP negotiations. During the second half of the week,
European negotiators join for the Oxford Seminar, where
all officials have the opportunity to exchange views on key
negotiation topics in an informal setting.
The third area of work is a Publications and Policy Analysis
Unit (PPAU), which produces papers aimed to be “relevant
to ongoing negotiations under the UNFCCC, timely, and
trustworthy.” PPAU collaborates with developing country
officials to identify relevant topics and to produce the
publications. PPAU also produces background papers and
guides geared to help more junior negotiators become
familiar with the process and issues.754

Box 2 Government-funded, WTO administered,
support for broader LDC participation in
fisheries negotiations

The CONNEX mandate to directly support negotiations
reflects the articulated need and demand of beneficiary
countries for assistance in negotiating contracts for largescale, complex projects (such as those in the extractive
sector) to overcome existing asymmetries in access to
information, resources, and experience.
CONNEX exclusively advises governmental actors involved
in (re)negotiations. The international and regional experts
identified by the CONNEX Support Unit are bound by the
CONNEX Code of Conduct to ensure their integrity and
commit them to confidentiality.
CONNEX has a strong focus on economic development
objectives, in particular domestic revenue generation,
and further promotes social and environmental
development. It is continually monitoring and evaluating
the developmental impact of its work, to ensure the
satisfaction of the beneficiary governments.
Germany is the founding and first member of the
CONNEX Governing Board, the main governing body
of the CONNEX Support Unit. Germany also hosts the
Secretariat of the CONNEX Support Unit. The Governance
Structure is complemented by an Advisory Committee,
comprised of nine highly experienced individuals with
different backgrounds, who provide strategic advice to
the Secretariat and the Governing Board. The German
government currently funds CONNEX but additional
funding partners are expected to join soon.757

On 3 May 2019, WTO Director-General Roberto Azevêdo
announced the establishment of a new trust fund
designed to enable capital-based delegations from LDCs
to attend and participate in WTO negotiations on fisheries
subsides.755
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2.2.2.1.2 UNCITRAL Working Group III
In the context of UNCITRAL’s Working Group III on
ISDS reform, which is not a specific treaty negotiation
but may result in outcomes that substantively impact
existing and future treaties and, in particular, the
ISDS mechanism contained therein, the UNCITRAL
Trust Fund is available for certain countries for travel
and accommodation to and during Working Group
III Sessions.
Also related to the Working Group III process, CCSI,
in collaboration with the UNCITRAL Secretariat
and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) convened preparatory
sessions in the days preceding the 36th, 37th and
38th Sessions that were intended to (1) orient new
delegates to the UNCITRAL process and update
them on the previous WGIII and Commission
sessions; and (2) enable delegates to effectively
participate in the forthcoming Session.

2.2.2.1.3 Similar ad hoc support
One academic interviewed provides certain
governments with specific, on-call support during
certain ongoing negotiations. The International
Institute for Sustainable Development also offers this
kind of “hotline” support during certain negotiations.
Other service providers that respond to government
requests on a broad range of investment-related
topics, such as IISD, IDLO, TradeLab, and several
other international organizations, academic or
private sector providers may similarly be available
for ad hoc trainings, research or support with respect
to specific negotiations.

2.2.3 Domestic implementation of IIA
obligations
After an IIA is concluded, countries may encounter
challenging and resource-intensive tasks in
understanding the scope and nature of their
obligations under those agreements, and in ensuring
optimal and effective domestic implementation.
These tasks also may be becoming increasingly
demanding over time as states face a more complex
web of treaty obligations.98 For developing states,
this web can be particularly complicated due to the
fact that the substantive elements of their treaties
may be varied or inconsistent, whether due to the
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state not having a model provision, not effectively
negotiating to remain consistent with its model, or for
other reasons.99 In many cases, states may have a set
of overlapping but inconsistent obligations vis-à-vis a
single treaty-partner.
A number of state interviewees indicated interest
in further understanding and exploring policies and
practices for treaty implementation and dispute
prevention (discussed below in Sections 2.2.3 and 2.3.3).
The discussion below considers some of the issues
that arise in the context of implementation and efforts
undertaken to understand and address these issues.

2.2.3.1 Compliance with core, post-establishment
investment protection standards
Most IIAs in force contain a set of core provisions on
direct and indirect expropriation, fair and equitable
treatment (FET), post-establishment non-discrimination,
and requirements regarding free transfers of capital.
One broad strategy for minimizing or avoiding costs of
ISDS disputes is for governments to take ex ante steps to
prevent investor complaints that these treaty obligations
have been breached. Such dispute prevention activities,
however, are difficult to implement for a number of
reasons.
For one, as is widely and often stated, these standards
are usually vaguely worded, and have been subject to
varied and even conflicting interpretations. The inchoate
nature of the obligations and uncertainty regarding their
meaning in practice can make it difficult for governments
to know what conduct could trigger a claim, and what
might result in liability. Moreover, cross-ministerial
guidance or instructions to relevant officials/agencies/
branches to ensure that such persons and entities
carefully follow relevant domestic law and procedure
may be of little use, as compliance with domestic law
is generally not a defense to an international law claim.
Additionally, assuming that one could identify factors:
•
•

beyond compliance with domestic law and
within the control of government

actors

that make claims and/or liability more or less likely, the
breadth and depth of IIA coverage makes it difficult if
not impossible to actually communicate those factors
to the range of government actors whose conduct
could trigger claims. The obligations contained in
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IIAs generally govern all government actors, from
local to national levels, from low- to senior-levels,
and across all branches of government. IIAs also
can cover the conduct of other actors such as stateowned enterprises. Further, IIA obligations generally
apply in all sectors of economic activity, and to all
areas of government law and policy.100 High levels
of bureaucratic and organizational capacity may be
required to effectively implement cross-ministerial
and cross-jurisdictional investment law sensitivity,
a challenging task even in high-income economies
with highly rated bureaucratic processes.101 Further,
ad hoc training of specific officials may be ineffective
or inefficient in contexts in which turnover of officials
is high and institutions are not able to capture and
internalize learning over time.
In light of these factors the task of communicating
IIA-compliance lessons across any given state may be
daunting and extremely costly. This is likely especially
difficult for decentralized states where local and state/
provincial jurisdictions have relatively significant
governance authority. And given the challenges in
stating with adequate precision what investment law
requires, such nationwide training and awareness
raising may not even provide domestic actors sufficient
guidance to avoid triggering claims.102
Moreover, even if dispute prevention policies and
practices resulted in no formal ISDS claims, that does
not necessarily mean that they should be judged a
success. When claims arise out of the decisions of
domestic courts, advance guidance may, in certain
circumstances, raise greater concerns about judicial
independence. Similarly, it is important to ensure that
any IIA-compliance and awareness raising activities do
not cause government actors to be unduly cautious
toward or solicitous of private sector interests and
demands due to fears that an otherwise lawful action
may trigger a claim from a covered foreign investor
somewhere in the corporate chain of an affected
investment.103 Cautionary education regarding IIAmandates may exacerbate incidences of undue
regulatory chill, and could distort government policy
and practice in favor of certain economic interests to
the detriment of other economic and non-economic
interests.104 Thus, care must be taken not only to ensure
that dispute prevention policies and practices warrant
the resources they use, but also that they send the
“appropriate” messages – a term that may be difficult
to define – regarding the constraints imposed by IIAs.

There is a growing body of research looking at
these issues, such as the depth and impact of IIAinternalization in different jurisdictions.105 There are
also opportunities to learn from prior and existing
initiatives to support states in understanding and
implementing their IIA obligations.

2.2.3.2 Compliance with liberalization
provisions and other elements of modern IIAs
Modern investment treaties often contain obligations
not found in older-generation treaties. Liberalization
commitments, including commitments on preestablishment national and most-favored nation
treatment, and restrictions on performance
requirements, are increasingly common. These types
of provisions raise somewhat distinct challenges for
implementation from those “core” obligations noted
above.
Various questions arise regarding the meaning and
practical implications of these newer provisions.106
Liberalization commitments adopted in a treaty
may have immediate effects on and consequences
for a range of policy areas including government
procurement, government incentives schemes, socioeconomic development programs, land ownership
rules, and public benefit schemes.107 Treaty parties
and their domestic constituents must understand
what compliance with these obligations means,
and what policy space remains due to negotiated
flexibilities, exceptions, and carve-outs. Government
officials interviewed for this scoping study noted a
lack of capacity in coordinating across ministries and
beyond, and a lack of ex ante analysis, understanding
and internalization of impacts of these kinds of IIA
provisions.
States also identified intra-state organizational
capacity challenges that prevent them from effectively
advancing a coherent policy on specific elements
of IIAs, noting, for example, that treaty negotiators
and officials managing disputes do not effectively
communicate and learn from one another, thus
minimizing even the ability of the state to effectively
internalize and implement its own experience and
learning.108
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2.2.3.3 Existing initiatives
Many of the initiatives discussed under Section
2.2.1 (Investment policy-making and 4.7.5 (Efforts
to democratize the law) are also relevant to these
issues of internal implementation. Some additional
relevant work is noted below.

2.2.3.3.1 UNCTAD – Work on Treaty
Implementation and Dispute Prevention
UNCTAD has worked with governments and other
stakeholders relating to treaty implementation
and associated dispute prevention policies and
practices.109 It has researched and documented
government initiatives, facilitated the sharing
of experiences and exchange of knowledge,
and deepened understanding of challenges
and opportunities for governments seeking to
understand and internalize treaty obligations.
More broadly, its “pink series” on particular treaty
provisions, and other publications on ISDS outcomes
have contributed to helping states understand the
practical implications of IIA obligations.110
UNCTAD’s annual review of ISDS decisions
summarizes tribunals’ (at times inconsistent findings
on core issues in international investment agreement
provisions (e.g. on legitimate expectations under the
fair and equitable treatment standard, or reliance on
the most-favored nations clause to expand tribunals’
jurisdiction).111

2.2.3.3.2 Ad Hoc initiatives
Certain Assistance Mechanisms, such as TradeLab,
provide tailored research to respond to specific
questions and circumstances of requesting
governments and other parties.112 Analysis on
specific topics is typically context specific and
nuanced with respect to any state, and indeed, subsections and demographics within states. Analysis
conducted by TradeLab involves economic, legal,
and other expertise.
Other relevant work includes a 2019 Handbook
on Obligations in International Investment
Treaties, produced for the Australian Government
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, written by
Jansen Calamita and published by the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC.
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2.2.4 Ongoing engagement and treaty
management
When states conclude IIAs, that is not the end of their
law- or policy-making work, or their engagement with
treaty parties and domestic constituents on the contents
and implications of the agreements. Rather, there is
much that can and should go on post-signature and
ratification.
Crucially, states have a continuing role as “masters of
their treaties” to guide interpretation of their IIAs. The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) makes
clear that states’ post-treaty-conclusion activities have an
important role to play in continuing to clarify and shape
the meaning of those international agreements. The VCLT
expressly directs tribunals to take into account states’
subsequent practice and agreement in interpretation
and application of treaty texts;113 and there is much that
states can do, even unilaterally, to evidence their practice
and seek to establish and demonstrate agreement. This
includes ensuring consistency and coherence in their
own pleadings; following disputes their investors file
and submitting non-disputing party briefs;114 reacting
to tribunal decisions;115 intervening in annulment or setaside proceedings; and issuing interpretations clarifying
their understandings of treaty provisions.116 The treaty
parties can also take joint action to more clearly formulate
relevant agreements on interpretive questions.117 Some
treaties contain provisions specifying that treaty parties’
joint interpretations of treaty provisions – which may be
crafted in committees established by the relevant treaty
-- are binding on tribunals.118
To date, these tasks of ongoing treaty monitoring,
engagement, and clarification do not appear to be widely
performed. This may be because the potential value and
impact of such actions under the VCLT or specific treaty
provisions is not widely known; the bodies negotiating
the treaties are not closely following the disputes and
how the treaties are being interpreted and applied;
the lack of awareness, due to gaps in transparency, of
when treaties are being invoked by an investor; and/
or a lack of state resources available to follow disputes
and decisions, and to give these issues the dedicated
and consistent attention they require. Sharpe has stated
that:
For many States, the various mechanisms for
controlling the development of arbitral precedent
may be more theoretical than real. Many States lack
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Trade Agreements, establish institutional mechanisms
for treaty parties to engage in state-to-state dialogues
assessing the implementation and implications of the
agreements, tracking progress on agreed areas of
cooperation, performing ongoing tasks, identifying
future areas of cooperation and negotiation, and
resolving issues that have arisen.120 Maximizing
the opportunities presented by these institutional
structures will require dedicated resources and
attention.

a dedicated government official with the required
knowledge, authority and resources to monitor
investment disputes and intervene as a nondisputing party or incorporate the latest arbitral
case law into the State’s newest international
investment agreements. Such States often turn
individual disputes over to outside counsel,
who themselves may not fully understand the
mechanisms available to States to shape the
development of international investment law or
who may lack insight into the State’s other cases
and treaty negotiations. Through unawareness
or incapacity, States may unwittingly forfeit their
ability to proactively shape arbitral precedent.119

A third dimension relates to operational- and
implementation-related tasks required or expected
of individual treaty parties. For instance, some
treaties call for states to conduct consultations
with, or establish advisory groups of, stakeholders
to advise on and support treaty implementation;121
some treaties also anticipate ongoing evaluation of
the agreements’ effects on sustainable development
within the country.122 Creating and effectively using
these stakeholder engagement systems, as well as
designing and implementing meaningful assessments
of treaty impacts, are complex initiatives that can

Mechanisms
focused
on
treaty
Assistance
implementation could, therefore, play a role in
supporting these types of activities and capacity within
governments.
A second aspect of these “living treaty” tasks arises
from the fact that a number of IIAs, particularly newer
agreements and those that are part of broader Free
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benefit from peer learning, technical assistance, and
financial support.
These three types of post-signature IIA activities are
not an exclusive list of the ways in which international
law and specific IIA provisions provide space for,
encourage, or even require ongoing engagement
within domestic fora and between or among treaty
parties regarding concluded treaties. The catalogue
of relevant activities and initiatives likely stretches
much longer. Nevertheless, it is an area that does
not seem to have received much attention to date
in international investment law but could have
significant implications for the practical content and
effects of treaty obligations, implementation of treaty
commitments, effectiveness of treaty institutions,
and exposure to and resolution of disputes.

2.2.4.1 Existing initiatives
The OECD has analyzed and published papers on
state control over treaty interpretation;123 and CCSI
has also organized informal meetings on the topic
among government officials. Research conducted
for this Scoping Study did not, however, identify
other initiatives focused on supporting ongoing
engagement and treaty management as a general
matter.124

2.3 Stocktaking: Challenges in
managing ISDS proceedings, and
existing mechanisms to overcome
those challenges
To date, approximately 1000 investment disputes
have been filed against nearly 120 respondent
states.125 Some states have faced dozens of claims.
Other states have faced few or no claims in the
decades since they first signed an investment treaty.
However, publicly available statistics on claims do
not necessarily reflect all claims that have been
pursued and decided. Nor do they reflect those in
which an investor submitted a notice of intent or
notice of arbitration, but the matter was settled early
and/or non-publicly. Thus, they underrepresent the
extent to which individual states are facing ISDSrelated challenges. This section highlights key
challenges in the defense of ISDS cases highlighted
in literature and interviews, and some of the existing
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initiatives and resources to help address them. It groups
these issues into the categories of: (1) case staffing; (2)
anticipating, and potentially resolving, ISDS cases at an
early phase; (3) appointing arbitrators; (4) dealing with
uncertainty and ambiguity; (5) working with experts; and
(6) engaging in discovery of and managing information.
As discussed below, these issues have implications for
costs and outcomes. Some are, or have been, targets
of support initiatives, and some could potentially be
addressed through reform discussions. All could also
be considered in connection with development of any
future Assistance Mechanism.

2.3.1 Case staffing
The frequency of ISDS claims and cases are relevant to
the question of whether and to what extent states want
to internally staff for those disputes. If cases are few
and far between, governments may opt not to spend
resources on hiring, training, and providing continued
professional development for staff in case of disputes.
This may be particularly true for states with high turnover
of staff and/or for states who are not organized to be
able to easily allocate IIA/ISDS staff to other subject
areas when they are not fully utilized on IIA/ISDS work.
States may also be reluctant to risk handling disputes
in-house, especially given the high stakes presented by
large damages claims, and risk of creating damaging
precedent if the state loses the claim.
There are three general models that states employ to
handle their legal defense, each of which is described
further below. According to Franck, the most common
appears to be a hybrid system; the second most common
is to use exclusively in-house counsel; and the third most
common is to use exclusively external counsel.126
Irrespective of the model chosen, in all cases and in
advance, it is important to identify who, internally, has
responsibility for and rights to do what, and to clearly
set out those roles in laws or policies as appropriate.
Then, when and if a dispute arises, governments will be
in a better place to coordinate defense; choose whether
or not to hire external counsel and, if so, on what
terms; manage any outside counsel selected; control
litigation strategy; engage with other relevant domestic
actors; gather evidence; assess facts; and/or handle
communications with the investor and others. Sharpe
has set forth in detail the critical role that a designated
agent within the government can play in advancing
a government-led investment treaty policy.127 The
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importance of developing and implementing these
types of internal coordination plans before disputes
arise was stressed by interviewees from government,128
private practice,129 arbitration institutions,130 and
existing support mechanisms. India, for its part,
is an example of how the role of an agent can be
implemented more fully into a country’s investment
policy and practice.131 UNCTAD,132 ICSID,133 and private
law firms134 have provided or are providing support on
relevant structures and strategies.
Yet it seems that there remains important work left to
do. Joubin-Bret conducted a systemic review of the
50 respondent states (as of 2015) that had faced more
than three ISDS claims, finding that a minority had
dedicated in-house teams, even when considering a
task limited to managing the cases and interacting
with outside counsel.135 Additionally, few countries
had an identified, dedicated and structured lead
agency or management team, and as a result, these
cases were often dealt with on an ad hoc basis with
various ministries or agencies leading the defense.136
Consistent with those findings, one frequent comment
by government representatives in interviews conducted
for this scoping study was that they would like to
know more about different countries’ approaches to
these issues, and the advantages, disadvantages, and
lessons learned from the different systems they put in
place.
Regardless of the approach to internal defense
organization that a state is taking, once a dispute
has been officially commenced, states may choose to
settle the claim, or to proceed through the arbitration
proceeding.
With respect to the extremely high cost of top outside
counsel, many states feel they have no choice but
to pay. These expenditures, particularly for cashstrapped governments, mean less to spend on other
government functions, and this trade-off can have
meaningful consequences, especially for developing
countries. In some cases, however, governments may
simply not have the liquid funds, or may not be willing
or able to allocate the amount of funds necessary to
hire outside counsel.
These issues can affect case strategy and outcomes.
For instance, some important research suggests that
developing countries are more willing to settle ISDS
cases than developed countries.137 In a 2017 paper,

Strezhnev found that while high-income countries
tend to win about 20% more investment disputes than
low- or middle-income countries, this disparity can be
explained by differences in early rates of settlement
among countries. Specifically, developing country
governments facing high arbitration costs are about
22% more likely to settle a given dispute. Unpacking
these findings, Strezhnev finds that even when the
claim is poor, developing countries concerned by
likely arbitration costs and potential damage awards
choose to settle in order to avoid the risks of significant
losses.138 In contrast, developed countries are more
willing to bear the defense costs and risk of an
adverse award. Developing countries may therefore
particularly benefit from greater capacity in early case
assessment that can signal whether they should in
fact be settling or defending cases. This study also
suggests that the high costs of defending claims and/
or the risk of a high adverse award have systemic effects
that encourage risk-averse states to settle rather than
defend claims. This raises serious questions about
how and to what extent the high costs of defense and
possible awards intersects with decisions to settle
ISDS claims or actually pursue a defense. The reasons
for this pattern, the systemic and individual impacts
that these decisions to settle may have on developing
countries, and how to address these issues, deserves
further exploration in the context of an Assistance
Mechanism focused on legal defense.
On the flip side of the coin, when states do have the
financial ability to pay (or can obtain financial assistance
from elsewhere to do so),139 and have decided not to
settle but to pursue a claim, these states are often
“lawyering up, and lawyering up with quality counsel
and with great experts.”140 While many government
interviewees stated that there is a certain level of
sticker shock when other branches of government
see how much is being spent on ISDS defense, and
all governments would like to see that cost decrease,
once a claim has hit and the government decides to
pursue a defense rather than settle, cost becomes a
lesser priority than winning the case. For this countries
that are financially able to do so are willing to hire the
best lawyers.141 One individual with experience with
an existing assistance mechanism stated “Developing
countries don’t have a lot of money, but when it
comes to defending cases, trust me, they will spend
what they need to spend.”142 For many governments
this involves difficult decisions on how and where to
allocate scarce resources.
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However, while retaining experienced and highquality counsel was prioritized by many interviewees,
some suggested that the perceived benefits of
using major top-tier international law firms may be
overestimated. One interviewee with experience
working for an arbitral institution, for example, stated
that while there are plenty of examples of small
firms that cannot adequately manage a complex
ISDS claim, large international law firms are not
always necessary for states to achieve “adequate”
legal defense: “We have seen very competent legal
advice provided at much lower rates from regional
firms, who have a strong arbitration practice and
have branched out into investment arbitration.
Moreover, we have seen firms established in, for
example, Eastern Europe, provide highly competent
advice at much lower rates than the international
firms.”143 One upper-middle income government
official expressed some frustration that large
international firms are not always responsive and
that it is necessary for this official to continuously
be on top of case management to ensure that the
firm is appropriately prioritizing this official’s work.144
Some of the concern, therefore, seemed to be on
the risk associated with hiring lesser-known and
lower-priced firms, as opposed to conviction that
such firms are of lower quality.
Moreover, the knee-jerk reaction to hire the best
counsel, and spend whatever it takes to defend
an award, may also be a result of not having a full
understanding of where costs can be cut. As Sharpe
has argued:
[A] standing agent can help control costs
through better allocation of government
personnel and resources. Counsel fees generally
constitute the bulk of arbitration costs. State
lawyers invariably cost less than experienced
outside counsel. Much arbitration work can
be performed even within those governments
that lack significant experience in international
investment arbitration. Government lawyers, for
instance, may retrieve and review documents;
identify and interview potential witnesses;
prepare timelines and memoranda on key issues;
and research local law. Performing such timeconsuming work internally can substantially
reduce the State’s litigation costs.145
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When compared to the WTO context, the motivation to
spend money on defense and hire top counsel is even
higher in investment because in addition to costs, losing
an ISDS case also results in a monetary award. One
upper middle-income government official explained the
pressure on governments:
These cases are very public, and you have to answer
questions to parliament, to the media, to the public,
to everyone. Having a firm that has done 100 cases
will be justifiable, whereas having a lesser-known firm
that has only done 20 cases at a lower rate might be
riskier. That’s the problem when governments face
these claims – the responsibility is yours, but the
money isn’t. Public funds are at risk. It’s very difficult,
and these ISDS cases, where the state is being sued,
raise questions in laymen’s eyes about why the “best”
firm wasn’t chosen when the state is on the defense.146
In addition to the mainly financial hurdles governments
experience in hiring legal counsel, distinct hurdles
regarding a state’s engagement with outside counsel
were described. One challenge noted in consultations
was the timing of the engagement, and a procedural
inability to bring outside counsel in at an earlier stage of
the defense process. In the words of one private sector
interviewee who also has experience with an existing
Assistance Mechanism, “[i]t’s never really a budgetary
constraint that prevents counsel from being brought in at
an early stage, it is how governments operate.”147 There
are various reasons that governments may engage at
too late a phase. Some reasons may stem from internal
coordination challenges in managing the notice. For
example, as Sharpe explains: many governments have
not implemented standard operating procedures
in managing claims; many states do not have laws,
regulations, decrees or directives to ensure that the
responsible government official has authority to take all
steps necessary to represent the State effectively; and
procedural hurdles may inhibit a government authority
from properly coordinating the defense of claims,
both internally and externally.148 When clear authorities
and procedures are not in place, any one agency or
individual may be a hesitant to take ownership over the
claim and internal management and coordination gaps
may thus be exacerbated.149 The inability to conduct
a rigorous early assessment of the strength of a claim
(on jurisdiction, merits, and quantum) can have serious
implications for early decisions that a state must make
on settlement or proceeding to arbitrate.150
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Rules on government procurement can also make
timely case staffing particularly difficult when external
counsel are used. However, those procurement rules
and processes are often designed to serve important
policy purposes (e.g., to ensure value-for-money and
avoid corruption). It may be challenging to speed up
processes while maintaining adequate oversight of
government contracting and expenditures.151
Another challenge may be much more closely related
to the in-house capacity and experience of government
lawyers, regardless of whether the claim is managed inhouse or if outside counsel is hired. Interviewees with
experience working for arbitration centers highlighted
in-house experiences as absolutely critical to claim
management. In the words of one:
In our experience [obtaining high quality
representation] doesn’t have anything to do with
how poor the country is or what mechanism they use
(write a check, hybrid, in-house). In my view, good
representation of states doesn’t seem to depend
on how financially resourced the state is; experience
is the important element. Countries who can afford
good lawyers but have no experience in-house are
the ones that make the most mistakes.”152
Another interviewee with experience working for
an arbitration center stated that s/he had initially
thought that the economic development status of
a respondent state would be the clearest indicator
of how responsive and effective a state will be in an
ISDS claim, but that s/he has been proven wrong as it
seems to be prior experience in managing claims that
is most important.153
Thus, the challenges that were highlighted during
CCSI’s consultations and research were that the high
cost of outside counsel may lead the state to settle
claims that may be of low quality. When states do
decide to pursue claims, some states do not have the
liquidity, or choose not, to pay for top counsel and may
settle, or hire lower-cost counsel. However, in large
part the concerns were not that states are not getting
top outside counsel, but that in many cases when a
state decides to hire top international legal counsel
the state has serious concerns about foregoing other
domestic spending priorities to pay for such counsel,
is constrained in terms of its ability to timely retain
external advisors, and faces hurdles engaging with
and managing those service providers. As with other

areas of IIA and ISDS engagement and management
discussed during consultations, several interviewees
noted that a certain level of capacity to engage with
outside counsel, make decisions, and effectively
manage those legal advisors is of critical importance
to ensuring an effective defense.
This study now turns to discussing how these issues
interact with the three general models that states
employ to handle their legal defense: in-house, hybrid,
or fully out-sourced representation.

2.3.1.1 In-house counsel
This section considers specific issues that arise for
states with respect to an in-house model of staffing
the defense of claims.
In a recent study of states’ staffing of ISDS claims,
Franck found that in roughly a quarter of disputes,
states relied completely on in-house teams.154 States
using this model include Argentina and the United
States, as well as Canada for most, but not all, of its
cases.
In-house teams can have several advantages for
states, including that they are lower cost, have a
clearer and more consistent alignment of interests
between attorney and client, are more accountable to
the client government, have a deeper understanding
of the state’s legal and policy positions, and have
a better and more effective relationship with subnational jurisdictions and other agencies. An in-house
counsel may also be in a position to elevate standards
of conduct in international investment arbitration
through training, experience, and professional
socialization.155
Several interviewees from states that have faced three
or more claims indicated that they are interested in
conducting more (or all) of the state’s defense inhouse. Many in-house teams were seeking to take
more control over strategy and decision-making, and
to retain greater control over information gathered.156
Interviews underscored that in-house teams were also
better suited than external counsel to engage with,
and gather evidence from, other relevant domestic
government actors relating to the case, and to handle
issues of domestic law.157
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Perceived barriers to adopting a fully in-house
strategy included concerns about staffing, including
balancing the frequency of claims with the expense
and time it takes to build up in-house expertise,
and doubts about the ability to successfully litigate
against highly experienced investor-side counsel.
Interviews and research, however, suggest that in
some cases states have successfully managed these
hurdles.
First, in order to accommodate for staffing needs
that ebb and flow, a few countries have hired people
that move across to other activities depending on
needs. For instance, in some countries with in-house
teams, staff participating in ISDS defense can and
do work in other types of international legal disputes
(e.g., international human rights cases, WTO
litigation, and specialized mechanisms such as the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal). They may also
engage in other investment law-related activities,
such as supporting treaty negotiations, engaging
in investment-related dialogues in international
forums, monitoring cases filed by their investors and
submitting non-disputing state party briefs on issues
of treaty interpretation, and engaging in stateto-state or multi-stakeholder consultations under
specialized bodies or mechanisms established under
their treaties. Of course, specialization in investment
law in addition to other substantive areas requires
exceptional technical skill that must be built over
time. To the extent staff are frequently rotated out
of positions, or for offices with high turnover rates,
it may be difficult for an in-house team to maintain
relevant expertise.
For states seeking to build in-house capacity, the
various options include hiring new staff with relevant
expertise, hiring external counsel but working closely
with them with a view to eventually transition work
entirely in-house,158 arranging formal secondment
programs (including with other governments),159 and
attending training programs. Because treaty-based
ISDS is still a relatively young field with few causes
of action and a limited amount of “case law” it is an
area where new practitioners likely face low barriers
to entry and effectiveness.160 Major challenges to
diffusion of knowledge about the law and practice
are, confidentiality of awards, and as noted above,
the concentration of sources behind paywalls and
in English.
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Second, there remains some fear that respondent states
seeking to rely exclusively or largely on in-house teams
will be at a disadvantage as compared with investors
hiring experienced private counsel. Some data,
however, suggests that the average investor team will
not have much of an advantage over even relatively new
in-house state counsel teams. Using a dataset of 202
cases generating 272 awards made public through 2012,
Franck finds that “each legal entity represented a client
[state or investor] in an average of two cases,” and that
“the median number of cases was one.”161 She also found
that “[r]oughly 75% of the known legal entities involved
in [investment treaty arbitration] who arbitrated a single
case had had no further demonstrated participation in
[investment treaty arbitration].”162 These figures suggest
that the experience gap between a relatively newly
established respondent team and investor counsel is
not necessarily great. Were an Assistance Mechanism
to support filling gaps in experience or access to
certain information, that may help to level playing fields
between the parties.
Of course, these figures have likely shifted since Frank’s
study. The rise of third-party funders as upstream repeat
players capable of injecting additional substantive
knowledge into the disputes and enabling (or requiring)
use of certain quality legal teams might, for instance,
have had an impact on market concentration and repeat
play. Yet, when considering state needs, and taking into
account the apparent interest among states to take more
control over their ISDS defense activities, it is useful to
both question the assumption that states committing
to in-house structures will be outmatched by more
knowledgeable private firms, and to understand the
variables that make that assumption more or less likely
to be true.
Overall, the frequency of ISDS threats and claims may be
a key determinant in whether and what types of external
versus in-house support states seek. If a state has not yet
faced a case, faces them infrequently, or has not faced
one for years, it may be more interested in extensive
assistance by outside counsel, which can inform how an
Assistance Mechanism may fill certain needs. As those
states become more experienced in handling cases
and staffing teams, however, or to the extent a larger
number of claims or potential claims materializes, states
may want and be able to do more on their own.
In consultations, states seeking to establish a greater role
of in-house capacity raised certain ideas as to the ways
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in which external assistance could continue to play a
useful role. These included, for example, a “hotline”type mechanism for discrete questions in tight
timeframes, assistance with adjudicator appointment,
support with discovery and fact gathering, or support
in early case assessment and management. The nature
of those requests will likely affect the cost to provide
the services, the willingness of beneficiaries to pay for
the relevant services, and the interest and ability of
those other than the users to fund those services.

2.3.1.2 External counsel - hybrid and exclusive
external models
This section considers hurdles states face in hiring and
engaging with outside counsel.
In her study, Franck found that approximately 70 percent
of cases involved states using external counsel.163 In
most, the states also relied to some extent on in-house
lawyers. In a minority, the government appears to have
been solely represented by outside counsel. These
tended to be countries with only one ISDS dispute.164
When states do use external counsel, several
government representatives from developed and
developing countries noted the importance of ensuring
that in-house teams still have sufficient capacity to
effectively manage outside counsel and the claim.
The in-house team must have the ability to exercise
desired control over decisions regarding the claim
and the confidence to “stand up” to outside counsel
in the event of disagreement.165 Thus, even if external
support is used, a certain, relatively sophisticated,
level of internal competence is crucial.
To the extent that a state’s model involves the use of
outside counsel, it is viewed as important to appoint
that counsel at an early phase in the dispute. However,
as noted above, this objective may be hindered by the
fact that the government may need to take a series
of potentially time-consuming steps to appoint and
hire counsel. These include following the relevant
government procurement processes; identifying the
desired criteria for service providers to be used in any
tender process; doing due diligence on potential firms
and lawyers; and contracting with the service providers
regarding their fees and responsibilities.
At the same time, certain decisions regarding the
claim that must be made in this phase can potentially

influence the outcome of the case (for example,
decisions regarding selection of arbitrators, or
decisions as to certain procedural matters), and must
be made in as timely a fashion as possible. States
noted various organizational capacity challenges that
exist and prolong the amount of time necessary for
the state to finalize these tasks.
Some states expressed interest in better understanding
options for managing the steps required to: hire
and manage outside counsel; craft contractual
arrangements with outside counsel, optimally allocate
responsibility between in-house and outside counsel;
and identify ways to control fees charged by the
firms employed.166 Several interviewees expressed
concern about the high costs of external counsel,
and perceptions that law firms lacked a sense of
accountability to public taxpayers. Indeed, the
issue of fees has been identified by delegations in
UNCITRAL Working Group III as an issue of concern
meriting multilateral reform. One 2017 study found
that average costs for respondent states to defend
ISDS cases are nearly $5 million,167 and average costs
for states in annulment proceedings are nearly $1.5
million.168 Table 2 below presents the findings from
other studies on the costs of ISDS disputes.
While the fees being paid to external counsel may
not vary much by respondent country, the difference
in relative impact depending on countries’ respective
revenue and budget, can be enormous. As noted
by one lower middle-income government official
that incurred roughly US$ 6 million in legal fees for
services provided by London-based counsel, the fees
constituted the “budget for a whole ministry, or two
or three critical hospitals.”169 Another upper-middle
income government official noted that the budget
this official was requesting for outside counsel in ISDS
cases for the coming fiscal year exceeded the amount
that would be otherwise budgeted for the entire
ministry.170
Notably, there are some initiatives on investment and
trade issues that seek to support states in identifying
and contracting/negotiating fees with external counsel.
For example, IDLO’s ISP/LDCs program (discussed in
Section 4.1.3) will assist states in obtaining no-cost
legal services with respect to investment law matters.
The Permanent Court of Arbitration’s Trust Fund
(discussed in Section 4.3.1.1) assists certain states with
costs related to participation in disputes at the PCA.
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Table 2 Legal Costs of ISDS Proceedings ($)
Sample (#
of awards)

Average
claimant
costs

Sample (#
of awards)

Average
respondent
costs

Inflationadjusted year

Study

Period

Arbitral
Rules

Commission
and Moloo
(2018)758

20112017

ICSID

90

6,043,915

88

5,217,247

2017

Commission
and Moloo
(2018)759

20102017

UNCITRAL

36

6,077,585

41

4,596,807

2017

Behn
and Daza
(2019)760

19872019

ICSID and
UNCITRAL

169

6,067,184

177

5,223,974

2018

Source: Malcolm Langford, Daniel Behn and Laura Létourneau-Tremblay, ‘Empirical Perspectives on
Investment Arbitration: What Do We Know? Does It Matter?’ (2019) ISDS Academic Forum Working Group 7
Paper, 7.

Outside of IDLO’s ISP/LDCs program and the PCA Trust
Fund, however, it does not appear, in the context of
investment law, that a robust service yet exists to assist
governments in procuring low-cost outside counsel for
ISDS defense.

2.3.2 Staffing of defense claims: Issues of cost,
quality and control
From research and interviews conducted for this
Scoping Study, some important takeaways regarding
staffing and defense of ISDS cases are that:
•

•

•

In some cases, states are unable to allocate funds
necessary to hire international legal counsel and
may choose to either settle rather than fully defend
a claim, or to hire less expensive outside counsel.
When states decide to hire international legal
counsel, states did not widely report concerns
about the quality of defense they were receiving
or their ability to access law firms to provide them
with quality defense.
Concerns that states expressed about hiring
outside counsel include:
° the high costs of external representation;
° misalignment of interests and cost sensitivities
between in-house and outside counsel;171
° challenges effectively supervising and
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•

•

controlling the management of the case when
outside counsel were engaged;
° difficulties in the timely procurement of
outside counsel; and
° the ability to secure external input and advice
on discrete issues and questions when a claim
is handled in-house or before outside counsel
has been procured.172
Some states do not currently see a cost-benefit
advantage to moving to an in-house model
and will continue to rely on outside legal
representation.
Some states were interested in taking greater
control, and moving more defense activities inhouse, although:
° Some states were interested in ideas for
ongoing discrete assistance from outside
counsel (e.g., hotlines and second opinions) to
complement an in-house model; and
° recognized that this would necessitate access
to information currently held by firms.

These issues, in turn, raise questions of how to decrease
costs of external counsel, and/or increase the ability of
states to take a greater share of control (in a broad
sense, including managing the claim in coordination
with external counsel up through moving more of
the actual defense in-house), while also retaining or
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improving perceptions of quality. The answers to these
questions should be considered in the development
or expansion of an Assistance Mechanism. Even if it
is ultimately decided that an Assistance Mechanism
should not play an active role in advancing these
objectives, it should also not undermine them, and
would ideally complement steps that states take in
reforming these areas, including beyond an Assistance
Mechanism and into broader reform efforts.

2.3.3. Anticipating, and potentially resolving,
ISDS cases at an early phase
It was commonly stated by interviewees that
anticipating, avoiding, and resolving disputes at an
early phase is a challenge for states. Section 2.2.3
above discussed some initiatives to help states
understand and implement treaty commitments. This
Section focuses more specifically on actions relating
to anticipating, and trying to resolve, potential or
actual ISDS cases at an early phase.

2.3.3.1 Anticipating disputes
The inability to anticipate a dispute has implications
for states. States, of any economic development
level, that have not implemented standard operating
procedures upon notice of intent may struggle to
organize and take control of the defense of the claim
and other decisions that must be made early on. States
may also feel at a disadvantage when compared to a
claimant that has, in many cases, had a greater amount
of time to organize and prepare a claim.
While states do have some ability to anticipate certain
disputes, the anticipation of a large number of disputes
can be difficult for many reasons. One issue relates to
a claimant’s use, or failure to use, the domestic court
system. The requirement to exhaust local remedies
is generally not expressly required by treaties (and
in some treaties has been expressly waived). When
claimants are required to exhaust domestic remedies
(including for a specific period of time), states have an
opportunity to identify a dispute bubbling up through
the legal system, and their officials and institutions
have a built-in opportunity to correct mistakes and
prevent ISDS cases.
Relatedly, when contract claims arise under a treaty,
treaty provisions (namely the umbrella clause)

and arbitral decisions appear relatively flexible in
permitting investors to frame disputes as treaty claims
and pursue them directly via ISDS alongside or instead
of dispute resolution proceedings in contractually
specified fora.
Moreover, there is no doctrine of “ripeness” that has
stepped in to uniformly control the flow of claims.
States may be taken by surprise when they receive a
notice of intent and learn that a lower level official has
taken a relevant action, that an administrative agency
has made a certain (appealable) decision, or that a
lower- or mid-level court has issued a certain ruling.
In short, the investor has significant flexibility to frame
when a dispute has crystallized and a claim is ripe.
While this benefits the investor, as it can determine
whether and when to opt out of domestic or other
proceedings, it can make it nearly impossible for a
state to anticipate when a claim will arise, much less
prevent it.
These issues are among those that could potentially
be resolved through other reform discussions,
for instance to excise umbrella clauses, introduce
requirements for exhaustion for all or some causes of
action, and/or clarify the relevance of doctrines such
as ripeness.
Another problem that makes the task of anticipating
and avoiding claims difficult is that treaties may grant
many investors, including indirect shareholders, in a
particular investment the ability to pursue an ISDS
claim. Governments may be unaware, before a notice
of intent has been filed, that a foreign investor is
involved in a particular investment, that such foreign
investor’s interests are protected by a treaty, and if so,
which treaty. The issue of shareholder and reflective
loss claims is also an issue that could potentially be
addressed through broader reform discussions.
An additional issue is that makes the anticipation of
claims challenging for states is that even if a state
sees a dispute on the horizon, the relevant agency in
charge of investment policy and dispute resolution
may have no power to resolve the emerging dispute.
If, for instance, the potentially brewing ISDS case
relates to a court dispute between private parties
over ownership of or rights to use land, the validity
of intellectual property rights, or the existence and
extent of tort liability, the executive branch of the
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government may have no legal ability to override
any subsequent judicial decision and likely has
important policy reasons to avoid trying to interfere.
Dispute prevention was indeed identified as a
“hot topic” and of great interest to states during
consultations for this Scoping Study.

Early assessment and resolution of disputes
In CCSI’s consultations many interviewees felt that
the early stages of a dispute were an incredibly
critical period during which little outside support
for states is available. Two general issues were
highlighted: (1) effectively managing the early
periods of claims, organizing internally, and taking
advantage of “cooling off periods, and (2) assessing
the strength of the claim.
With respect to the first point, a potentially important
opportunity that was identified arises with the socalled “cooling off” period. Many treaties contain
clauses requiring investors to give states notice of
their intent to file arbitration claims before formally
initiating the arbitration. A common challenge
for states, however, is effectively managing these
periods. One government official asked if a “best
practices” handbook exists for the “cooling off”
period, and to CCSI’s knowledge a generalized set
of advice is not available.
A number of interviewees from governments and
private practice was that many states lack certain
capacities in receiving and effectively managing
claims. Sharpe has also articulated some of these
issues, and solutions to them.173 For example, many
states have not developed clear or comprehensive
procedures dictating who should receive the
notice and what they should do once they have it.
Many do not have media guidelines or effective
communication channels established with other
ministries to provide cross-governmental updates
on pending disputes. This can result in valuable time
and evidence being wasted and may even escalate
the dispute based on statements or conduct
(including inaction) over that time period. There
are some existing resources and initiatives to help
address these issues. These include ICSID’s “Practice
Notes for Respondents in ICSID Arbitration,174
pro bono assistance provided by counsel,175 and
opportunities for sharing experiences at workshops
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and trainings.176
For states seeking to manage more of a claim in-house,
the ability to turn to outside support regarding key
questions (e.g. a “hotline” type approach) could be
important during the defense-organizational phase. For
states who plan to hire outside counsel, the time that
procurement processes take can result in valuable lost
time early in the process with respect to both procedural
and substantive matters. On the procedural side,
appointment of arbitrators and other early decisions
impacting the procedural elements of the case can have
lasting impacts on the ultimate outcome of disputes.
On the substantive side, more attention to and better
guidance during the “cooling off” period may assist
states in early resolution of disputes. One interviewee
with experience working for an arbitration center
stated that these initial phases see “a limited number
of problems arise, and it is definitely possible to have a
high impact in this area.”
While there was general agreement that this phase
is both critical and also one of the most difficult for
states to take advantage of, some caution was urged.
For example, to the extent one Assistance Mechanism
were to become involved in advising many different
client states about arbitrator appointments or other
procedural elements of a defense at early phases there
may be various concerns that one institution was the
dominant player in an advisory role, and unintended
systemic impacts could result.177
With respect to the second broad issue, governments
may face challenges reviewing, understanding the
strength of the case asserted in the Notice of Intent
or subsequent Notice of Arbitration, and then taking
appropriate action. Some of these challenges again
arise from the structure and procedures of the current
ISDS system. Rules regarding the contents of notices are
relatively relaxed, and there are no general requirements
to require filers to conduct due diligence and certify the
veracity of their assertions, nor are their clear sanctions
for non-compliance. The door to initiate a claim is
relatively wide open, and arguably open to abuse, as
the mere filing of an ISDS claim can trigger significant
dispute-related expenditures and raises the threat of
potential future losses.
In other non-ISDS dispute settlement contexts,
procedural tools are often used to avoid dragging
defendants/respondents into high-stakes, high-cost
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proceedings absent a sufficient showing of a plausible
claim. The ISDS system could likewise employ some
type of pleading standard to filter out frivolous and
abusive claims, and provide respondents greater
notice of the claims against them.178 One could,
for instance, envision rules of procedure whereby
investors had to assert facts at the time of submitting
their notice of intent and/or arbitration on:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

the relevant treaty or treaties;
the identity of the investor, including its corporate
structure if a legal person;
the investment and relevant treaty provision
protecting that investment;
whether or not any additional proceedings had
been or were being pursued relevant to a fork-inthe road or similar provision;
the measure(s) alleged to have given rise to the
breach and the date(s) of the measure(s);
the breaches alleged and the facts that support
those allegations; and
damages claimed.179

Detailed factual and legal allegations in Notices
of Intent and Notices of Arbitration, particularly of
information that is within the custody and/or control
of the investor claimant, can be crucial for enabling
governments to conduct useful case assessments
and decide whether and how to proceed (e.g., by
suggesting mediation, settlement of all or some
claims, or deciding to defend against the case). 180
Increased pleading requirements would likely result
in some added costs for the investor. Those costs,
however, would presumably be relatively minimal if
the required disclosures called for information within
the investor claimant’s custody or control, and would
arguably be outweighed by the systemic contributions
that these disclosures could make toward improving
early case assessment.
While several interviewees suggested that an
Assistance Mechanism may assist in early assessments
of the strength of a claim, absent a sufficiently robust
factual matrix on which to base their analysis, legal
opinions on the strength of the investor’s claims and/
or state’s defense may be too vague and general to be
of much use.
Effective early case assessment depends on at least
two things: one is having enough information to
evaluate the case, at least on a preliminary basis; the

other is having access to a legal team that can do that
analysis. If a team is not in-house, then timely external
support will need to be found.
Some existing efforts described below are attempting
to assist states with early identification and/or
prevention of disputes and assessment of claims.

2.3.3.1.1 World Bank Systemic Response
Mechanism
The WBG’s Systemic Investor Response Mechanism
(SIRM) seeks to be an early warning and tracking
system that identifies problems arising from
government conduct, allowing governments to
respond to investor grievances at a phase earlier than
a dispute.181 The SIRM works by collecting certain data
points and identifying patterns of political risks that
impact investments and quantifies investment lost
or gained as a result, thereby providing evidence of
impacts and a basis for reform or steps to minimize
the recurrence of investment-related problems.182
SIRM is not a one-sized fits all solution, but is adapted
to the political economy circumstances of every
country.183 Common elements, however, include: (1)
empowerment of a lead agency that implements and
coordinates SIRM, (2) an early alert mechanism and
tracking tool to identify problems to the lead agency,
(3) problem solving methods available to the lead
agency and other agencies to find a solution, including
through exchanges of information, consultations,
peer pressure, or legal opinions, (4) political decision
making at higher levels when the lead agency is
unable to recommend a solution or discipline a peer
agency.184
The SIRM has been piloted in Bosnia & Herzegovina,
Dominican Republic, Georgia, Albania, Colombia,
Kyrgyz Republic, and Mongolia.185

2.3.3.1.2 Similar state led ISDS prevention
initiatives
Korea’s Office of the Foreign Investment Ombudsman
(OFIO) was established in 1999 to provide aftercare
support and grievance resolution services for foreign
investors and foreign-invested companies in Korea.186
The OFIO is intended to improve the investment
environment in Korea and help to resolve investor
grievances at an early phase. The OFIO provides an
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online application for investors to seek to resolve
grievances in a wide variety of industries.187 The
OFIO also can help investors navigate legal and
legislative processes related to their grievances.
Similarly, Brazil’s Cooperation and Facilitation
Investment Agreement (CFIA) model is based
on dispute prevention.188 The CFIA sets forth
institutional mechanisms to assist in dispute
avoidance and to achieve early settlement of
potential investor grievances.189 The objective is to
assist host countries in anticipating possible origins
of disputes and taking earlier preventative action.190
The inspiration for a focus on investor support was
found in the Korean OFIO.191
Both the OFIO and the CFIA models present a
rethink of the areas in which states might allocate
scarce resources to address investor grievances,
looking to a greater extent to address concerns
before they rise to the level of a full-blown dispute.
In many cases earlier attention to concerns and
disputes may benefit both the investor and the host
state.

2.3.4 Appointing arbitrators
A potentially outcome-determinate, time-sensitive,
and early-phase task (briefly discussed in the
preceding section) is the appointment of arbitrators.
An ongoing OECD project is addressing the various
policy issues and challenges that arise with respect
to arbitrator appointment, appointing authorities
and adjudicator compensation in ISDS cases.192
The preliminary findings of this project indicate
that the system for the selection of arbitrators in
ISDS cases is very complex, involves limited levels
of public disclosure on arbitrator appointments and
may be affected by significant competition between
arbitration institutions competing for ISDS cases.
Notwithstanding the increased transparency of
arbitral awards in recent years, a significant share
are not yet publicly available, nor are the bulk
of other materials produced in connection with
ISDS proceedings such as pleadings submitted to
tribunals and transcripts of hearings. These materials
can provide insights into arguments that arbitrators
may have raised when acting as counsel, and also
into what resonates, or does not, with them when
sitting on a tribunal.
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Due to confidentiality of these documents, however,
there are asymmetries in who can access and benefit
from these insights. Repeat-player law firms, expert
witnesses, third-party funders, and arbitration
institutions contain a relative wealth of relevant material
in their internal files and networks. Others, including
states that are infrequent respondents, may be forced to
choose between going without a similar depth of crucial
information or paying to access it.
There are some ongoing efforts to gather and
disseminate information about arbitrators, including by
IAReporter,193 Arbitrator Intelligence194 (both behind a
paywall), and Pluricourt’s Investment Treaty Arbitration
Database (PITAD).195 Free or reduced-price access to
subscription databases, free or low-cost access to expert
advice on arbitrator section, and virtual or in-person
platforms for sharing experiences about arbitrators
are all ways of closing existing “gap[s] on access to
information” that contribute to states’ current “reliance
on outside counsel.”196
These issues are further linked to ongoing reform
discussions. Initiatives for a court-like mechanism
that would move ISDS away from its use of partyappointed arbitrators could, for adherents to such a
new mechanism, reduce the need for case-by-case due
diligence on, appointment, and possible challenge of
arbitrators.

2.3.5 Handling cases - dealing with inconsistency,
uncertainty and incorrectness
As recognized in the context of UNCITRAL’s Working
Group III, states have concerns about inconsistency,
uncertainty, and incorrectness of arbitral decisions.
These are all features of investment law that complicate
domestic officials’ abilities to predict whether a claim will
succeed or fail. However, irrespective of the outcome of
a claim, states incur significant costs to defend against
claims and are not likely to recover those costs.197
Some efforts to address these issues of inconsistency,
uncertainty, and incorrectness include drafting new
language for future agreements; renegotiating existing
treaties; using tools available under the VCLT to clarify
for or bind tribunals to specified interpretations;
engaging in treaty committees to consult on and address
problematic issues of interpretation; and participating in
negotiations such as the ongoing efforts at UNCITRAL
to craft reform solutions, including the potential
establishment of a more permanent adjudicatory body
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and appellate system to bring more clarity to the
content of the law. Assistance Mechanisms could be
used to better support states in each of these areas
of work.
A related solution (one which is particularly relevant
in the event that developed country donor funds may
be financing an Assistance Mechanism) is for countries
to explore steps to work with treaty counterparties to
minimize the uncertainty surrounding treaty language
or treaty interpretation, such as through joint
interpretative statements or other clarifications. This
step could help to avoid or reduce disputes over the
content of relevant treaty standards.
Data indicates that, should (particularly developed)
home country governments wish to rein in some of
the more expansive interpretations of substantive
and jurisdictional treaty provisions and ensure that
interpretation is (re)aligned with the intent of the
treaty parties, their actions could potentially impact
the conduct of a large number of proceedings. In

practice, capital importing states are less frequently
non-disputing state parties and more frequently
the respondent, and opportunities to act as a nondisputing state party are thus more infrequent. Steps
to clarify treaty party intent, particularly on the part
of the non-disputing parties, could potentially reduce
claims that attempt to stretch the bounds of treaty
language and make it clearer to tribunals when a
claim is without merit and worthy of early dismissal:
“The United States, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom, Germany, Canada, and Spain are ‘strongly
represented’ as home states of investor claimants”198
and consequently have important opportunities to
play a more active gatekeeping or management role
regarding the way their treaties are used.199 Greater
certainty on the bounds of treaty language could, in
turn, potentially narrow the jurisdictional window for
claims and issues that respondent states are currently
spending valuable resources disputing before arbitral
tribunals.

Table 3 Non-disputing State Party Submissions Made Under Different Types of IIAs

Source: Data on claims under different treaties is from UNCTAD (search done October 9, 2019);
data on non-disputing state party submissions is collected from PITAD databases, supplemented
and corrected by CCSI (internal spreadsheet updated as of October 9, 2019).
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Table 3 sets forth the frequency of non-disputing
state party briefs under various treaties.

2.3.7 Handling cases - engaging in discovery,
managing information

Consideration should be given to the reasons for
which states currently do not choose to engage in
joint interpretations or other clarifying efforts, and
any attempts to increase the prevalence of these
efforts may seek to take account or correct for the
reasons underlying the current lack of engagement,
if possible and desirable.

A final set of issues identified in this Scoping Paper relates
to the challenges that governments face conducting
discovery and gathering and managing the volumes
of evidence that may be required to effectively defend
ISDS disputes. These activities may cause governments
to engage in court proceedings in foreign jurisdictions
in search of evidence, and to identify and contract with
technical service firms to assist in document retention,
review, and disclosure. While such tasks are relatively
discrete, there could be important savings in time and
cost for states – especially those with in-house teams –
to have assistance in performing them.

2.3.6 Handling cases - working with experts
Included within data for legal fees are often fees for
expert witnesses on valuation and other topics. While
studies on party costs do not tend to systematically
distinguish between legal counsel and other fees,
having a better sense of the expenditures on each
– and their relative importance in ISDS proceedings
– is necessary as an Assistance Mechanism could
focus on enabling access to one of the two, or
both. Information available from costs submissions
that are publicly available indicates that expert fees
can approximate legal counsel fees in amount.200
And if states move more tasks in-house, they may
nevertheless continue to feel the need for support
in identifying, contracting with, and working with
experts on technical topics.
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Section 2 of this Scoping Study has set forth the various
phases of a state’s engagement with international
investment law. With respect to each, capacity
challenges in the ability of a state to effectively achieve
its objectives has been set forth, along with a discussion
of what resources are available to states in these areas.
We now turn to considering previous attempts to
establish an investment law advisory center, followed
by a discussion of potential models for an Assistance
Mechanism in investment law.
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Section 3.

Previous Attempts to Establish an “Advisory Center”
on International Investment Law

3.1 UNCTAD-IADB-OAS-VCC
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3.2 UNASUR 				46
3.3 ANZ-ASEAN Forum 		
46

3.1 UNCTAD-IADB-OAS-VCC
In the 2000s, several Latin American states, with the
support of UNCTAD, the Inter-American Development
Bank (IADB), the Organization of American States
(OAS), and the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable
International
Investment
(VCC)201
proceeded
extremely far along the process of establishing
a regional investment advisory center. In 2006,
Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and other Central
American countries requested a feasibility study of
an advisory center to assist countries in the handling
and defending of investor-state disputes.202 A detailed
set of consultation guidelines and a consultation
report were prepared to review what services an
advisory center could provide as well as the possible
institutional options for such an initiative.203 In 2009,
a steering committee meeting of interested countries
took place to come up with a consolidated vision
and develop terms of reference for an advisory
center.204 It was agreed that: the center would be an
intergovernmental organization, established by states
and run by states; the model would be the ACWL; it
would ultimately be financially self-sufficient; and the
center would carry out two core functions of advisory205
and defense206 services.

As states began, in the early 2000s, to grapple
with the significant increases in ISDS cases,
several attempts were made to establish
regional advisory centers.761 These efforts are
described here in order to assess these efforts
and any lessons learned.

The initiative resulted in a draft treaty and a
consolidated budget that was submitted to interested
countries and discussed at a steering group meeting
in Colombia in May 2009. February 2010 had been set
for the ministerial signature of the treaty that would
establish this center, however efforts failed at the last
minute.
Based on interviews with individuals involved in this
effort (both conducted by CCSI and reviewed in the
context of desk research), certain lessons can be
learned. As a general matter, technical issues (even
those that were eventually overcome), questions
surrounding funding of the center, and last-minute
changes to several countries’ negotiators are viewed
as having significantly contributed to, if not caused, its
failure.207
Certain technical issues proved to be high hurdles in
negotiations. One interviewee understood differing
country positions as stemming from divergences in
country needs in disputes (e.g. how much each country
wished to perform in-house versus outsource), which
resulted in each country ultimately taking a different
approach and having a different perspective on what
each viewed as the appropriate and desirable role
for an advisory center, particularly with respect to the
desired level of involvement in the defense of claims,
and how much responsibility should be given to a
center.
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A second, not unrelated, technical issue surrounded
the ideal structure of a center, including what its
staffing would look like, what the nationality of its
officials would be, and where it would be located.
With respect to its location, it was agreed that it
would initially be located in Washington D.C., a
location favored by certain negotiators, and then
moved to Panama, although even with respect
to South American locations, there were several
competing proposals.208 Each of these discussions
was highly political, and one interviewee involved in
this process noted that the ability to resolve these
seemingly small and last-minute questions about an
advisory center should not be underestimated.209
Ultimately, one of the most difficult issues was the
funding of the center, and “when it came to funding,
the whole thing blew up at that point.”210 The
agreement that the center would be self-sufficient,
combined with difficulty in estimating ISDS dispute
costs, persisted and made difficult finalization of
the scope of services and member contributions
(and whether these would be differentiated
based on economic development levels) and
how contributions from other organizations or
development banks with interests in the IIA/ISDS
system would be handled.211
Finalization of financial details coincided with lastminute changes to several key negotiators and the
loss of certain influential diplomats in the effort was
ultimately the final blow.212
The final steps of the UNCTAD-IADB-OAS-VCC
project also coincided with the introduction of
a competing UNASUR advisory center initiative,
described below. These proposals were similar
but were supported by different members of the
region, which resulted in neither center gaining
comprehensive regional backing.213
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3.2 UNASUR
In May 2008, the Heads of States of the Union of
South American Nations (UNASUR) set forth a plan of
action that included an investment court, investment
arbitration rules, and an advisory center on investment
law and ISDS for UNASUR member states.214 UNCTAD
had been invited to assist the working group on ISDS
with technical assistance and input as far as technical
options, budgetary issues, and institutional options.215
The idea for a Southern Observatory on Investment
and Transnational Corporations arose in the early
2010s around the time that the UNCTAD-IADB-OASVCC project was abandoned.216 While it was not
based directly on the ACWL model, it was intended to
provide a collective repository for the region’s ISDSrelated knowledge and experience to assist in strategic
defense of UNASUR member states in order to more
systematically influence regional and international
investment rules.217
While the status of the UNASUR project is unclear, and
no public announcement has been issued to indicate
significant progress, it appears that an Executive
Committee has continued to advance specific proposals,
and that a proposed legal framework and agreements
establishing a center are proceeding.218

3.3 ANZ-ASEAN Forum
Outside of the Latin American region, in 2012 Vietnam
proposed to the Australia-New Zealand and the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ANZ-ASEAN)
Forum that a regional advisory center be established
similar to that envisioned by the UNCTAD-IADB-OASVCC initiative.219
This proposal focused on the cost burden of and
technical expertise needed for ISDS disputes and the
need to share expertise and experience among the
ASEAN region, and called upon states to move this
onto the ANZ-ASEAN agenda. 220 This proposal did not
ultimately gain sufficient political support.221
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An Assistance Mechanism (or Mechanisms) to
provide investment law-related support could take
a wide variety of forms. Several are described below.
This list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Moreover,
while this study has, in the interest of conceptual
coherence and clarity, attempted to place existing
Assistance Mechanisms into the general categories
set forth below, given the myriad services and
models, neat divisions proved challenging and
overlap between categories occurs. Some of the
mechanisms described below already support
investment law-related activities and some focus
other substantive areas or forums, but all are helpful
to consider as a model for how an investment-law
focused mechanism could work, as well as to benefit
from lessons learned in other contexts. Of course,
any Assistance Mechanism should be designed
to most efficiently and effectively respond to the
identified concerns and capacity challenges that it is
intended to address.

4.1 Institutionalized, multiservice support including legal
representation of client governments
One model for an Assistance Mechanism
would be an institutionalized mechanism that is
able to pursue a range of functions, depending on
the context and need of a particular beneficiary,
and which could include any of a menu of services
(e.g. capacity building, negotiation support, policy
advice, legal opinions, and/or defense).
This section addresses a range of models of multiservice Assistance Mechanisms, each of which varies
in its focus and services offered.
First, an Assistance Mechanism may be conceptually
similar to the Advisory Center on WTO Law (ACWL).
Indeed, the ACWL model is often raised in the
context of an Assistance Mechanism in international
investment law and is thus described in some
depth below as a potential model for an Assistance
Mechanism in investment law.222 The ACWL can be
distinguished from other mechanisms as it is the only
mechanism that provides a significant level of direct
legal services in-house, by its own ACWL lawyers. The
ACWL also has a “clearinghouse” element, whereby
some services are provided through the ACWL but
by private practitioners in specific circumstances.

The African Legal Support Facility (ALSF), also described
below, provides an extensive range of services,
but, compared to the ACWL, operates to a greater
extent on the “clearinghouse model”, facilitating
legal relationships between private practitioners and
government clients. However, the ALSF compares itself,
to some extent, to an office of “general counsel” in that
its in-house lawyers are able to, and do, provide many
legal services and advice in-house, and help countries
manage relationships with, and advice received from,
outside counsel.
The International Development Law Organization’s
(IDLO) Investment Support Programme for Least
Developed Countries (ISP/LDCs), described below,
facilitates a wide range of investment-related services,
but currently has a more limited “in-house” advisory
role. The ISP/LDCs program is active in cultivating
relationships with outside service providers (which
include economists and development policy specialists
in addition to private practitioners) and remaining
engaged with the beneficiary throughout the matter.
Unlike the ACWL (limited to WTO law) and ALSF (focused
to a greater extent on investment contracts), the ISP/
LDCs program is an existing Assistance Mechanism that
is specific to investment law-related support.223
Finally, suggestions for an investment law “hotline” are
briefly described in this section, as this notion arose in
CCSI’s consultations and could form an element of any
broader institutionalized mechanism.
Each of these existing Assistance Mechanisms - ACWL,
ALSF, and ISP/LDCs – are now described in depth.

4.1.1 Advisory Center on WTO Law
4.1.1.1 Overview
The ACWL was established in 2001 pursuant to
an agreement between a coalition of developed
and developing members of the WTO.224 As an
intergovernmental organization it “enjoys a legal status
on par with the UN and the WTO.”225 While the ACWL
was founded as, and functions as, an intergovernmental
organization independent of the WTO, its explicit
mission is to “provide developing countries and LDCs
with the legal capacity necessary to enable them to
take full advantage of the opportunities offered by the
WTO.”226 To that end, it provides developing country
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Members and LDCs with direct institutional support
for defense and prosecution of claims at pre-set
prices, technical support and capacity building, and
free legal opinions concerning WTO law. The ACWL
has been broadly credited, both by recipients of
its aid and observers in academic and civil society
organizations, with substantially supporting access
to the WTO’s dispute resolution mechanisms by
developing countries and LDCs and increasing access
to justice within the existing institutional frameworks
of WTO law.

4.1.1.2 Organizational governance
The ACWL’s governance structure was designed with
the goal of isolating the day-to-day work of the center’s
professionals from direct “control or influence by any
Member [(of the ACWL)] or group of Members.”227 The
ACWL is independent of the WTO and is governed
at the highest level by a General Assembly, which
consists of representatives from each member country
(developed and developing), as well as representatives
from any LDC entitled to the ACWL’s services.228 The
General Assembly meets biannually and performs
three functions: (1) monitoring the performance of
the ACWL, (2) electing the Management Board of
the ACWL, and (3) adopting budgets and regulations
proposed by the Management Board.229
The Management Board has a more direct role in
the management and financial control of the ACWL.
The Management Board performs four key functions:
(1) appointing the Executive Director in consultation
with Member countries, (2) preparing annual budgets
for approval and adoption by the ACWL General
Assembly, (3) supervising the administration of the
Endowment Fund, and (4) proposing rules and
regulations (for consideration and adoption by the
ACWL General Assembly).230 The Management Board
will also decide on any appeals by Members to whom
legal support in a dispute settlement proceeding has
been denied.231
The Management Board consists of six individuals who
serve “in their personal capacities and independent
of their national affiliations.”232 These individuals serve
two-year terms, and national affiliations are considered
in their appointment: three of the Management Board
members are nominated by developing country
Members of the ACWL, two by developed country
Members of the ACWL, and one by LDC beneficiaries
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of the ACWL. In addition, the Executive Director
of the ACWL serves as an ex officio member of the
Management Board. Lawyers familiar with the Centre’s
decision-making bodies noted that representatives
nominated by developed country members tend
to be retired ambassadors or civil servants, while
other Management Board members often had active
professional relationships with developing countries
or LDCs. These lawyers speculated that by turning
to retired experts, the ACWL has the advantage of
incorporating a developed country perspective while
avoiding some of the perceived conflicts that would
arise if Managing Board members had ongoing formal
relationships with developed countries who could not
use the Centre themselves.
Finally, the day-to-day operations of the ACWL
are managed by an Executive Director, who
represents the ACWL externally and reports directly
to the Management Board.233 Throughout CCSI’s
consultations, representatives from academia, civil
society organizations, private sector law firms, and
developing and developed country governments
all independently credited Frieder Roessler, the first
Executive Director of the ACWL, for contributing
significantly to its early reputation and its current
track record of success. Additionally, a number of
interviewees suggested that Roessler’s personal
reputation was a crucial element in convincing
developed countries to “buy-in” to the idea of the
ACWL and provide financial and political support to
its establishment.
Table 4 illustrates the governance structure of the
ACWL.
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According to a note by the Management Board, this governance structure aimed to put in place a system of
“checks and balances … to ensure that when a developing country Member or least-developed country seeks
legal advice from the ACWL …the ACWL’s advice will be based solely on the professional expertise of the
Executive Director and staff of the ACWL, operating entirely independently of any influence, control or fear of
consequences from any of the ACWL’s Members, especially its donor Members.”234 This note placed significant

Table 4 Governance structure of the ACWL

The General Assembly
shall …
•

Evaluate the
performance of the
ACWL;

•

Elect the Management
Board;

•

Adopt regulations
proposed by the
Management Board;

•

Adopt the annual
budget proposed
by the Management
Board;

•

Perform the functions
assigned to it under
other provisions
of the Agreement
Establishing the
ACWL.

The Management Board shall …
•

Report to the GA;

•

Take decisions necessary to ensure the
efficient and effective operation of the
ACWL in accordance with the agreement
establishing the ACWL;

•

Prepare the annual budget for the GA’s
approval;

•

The Executive Director
shall …
•

Report to the
Management Board;

•

Manage the ACWL’s dayto-day operations;

•

Decide on appeals by Members to whom
legal support in a dispute settlement
proceeding has been denied;

Hire, direct, and dismiss
the staff of the ACWL in
accordance with the staff
regulations adopted by
the General Assembly;

•

•

Supervise the administration of the
Endowment Fund;

Contract and supervise
consultants;

•

•

Appoint an external auditor;

•

Appoint the Executive Director in consultation
with Members;

•

Propose for adoption by the GA regulations
on

Submit to the
Management Board and
the General Assembly an
independently audited
statement of receipts and
expenditures relating to
the budget during the
preceding fiscal year; and

•

Represent the ACWL
externally.

•

o

Management Board procedures,

o

duties and conditions of the Executive
Director, staff, and consultants, and

o

the administration and investment
policy of the Endowment Fund; and

Perform the functions assigned to it
under other provisions of the Agreement
Establishing the ACWL.

Source: adapted from ACWL, The Governance of the ACWL: A Note by the Management Board (22 October 2015), ACWL/
MB/W/2015/20, 7 (internal citations omitted).

COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT | 51

SCOPING STUDY

weight on the limited nature of the General Assembly’s
powers to manage the operations of the ACWL, and on
the important role of the Management Board in acting
as a “‘buffer’ between the management of the ACWL’s
day-to-day operations, and ‘the policies of donor
countries … and user developing countries… .’ In other
words,” the Management Board’s note continues, “the
Management Board exists to ensure that the operations
of the ACWL are managed, not by the ACWL’s Members
themselves through the General Assembly, but by an
independent body of highly-qualified individuals that
are not answerable to the political goals of the ACWL’s
Members either individually or acting in blocs.”235 The
note also highlights the importance of the fact that
the Executive Director is not appointed by the ACWL
Members through the General Assembly, but by the
Management Board in consultation with the ACWL
Members. It emphasizes that this was done in order to
avoid politicizing the appointment process, “ensur[ing]
that the Executive Director and staff of the ACWL
would provide professional advice based on their
technical expertise and independently of any political
considerations.”236
Overall, this text emphasizes the Management Board’s
powers vis-à-vis the ACWL General Assembly. It
highlights the Management Board’s powers to take
decisions and the ACWL General Assembly’s limited
power to approve but not “review, amend, or appeal”
those decisions.237 Nevertheless, it is not certain that the
members of the ACWL General Assembly would agree
with that characterization; and it is unclear what would
happen in the event that the ACWL General Assembly
declined to approve decisions or recommendations by
the Management Board.

4.1.1.3 Scope of services
The legal services offered by the ACWL can be
generally divided into three categories: (1) assistance
in WTO dispute proceedings,238 (2) legal advice on
issues of WTO law,239 and (3) “training on WTO law,”
or what is more commonly described as “capacity
building,”240 although this Scoping Study, in defining
and conceptualizing “capacity” more broadly, would
characterize all services provided by the ACWL as
meeting some element of “capacity” challenges
experienced by states.
An overview of ACWL activities from 2008-2018 is
shown in Table 5.
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In terms of the distribution of person-hours across
these activities, one estimate is that between 40 and
60 percent of the ACWL’s work is in its non-disputerelated activities (i.e., legal opinions and training/
capacity building).241
As this subsection will discuss, these services are
inextricably interlinked and imbricated; legal opinions
support the pursuit or defense of dispute proceedings,
which provide substantive capacity building within
litigant governments that help identify new trade law
issues and support their participation in future WTO
litigation.

4.1.1.3.1 Litigation support
Direct assistance
The ACWL, uniquely among the Assistance
Mechanisms discussed in this Scoping Study, provides
direct legal support for developing countries and
LDCs in WTO litigation. The ACWL’s mandate allows
it to provide support to litigants and third-party
participants engaging in or considering WTO dispute
settlement proceedings at any and all stages of the
dispute, from preliminary dispute evaluation through
Appellate Body procedures, and compliance and
implementation.242 ACWL Members and LDCs are
charged specified hourly rates (Table 6), while nonMember developing countries must pay a higher hourly
rate for ACWL services. One of the most frequently
cited benefits of the ACWL’s direct representation
structure is that it serves as a repository of expertise
that allows infrequent WTO litigants to compete on
more or less equal terms with some of the WTO’s
largest users like the United States or the European
Union.243 Although developing countries and LDCs
individually are infrequent users of the WTO’s dispute
settlement forums, the ACWL itself is one of the
most frequent participants in WTO litigation. Since
its establishment in 2001, the ACWL has provided
direct legal support (either through its own lawyers
or through external counsel) in approximately 20% of
all WTO disputes – more than 60 proceedings.244 This
broad portfolio of cases allows the ACWL to perform
the function of “pool[ing] the legal experience of
developing countries and LDCs in WTO legal matters
and enabl[ing] each of them to draw on this collective
experience to defend their individual interests in
dispute settlement proceedings.”245

SECURING ADEQUATE LEGAL DEFENSE IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS A SCOPING STUDY

While in theory the ACWL has the ability (with the
permission of the Management Board) to refuse to
litigate truly frivolous cases, CCSI’s consultations
suggest that this option has never been exercised
and that non-meritorious cases brought to the
ACWL have historically been diverted prior to
litigation, during the diligence phase or otherwise.
It is important to note also that governments are
not required to use the ACWL, and “it is therefore
not uncommon to see a government use the
ACWL in one dispute and a commercial law firm in
another.”246
Additionally, the ACWL will at times work alongside
private counsel also engaged by the government,
on terms set by the client government. CCSI’s
consultations suggest that the Centre has historically
been quite accommodating of alternate case
management structures when client governments
request them. Consultations also suggest that the
ACWL is able to effectively do this because it has
a good reputation and private sector firms are
therefore willing to work as co-counsel with the
ACWL on matters.

A number of government officials from low and middleincome countries noted in Scoping Study consultations
that while strict public sector procurement processes
present hurdles to benefiting from private sector advice
in early-stage ISDS disputes, the ACWL’s status as a
trusted and well-established treaty-based organization
means that it is easier to both seek and to justify seeking
the ACWL’s help at the earliest stages of disputes, or
even when disputes are being considered. There is
some empirical evidence to support the idea that the
ACWL has helped secure more thorough representation
for developing countries and LDCs – a 2010 study of
the ACWL’s impact noted that the Centre seems to
have allowed developing countries “to pursue disputes
undertaken more fully.”247 However, it does not appear
that the ACWL’s existence has brought many “new users”
into the WTO system – the overwhelming majority of
clients of the ACWL had participated in WTO disputes
prior to working with the Centre.248

Table 5 ACWL Activities: 2008-2018

ACWL
Activities

2018 2017

2016

2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008

Total WTO
17
disputes in
which the
ACWL provided
support

14

14

10

8

8

8

3

7

6

7

New requests for 5
support in WTO
disputes

3

4

4

1

3

5

0

4

3

2

Legal opinions

237

186

196

181

204

215

231

218

206

194

175

Certificates of
training

39

37

38

34

37

37

30

31

29

34

32
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Rosters of external counsel and pre-set fees

4.1.1.3.2 Legal advice

In the event of conflicts of interest (usually, when two
adverse countries entitled to the ACWL’s services both
request the Centre’s assistance in the same dispute),
the ACWL will represent the first country that requested
its assistance. With respect to the other country, the
ACWL maintains a curated list of lawyers and law firms
who have agreed to represent ACWL Members and
LDCs on the same terms as those provided by the
Centre, including with respect to fixed rates.249 As of
2017, 36 firms and individuals, including a number
of prominent international law firms, had joined the
ACWL’s roster of external counsel.250

In addition to direct representation and dispute
support, the ACWL provides on average 200 legal
opinions per year on issues of WTO law. The legal
opinions are entirely free of charge for Members and
can also be obtained at set fees by non-Member
developing countries.251 These opinions, granted on
a strictly confidential basis, take forms ranging from
extensive meetings to lengthy written opinions.252 The
opinions fall into three general categories:

The ACWL has an External Counsel Fund, fixed at
CHF300,000, that is used to pay these attorneys
(depending on the eligibility of the client country for
free or reduced fee services). For 2018, it was expected
that the expenditures would not exceed CHF75,000.

•

•

Technical Assistance Trust Fund
In 2002, the ACWL decided to establish a Technical
Expertise Trust Fund to be able to finance the
preparation of the underlying technical dossiers
required in complex dispute settlement proceedings.
Through experience, it became clear that in certain
kinds of technical disputes, particularly those pertaining
to the WTO Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade
and Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures, the highlyspecialized expertise that is necessary during the
course of litigation was a barrier for many developing
countries who do not have this expertise in-house,
and cannot afford to hire experts on an ad hoc basis.
The ACWL budget was also not large enough to
pay the costs necessary to prepare these kinds of
technical cases. Developing countries and countries in
transition that are ACWL Members as well as LDCs,
can request disbursements from this trust fund up to
CHF100,000. The amount of the subsidy varies, from
20% to 90% of costs, by the category of membership
of the ACWL (Categories A, B, C and LDCs, discussed
below). The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
has contributed CHF250,000 (EUR171,500) to the Trust
Fund for a period of three years. The balance as of 31
December 2018 was roughly CHF550,000.
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•

Systemic: General or systemic issues arising in
connection with negotiations and WTO decisionmaking. They include legal issues raised by
negotiating proposals, arising in trade policy
reviews, and connected to the work of various
WTO Committees;
Internal compliance: States seeking advice
regarding the consistency of their own measures
and other international treaties (e.g., subsidies,
trade remedies, intellectual property protections)
with WTO law. The ACWL notes that these are
sometimes used by ACWL Members and LDCs
to help resolve internal disagreements within
the government about the WTO-consistency of
proposed measures; and
External compliance: States seeking advice
regarding the WTO-consistency of measures
taken by other WTO Members and legal options
for addressing those inconsistencies.253

In the period from 2014-2018, 35% of legal opinions
related to systemic issues, 36% to issues of internal
compliance, and 29% to external compliance.254
In 2015, the ACWL General Assembly approved a
proposal enabling the ACWL to use its Roster of
External Counsel to provide these legal opinions when
conflicts of interests prevented the ACWL from doing
so. (Previously, the Roster of External Counsel had
only been used in the context of dispute settlement
proceedings). Under this approach, when the ACWL
has a conflict of interest, LDCs and developing country
Members can obtain a free legal opinion from a
lawyer/law firm of their choosing that is on the Roster.
The ACWL will pay the fees of the lawyer/law firm.255
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Several developing country representatives in
consultations for this Scoping Study noted that in
the context of ISDS disputes, budget constraints,
strict procurement laws, and anti-corruption
regimes make it difficult to quickly secure the advice
of private-sector counsel in the earliest stages of a
dispute or before taking actions that could trigger
disputes. These representatives frequently pointed
to the ACWL’s free provision of legal advice and
opinions as a crucial resource that circumvented
these restrictions and allowed them to quickly take
informed action. Bohanes and Vidal-Leon note
that the terms of these opinions, especially when
unrelated to imminent disputes, would be “difficult
to match for a private sector provider,” and that the
expertise, informality, and accommodation offered
by the ACWL’s legal opinions uniquely positioned
the ACWL among institutions.256 However, CCSI’s
consultations revealed that at least one uppermiddle-income government has structured a
standing retainer agreement with a private sector
firm that allows for similar access to on-demand
legal opinions in the investment law context, albeit
at a (relatively inexpensive) fixed cost.257
However, it is important to realize that ACWL
opinions are not without restrictions. First, “the
limitations of the ACWL’s mandate necessarily
limit” the benefits of the ACWL’s opinions, as the
ACWL cannot advise on non-legal issues “such
as economic policy or negotiating strategy or
negotiating objectives.”258 These kinds of non-legal
issues may prove to be more pervasive to questions
of investment law than with respect to WTO law.
Second, the inability of the ACWL to volunteer its
services means that governments are unable to seek
help with “unknown unknowns” – issues that might
present serious future challenges but have not
been identified in a particularized way by the client
government.259

4.1.1.3.3 Capacity building
Finally, the ACWL engages in significant capacity
building for developing countries and LDCs who
access its services. This capacity building was integral
to its design, and takes three forms: first, traditional
capacity building through trainings and seminars;
second, hands-on training for government officials
through organized secondments to the Centre;
and third, inherent capacity building through close

collaboration with government officials making use of the
Centre’s direct representation services. Claudia Orozco
Jaramillo, then-Minister Counsellor with the Permanent
Mission of Colombia to the WTO who is broadly credited
with originating the idea of the ACWL,260 described the
philosophy of the ACWL’s representation quite clearly.
“[T]he essence of the ACWL is not to be a law firm but
to contribute to development by helping developing
countries learn by doing. For this to happen, both the
ACWL and the user countries need to permanently
bear in mind this goal. Whenever a user country
decides to participate in a case it should appoint a
team of Government officials to represent the country
and request that such team be coached to perform as
much and as far as possible. The essence of the ACWL
is to help developing countries to move forward on
the path to development through enhancement of
their human resources and institutional organization
and by acting with the conviction that all, even
marginal contributions, are significant to this overall
purpose.”261
With respect to more traditional capacity building,
the ACWL’s main training and seminar program is
a 9-month training course that meets weekly and is
offered to WTO delegates from developing countries
and LDCs. Additionally, the ACWL offers a number of
ad hoc trainings, which can be set up at the request
of governments.262 These trainings are open to invitees
of any developing country Members and LDCs, and
so occasionally include private sector representatives
invited by governments. Users of these training services
who were consulted by CCSI (mostly, but not entirely
developing country governments) describe these
trainings as substantially similar to those provided by
other nonprofit organizations, governments, and private
sector firms. However, the ACWL’s annual training course
has the advantage of being located in Geneva, and so
is easily accessible for countries’ representatives to the
WTO.
The ACWL also operates an intensive 9-month
secondment for trade lawyers from developing country
Members and LDCs, which functions as a paid training
program that places these lawyers directly alongside
ACWL staff. Although this project was not initiated
until 2005, its presence was part of the early plans for
the ACWL.263 This program has other parallels; in the
process of compiling this paper CCSI spoke to private
sector lawyers who had negotiated contracts that
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had involved placing government lawyers in similar
secondments inside their firms. Nevertheless, the
ACWL’s secondment program allows trade lawyers
from developing countries and LDCs to gain substantial
experience with hands-on WTO litigation that would
be difficult for these governments (who, individually,
are not frequent WTO litigants) to duplicate in other
contexts, including within their own government or
perhaps, even, in a private firm.264
Perhaps most significantly, the ACWL contributes to
developing legal capacity in its users by permitting,
indeed requiring, client governments to work closely
with the Centre’s staff during the course of direct
representation through the ACWL.265 Although this
feature is often overlooked, lawyers who had worked
for the ACWL directly, interfaced with ACWL services
from within developing country governments, or
coordinated with the ACWL from the private sector
all credited the ACWL’s lean staffing model with
substantially increasing the capacity of developing
country governments. Although a number of
government representatives noted that the ACWL’s
resources and work model made it slightly less
responsive to short-term demands than a private
sector firm would be, they also pointed out that
the ACWL’s staffing model meant that the Centre,
by design and necessity, worked closely with inhouse government lawyers and provided intense
hands-on training opportunities that were rarely
available from other sources. As Claudia Orozco
Jaramillo’s comments above indicate, this training-bycollaboration was always intended to be a benefit of
the ACWL’s service provision structure. Although this
is not unique to the ACWL, and many governments
operate “mixed” models of representation that
involve collaboration between private sector counsel
and government lawyers, a number of government
attorneys were of the opinion that the ACWL’s
collaborative representation process provided a vastly
more valuable capacity building opportunity than any
private-sector partnership they had experienced.
The ACWL has been highly praised for its contribution
to enhancing the legal capacity of the states who
access its services. It is important to note, however,
that the ACWL’s capacity building programs focus
on developing technical competence and expertise
within the specific framework of WTO litigation rather
than on building more broadly governments’ capacity
to advocate for their national economic interests.266
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As such, the ACWL’s model is well suited to a more
narrow-conception of capacity building but is not
well-suited to address organizational, institutional
or systemic problems that might substantially hinder
states’ ability to effectively participate in the WTO
system and advance their economic interests. These
systemic barriers could take a variety of forms, from
breakdowns in inter-governmental decision-making
processes to failures to communicate effectively with
the private sector to fear of economic retaliation from
trading partners.267 Without the ability to provide aid
in these areas, the ACWL’s interventions are limited
to building technical competence and “equality of
arms” within existing international legal frameworks
rather than supporting the development of more
effective and equal institutional forms. Still, the narrow
focus of the ACWL’s capacity building effort may have
significantly eased the ACWL’s acceptance by the
global community.
In CCSI’s consultations the ACWL’s success was also,
in part, attributed to its ability to focus on legal rather
than policy issues, and thus retain an aura of neutrality.
The ACWL’s 2017 Annual Report, in response to the
frequently asked question, “How does the ACWL
ensure the neutrality and impartiality of its advice?”
frames this narrow approach as a key feature of its
neutrality. As a matter of policy, “[t]he ACWL provides
only legal, not political, advice.”268 Similarly, lawyers
involved in the formation of the ACWL noted in
consultations with CCSI that perceptions of the
Centre as “apolitical” were crucial to its acceptance
by both developed and developing WTO members.
It is also important to note that the use of the term
“narrow” in this context reflects the scope of ACWL
interventions rather than their quality or intensity. In
fact, multiple civil society and developing country
observers consulted by CCSI believe that the ACWL’s
capacity building programs are quite effective in
helping government officials acquire and maintain
technical legal expertise in the narrow sense.
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4.1.1.4 Funding
From its initial formation, the ACWL’s funding
structure was central to its mission. Claudia Orozco
Jaramillo was very explicit in her belief that the
Centre’s funding structures were essential to its
effective governance, long-term viability, and
immediate legitimacy in the eyes of the international
community:
[The ACWL] needed to be economically
independent to ensure stability and credibility.
Additionally, the need for economic stability had
to be balanced with the need to ensure that the
long-term viability of the facility would result from
the quality of its services. For that reason, an
economic model was developed based on a trust
fund that provided certain stability combined with
payable services. Even though some developing
countries lack resources required to pay legal fees
at market rates, services should not be offered
free of charge. Free of charge services affect the
quality of the services and the dynamics between
the provider and the user. The model had to
empower developing country users as owners and
clients of the facility.269

When the ACWL was established, it was envisioned
that, after an initial five-year transition period (20012005), it would be self-sustainable, funded by a
combination of (1) earnings on an Endowment Fund
funded by contributions of developed and developing
country ACWL Members and other governments, and
(2) fees charged to developing countries and LDCs for
support in WTO disputes.270 The ACWL also has some
ability to accept contributions from other sources for
“specific purposes that are not related to dispute
settlement cases,”271 but segregates those funds
from its core functions. This mixed funding model has
been described by those close to the Centre as “coownership” between developing and developed states,
and a number of lawyers familiar with the work of the
ACWL have credited this built-in reliance on developing
country funds for the Centre’s perceived institutional
independence from developed country donors.
With respect to the Endowment Fund, it is primarily
funded by its developed country Members, which now
number eleven (there are also thirty-six developing
country members, one associate developed country
member, and forty-four LDCs entitled to services
without membership). A “majority of the ACWL’s funding
originates from development agencies or development
directorates within a Ministry of Foreign Affairs. …These
contributions are normally considered as part of each
Member’s Aid for Trade effort and can be categorized
as [official development assistance].”272 Each developed
country member has contributed at least $1,000,000 to

Table 6 Hourly and maximum total charge to complainants and respondents in WTO panel
proceedings762

Category

CHF per hour

Maximum fee for a WTO
panel proceeding

Category A Member

324

CHF46,628

Category B Member

243

CHF35,721

Category C Member

162

CHF23,814

Least developed country

40

CHF5,880
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the operation of the ACWL through either endowment
fund contributions or direct contributions to the annual
budget.273
In terms of voluntary contributions from nongovernmental sources, while those are permitted
under the ACWL’s financial regulations, they have been
discouraged on the ground that they create tensions
with the “ACWL’s impartial and non-issue driven
nature.”274 On at least one occasion, for instance, “a
private foundation decided not to provide funding
when the ACWL could not guarantee that it would
take certain legal positions.”275
With respect to service fees charged to users,
contemporary observers of the ACWL’s formation noted
that this charging model was rooted in “four elements:
the ability to pay, the user pays principle, the need to
create incentives to become [a founding funder of the
Centre], and the need to avoid frivolous cases.”276 “The
ACWL charges developing countries and LDCs for
access to the ACWL’s direct representation services on
a tiered payment scale, with country categorizations
based on their underlying economic activity or GNP
per capita (country categories A, B, C, LDC). Category
A countries, which are charged the highest amount,
are those whose economic activity makes up >1.5% of
World Trade Share (WTS) or those who are identified
as High-Income Countries based on GNP per capita.
Category B countries are defined as countries whose
economic activity makes up between 0.15% and 1.5%
of WTS or those who are identified as Upper MiddleIncome Countries based on GNP per capita. Category
C countries are those whose economies represent
<0.15% of WTS, and the lowest fees are charged to
countries identified as LDCs.277 Services other than
direct representation (i.e., legal advice and training/
capacity building) are provided free of charge to
developing country members and LDCs. Table 6
illustrates the hourly rates and the maximum fees that
the ACWL will charge different Members and LDCs for
support as a complainant or respondent in WTO panel
proceedings. It sets additional maximum charges for
other phases of dispute settlement (e.g., consultations,
Appellate Body proceedings, participation in different
phases as a third-party).278
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As indicated in Table 6, countries at each payment tier
are charged a different per-hour rate for the work of
the ACWL’s staff, ranging from CHF324 Swiss francs
per hour for Category A countries to CHF40 per hour
for LDCs. In the event of a dispute between two
Members or LDCs who both seek the services of the
ACWL, these fees are raised by 20% to match fees
provided to private sector counsel.279 Outside counsel
is then engaged for the party who is not represented
by the ACWL,280 and will have agreed to charge fees
commensurate with those charged by the ACWL.
Any payment required by outside counsel beyond
the ACWL’s established fee structure is paid by the
Centre.281
In addition to offering services at discounted hourly
rates, ACWL provides detailed “time budgets”
for different types of representation that include a
projected number of hours for each activity and a
total maximum cost.282 The costs estimated by these
time budgets represent a firm cap on the amount the
ACWL will charge for the described services, although
all parties consulted on the topic acknowledged that
the actual work done by ACWL lawyers frequently
exceeded (in some cases, significantly) the time
budgets provided on an uncompensated basis,
although no one felt that the quality of service, or the
ACWL’s dedication to the client, diminished after the
time budget had expired. Government officials who
worked directly with the ACWL cited this as a key
feature of the ACWL’s appeal, as it allows states to
predictably budget for the Centre’s services without
noticeably restricting the availability of resources
to deal with unexpected complications. A number
of developing country officials told CCSI that the
ACWL’s fee structure and transparency provided
a public good beyond their role in the ACWL’s
representation; these time budgets (and maximum
fees charged) have occasionally been used as a
negotiating tool for developing country governments
securing representation from private sector law firms,
and the ACWL’s existence as a “best alternative to a
negotiated agreement” has allowed some countries
to secure substantially lower rates for private
sector representation. One noted that although his
government had not engaged in active negotiation
with private law firms to substantially lower fees,
this interviewee had seen bids decrease by 20 to 30
percent as the legal market adjusted to the presence
of a low-cost competitor (the ACWL). However,
Bohanes and Vidal-Leon point out that the ACWL’s

SECURING ADEQUATE LEGAL DEFENSE IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS A SCOPING STUDY

rise to prominence coincided with broader shifts in
international legal markets and the expanding role
of firms in developing country markets like China,
India, and Latin America, and so might not be the
sole or direct cause of price changes.283
Despite the original vision for the Centre, the ACWL
has never achieved financial self-sustainability.
After its first transitional phase, at the end of 2005,
the Endowment Fund stood at CHF18.0 million,
with projected yields of roughly CHF0.8 million per
year. Fees for services rendered were estimated at
CHF0.3 million per year. Together, those amounts
were less than one half of the annual cost of ACWL
operations (CHF2.3 at the time). A 2006 Task Force
report concluded that, given the growth and success
of the ACWL, and the size of and returns to the
Endowment Fund to that point, it was doubtful
that the Endowment Fund would ever reach a size
necessary to ensure the ACWL’s self-sufficiency.284
Additionally, while demand for all of the ACWL’s
services has increased, a significant portion of
that demand continues to be for legal opinions
and training/capacity building activities, services
for which the ACWL does not charge. Due to the
increased demand for ACWL services and associated
staffing needs, the annual budget of the ACWL
has grown (albeit modestly) each year. For 2016, it
was roughly CHF4.3 million;285 and for 2019, it was
estimated at roughly CHF4.7 million.286 In contrast
income from legal fees averaged only CHF161,000
per year from 2002-2014; stated differently, legal
fees have constituted on average roughly 4 percent
of the ACWL’s annual revenues.287 Notwithstanding
that gap, at least one external audit of the ACWL
commissioned by a developed country ACWL
Member recommended against any increase in fees
on the ground that it would have limited impact for
financial sustainability but “would likely discourage
Category B and Category C Developing Countries
from reaching out for ACWL assistance.”288
To date, ACWL governance has used five yearperiods to conduct major evaluations of the need for
and role of ACWL services, examine funding needs,
and plan for whether and how to meet those funding
needs. The budget for the 2017-2021 period is
estimated at CHF23.548 million. Taking into account
revenue from the Endowment Fund (which, by the
end of 2015, had reached roughly CHF26 million)

that could be withdrawn to fund the Centre over the
five-year window, CHF20 million in additional voluntary
contributions was determined necessary to cover the
ACWL’s financial needs through 2021.289 It is expected
that these funds will need to come from voluntary
contributions of developed country Members. Funding
appears to be an ongoing challenge for the ACWL.
While users, donors, past and current employees,
external auditors, academics, and others, widely give it
high praise, experience shows that it continues to need
to raise significant sums to support its five-year budgets.

4.1.1.5 Scalability
As of 31 December 2018, there were eleven developed
country Members, one developed country associate
Member, thirty-six developing country Members of
the ACWL, and forty-four LDCs entitled to its services
without a membership requirement.290 This represents
just over forty percent of WTO Members. Also, as of
31 December 2018 there were fifteen members of staff
(twelve lawyers, including the Executive Director, and
three administrative staff), and four attorneys with the
ACWL under its secondment program.
Given the resources required to hire and retain quality
staff, and to devote the time necessary to provide quality
legal support, the ACWL would not be able to increase
its activities absent additional funding and could face
challenges meeting needs if there were any dramatic
increases in demand for ACWL services.291

4.1.2 African Legal Support Facility
4.1.2.1 Overview
The ALSF, based in Abidjan, Côte D’Ivoire, is a public
international, treaty-based organization hosted by the
African Development Bank (AfDB) Group.292 The ALSF
provides legal advice and technical assistance to African
countries with respect to the negotiation of complex
commercial transactions, creditor litigation, and other
related sovereign transactions or disputes, including
with respect to international investment law. Its mission
is “[a]chieving sustainable legal capacity for Africa,”293
to be met through its goal of removing asymmetric
technical capacities and to level the playing field of legal
expertise among parties to litigation and negotiations.
All of its activities aim to build additional legal capacity.294
The ALSF was established by African finance ministers
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following a call, in June 2003, for the creation of a legal
technical assistance facility to help Highly Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPCs) address the growing problem
of vulture funds (legal claims based on distressed debt).
The Commission for Africa again reiterated the need
for such a facility in March 2005. The G8 recognized
that lawsuits instituted by vulture funds against African
countries were an obstacle to debt relief arrangements
that had been agreed in 2005. The ALSF was created
by a treaty that came into force in December 2008 and
per its founding treaty, will terminate in 2022.295

4.1.2.2 Organizational governance
The governance structure of ALSF consists of a
Governing Council representing twelve members
of participating states and institutions, consisting
of: a Management Board composed of five regional
member countries of the AfDB (each serving in his or
her personal capacity),296 four OECD member-states,297
one non-OECD member-state,298 a permanent seat
for a representative of the AfDB, and a seat for an
international non-governmental organization. The
technical staff is headed by a Director.
According to one interviewee who is familiar with the
founding and operation of the ALSF, key traits that
contributed to its success were that it was a regional
initiative, and not something that came from the G20,
G7, or other organizations outside of the region, and
that it started with African institutional support (the
AfDB), and thus benefitted from trust relationships
that were already established.299

4.1.2.3 Scope of Services
ALSF is a “broker-plus” model. ALSF helps countries
to engage outside counsel, but ALSF in-house counsel
also give advice and guide governments on what
that outside counsel is saying and in managing this
relationship.300 ALSF’s eight technical staff maintain
an internal knowledge base and expertise and are
thus able to help governments interpret and enact
the advice that they receive from outside counsel, as
well as to assist governments with relevant capacity
building and other tools that will strengthen the ability
of governments to act on their own.301
While ALSF was primarily founded with the idea of
helping to combat issues related to vulture funds, in
the early days of the ALSF it became clear that the
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problem that HIPCs were experiencing went beyond,
and was more profound than, issues surrounding the
lawsuits initiated by vulture funds, and that there was
a need for broader advisory services with respect to
foreign investment, particularly with respect to natural
resources and infrastructure contracts, and related
capacity building.302 ALSF now engages in a much
wider range of services ranging from negotiations,
litigation support, capacity building, and knowledge
management, and will coordinate with outside services
providers to engage, as appropriate, to facilitate these
services.303
ALSF conducts diligence around every requested
service, and while it has no formal policy surrounding
requests that should be rejected, some may be
rejected during the course of ALSF’s internal diligence
policy.

4.1.2.3.1 Engaging ALSF and Outside Counsel
ALSF operates upon request of governments. A
government must submit a formal written request for
assistance to the ALSF. This requirement is based on
a desire, by the ALSF, to ensure that there is sufficient
political buy-in to ALSF assistance before ALSF will
engage.304 As such, it has been the experience of ALSF
that when governments agree to formally submit a
request, there is broader agreement that they need or
desire specific assistance and are willing to request it
from the ALSF.305
In all cases, while ALSF will facilitate access to outside
counsel, governments make the final call on which
counsel they hire. The objective is to ensure that
governments trust outside counsel to the greatest
extent possible.306
In the past ALSF used a procurement process and
provided a roster of firms that were available for
engagement by governments. This system was in
many ways difficult to manage, not least because it
meant ALSF was constantly negotiating counsel fees
(in its “broker” capacity).307 It is understood that ALSF
has now moved to a panel system, which is easier to
manage, but which also means that rates are locked
in for a longer period of time, which is a trade-off.308
Under a panel approach, ALSF enters into framework
contracts with firms. When a request for assistance has
been received, ALSF then brokers with 4-6 firms to
enter into a procurement (including bids and financial
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proposals), which can be done relatively quickly
under existing framework agreements.309 ALSF does
maintain terms of reference for flat-fee arrangements
but has found that this kind of financial arrangement
is very difficult for litigation, so has generally focused
on other options of reduced fee arrangements,
which all vary by the kind of assistance required
and by firm.310 Some firms do work on a pro bono
basis, some do one hour of pro bono for each hour
of paid time, others commit to pro bono capacity
building with paid advice. Success fees in litigation
are also possible, however, ALSF did not prefer this
remuneration method.311 A key to ALSF’s success
is “demanding heavily discounted rates and brutal
negotiation” with service providers.312
In some cases, ALSF encountered political sensitivity
among client governments during the process of
hiring outside international counsel.313 In order to
ease political tensions in the client country, ALSF
began a practice of first coordinating the hiring
of a domestic firm in the client country to act as
local counsel, and then asked that this firm hire
international counsel in coordination with ALSF.314
This small change in practice made political issues
much easier to navigate because local counsel
typically knew the decision-makers in the client
country, and the government decision-makers knew
and trusted local counsel to help lead them through
the process of hiring and engaging with international
counsel.315
However, allowing client-countries to select their
own firms and go through their own procurement
processes did result in some tensions with some
ALSF donors.316 As a general matter, donors were
interested in clear and transparent procurement
processes, which was not always the case in every
client country.317 While this was a difficult tension for
ALSF to navigate, they generally leave this kind of
process and decision-making up to the client country,
as long as certain general minimum requirements of
both the process and the selected firm are met.318
ALSF also facilitates grants and loans to client
countries. With respect to litigation services, ALSF
uses grants and loans to offset the cost of outside
counsel.319 In order to streamline this approach and
make it more consistent, ALSF created a country
list that helped to qualify what the default position
would be on each project.320 This list was based on

various country-based sustainability analyses (such as
the IMF’s) and then also on the specifics of the sector
and project.321
ALSF has also started doing “reimbursable advances” for
services, with respect to which repayment is contingent
on success.322 The World Bank Group uses similar
structures, called “reimbursable advisory services.”
While this project was difficult to start, it is envisioned
that these kinds of financial advances will form the bulk
of ALSF’s financial arrangements for legal support in
the coming years.323 While these advances, can be
a source of financial risk to the institution, the ALSF
decided that the value of governments being able to
get advice through this kind of financing, and, critically,
governments feeling like they could take independent
advice, outweighed the institutional risk.324
Under a “reimbursable advance, ALSF directly funds
the lawyers selected by the government to complete a
specific project, and then requires the government to
reimburse the ALSF if the project is successful.325 What
defines “success” in each context is pre-determined
and agreed between ALSF and the client government,
and is entirely context-dependent (e.g. the negotiation
achieves financial close).326 A “reimbursable advance”
effectively amounts to an interest-free loan to the
government where ALSF (and by extension, a donor
institution) has agreed to take the first loss in case of
failure.327 The rationale for this type of financial structure
is based on the ultimate objective of development and
ALSF being a development institution.328 While this kind
of financial arrangement was technically available from
ALSF for years, it did not gain any interest until recently.
One interviewee attributed this delayed take-up to
ALSF needing to first gain the necessary trust among its
users.329

4.1.2.3.2 Capacity building
ALSF engages in capacity building on a project/clientspecific basis as well as through the ALSF Academy.

Project-specific capacity building and trainings
Each of ALSF’s projects blends capacity building with
advisory services, the precise nature of which depends
on the project at hand. This combination is considered
highly effective, particularly when compared with
capacity building that only takes place in classroom
settings outside of specific negotiations or litigation.330
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While ALSF used to do more of this kind of general
training, it found that one-off classroom sessions
divorced from specific projects had little impact and
were not useful from a cost-benefit perspective.331 Now,
for example, if a country has requested negotiation
assistance, capacity building related to that project
may involve analyzing and critiquing actual contracts
that have previously been negotiated by the client
country and examining the contracts against market
practice and what other countries are doing in similar
circumstances.332 This kind of capacity building has
been viewed as being far more impactful, although it
is much more difficult, specific, and time-consuming
to build into projects than generic training.333
In one interviewee’s experience, it is critically important
to lead a project with this kind of relevant training (the
above example would be relevant, for example, prior
to a contract negotiation).334 It not only helps to give
government officials an overview of the process that
will occur and to build specific knowledge, but it also
provides an opportunity for the government officials
to get to know, and ideally have more trust in, outside
counsel, which is viewed by the ALSF as critical to the
success of any project.335 One low-income government
official felt that this kind of capacity building may be
useful to a certain extent, but that because much of
any actual negotiation is still managed by a private
firm (through coordination with ALSF) the kind of
capacity building that is necessary to actually transfer
knowledge is lacking in the ALSF model.336

ALSF Academy Project
Through the ALSF Academy Project, the ALSF is
now launching a three-level capacity building and
certification program in negotiating commercial
agreements for African lawyers and experts.337 Firms
can pay a minimal sum and their lawyers can access the
Academy. The first cohort is still proceeding through
this one-year course, which began at the end of 2018.
ALSF started the ALSF Academy Project based on the
recognition that equitable and durable agreements
surrounding investment projects and ensuring that
they are negotiated to stand the test of time, are
key components of attracting and retaining FDI.
However, some countries may face challenges
in negotiating these deals because some topics,
requiring specific expertise, are often not taught at
African institutions.338 The ALSF Academy Project aims
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to remove the asymmetrical technical capacities and
level the field of expertise among parties to litigation
and negotiation.339

4.1.2.3.3 Knowledge sharing
ALSF has attempted to do formal and informal
“information sharing” among governments, but one
interviewee notes that this is fraught with challenges.340
One of the challenges is antitrust – especially if there
is any collusion about pricing. ALSF found that the
best way to promote information sharing was by
organizing peer-to-peer regional events on certain
topics, with a requirement that whomever attends has
to present on what his or her government is doing with
respect to a given topic.341 In so doing, ALSF found
that government officials also speak to each other
during breaks, or at dinner or lunch, and that other,
more informal information-sharing often happens in
this context.342

4.1.2.4 Funding
ALSF has a variety of donors including AfDB, the
African Development Fund, the Netherlands,
the United Kingdom, other regional and national
development agencies and institutions, and states.343
Since becoming operational in 2010 through 2018, it
has received $81.51 million in contributions.344
As a general matter, in order to minimize conflicts
between these donors and ALSF and its grantees,
ALSF has made efforts to build a wall around its
governance structures and to require donors give
into a multi-donor fund while prohibiting donations
to any specific project or case.345 This was viewed
as particularly critical in cases in which ALSF was
supporting litigation services.
When it comes to potential conflicts of interest between
the ALSF and its donors, ALSF also emphasizes the
role of client-country representatives (acting in their
individual capacity) in ALSF’s management and
decision-making structure.
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4.1.3 International Development Law
Organization, Investment Support Programme
for Least Developed Countries
4.1.3.1 Overview
The ISP/LDCs program was designed in collaboration
with the UN Office of the High Representative
for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked
Developing Countries and Small Island Developing
States and was launched in September 2017.346
The ISP/LDCs program provides on-demand legal
and professional assistance to LDC governments347
and eligible state-owned (SOEs) or private sector
small and medium-sized entities for investmentrelated negotiations, dispute settlement, and
other investment-related matters by matching
beneficiaries with support providers.348 The ISP/
LDCs program also supports training and capacity
building activities.349 The ISP/LDCs program is at
an early phase. It has begun providing advice to
countries on negotiations of investment treaties
and is in discussions with beneficiaries and support
providers to begin facilitating the representation of
states in ISDS proceedings.
The objectives of the ISP/LDCs program are to ensure
that LDCs derive maximum benefit from existing
investment opportunities, to increase sustainable
investment flows, and to promote greater economic
diversification. In order to accomplish these
objectives, ISP/LDCs seeks to address the capacity
constraints that LDC governments, SOEs, and small
and medium-sized private sector entities may face in
investment relationships and with foreign investors
by providing pro-bono assistance from lawyers and
other expert partners.350 All operational expenses
are provided through donor funds.
The ISP/LDCs program envisions that all costs,
such as logistical costs, expert fees (where pro
bono services are unavailable), and travel expenses
for experts, will be covered, but the budget is not
unlimited.351 Expenses for a typical ISDS dispute,
for example, are currently beyond the means of the
program.352

4.1.3.2 Scope of services
The ISP/LDC program is demand-driven, and can be
used to facilitate anything in the broad category of

“investment-related” services, including negotiations,
dispute settlement, and improving skill and capacity.353
With respect to investment-related negotiations (which
can include investment agreements or contracts) and
disputes, including investor-state dispute settlement
procedures, support may, for example, include: reviewing
the feasibility of an investment, drafting contract
provisions, assisting with treaty drafting, review or
negotiations, implementing treaty provisions, mediation
or alternative dispute settlement, or preparing for and
engaging in dispute settlement/ISDS.354
ISP/LDCs offers matching services for experts and
beneficiaries. It does not provide direct advisory services
in-house. However, as the program scales up and as
funding becomes available, it may hire individuals
to conduct relevant training and capacity building
activities, oversee service provision, and provide shortterm technical assistance to beneficiaries.355
Assistance that can be provided by the ISP/LDCs
program is wide-ranging and limited only by the
requests on investment-related services that may come
from beneficiaries, and the experts that the ISP/LDCs
program is able to facilitate (within the context of its
budget and available pro bono services). The ISP/LDCs
program has established a roster of law firms and other
experts who are willing to provide advice and assistance
to eligible beneficiaries at no cost (any residual costs
would be made up by the ISP/LDCs program, not the
beneficiary).356 The role of the ISP/LDCs program is to
match the needs of the beneficiary to the skills and
availability of partners, and ensure that decision-making
on expert engagement remains with the beneficiary.357
Once this relationship has been established, ISP/LDCs
remains available and receives regular reports, assists
as needed in paperwork, pays expenses and disburses
funds against deliverables (where applicable). The
primary relationship remains between the beneficiary
and the expert.
Currently, the ISP/LDC roster consists of about thirty
trusted law firms and other organizations. While more
were interested in joining, ISP/LDCs found that including
more, at this preliminary stage, was unnecessary.358
However, the program has fielded some requests that
may require a broader range of expertise in the future
(for example, with respect to damage experts or other
technical issues).359 One interviewee noted that even
though the roster is limited, it includes large firms that
have a wealth of expertise in a wide range of topics, so
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the program already includes expertise to cover much
more than just arbitration services.360
The range of ISP/LDCs roster could be a benefit as it
can draw on a broader range of expertise for certain
kinds of assistance. For example, with respect to treaty
negotiation services, several interviewees familiar
with treaty negotiations and Assistance Mechanisms
stated that law firms are not well placed to advise on
treaty negotiations, but ISP/LDCs broader roster may
permit beneficiaries to draw on expertise outside of
law firms.361
Eligible participants in the ISP/LDCs program can
submit a request directly from the ISP/LDCs website,
which is available in English and French, and will soon
be available in Portuguese.362 The request is evaluated,
and program staff will then reach out to facilitate
engagement with the beneficiary.
ISP/LSCs has experienced some expected growing
pains in convincing both governments and lawyers that
this kind of organization and the services it provides are
a plausible avenue to pursue.363 The ISP/LDCs program
sees trustworthiness as the main issue that it will need
to overcome, just as the ACWL, the ALSF, and other
established programs have, and this is something
that must be developed over time.364 One interviewee
noted that the reputation of the IDLO Director-General,
Irene Khan, has helped in establishing a certain level
of trust from the beginning.365 Other factors that this
interviewee believes will establish a certain level of
comfort that will at least lead to initial conversations
with clients include: “(1) a good reputation in rule of
law and independence, (2) some funding to support
the intervention, (3) a respectable list of partners.”366
These factors are absolutely critical given the sensitive
and confidential relationships that will need to be
established between ISP/LDCs’ beneficiaries and
service providers.

Commission announced a decision to set aside €1
million for the ISP/LDCs program.368 The program
finally received those funds in December 2019.369
With a fully-funded €2 million in donations, ISP/LDCs
envisions that it would be able to make about twelve
interventions of medium size, which could take the
form of arbitrations or large-scale trainings, but, of
course, the program is in a nascent stage and plans to
internalize lessons learned as it evolves.370
One interviewee familiar with IDLO’s operations noted
that one inevitable challenge with any Assistance
Mechanism, including the ISP/LDCs program, is
ensuring that there is a secure source of funding. For
ISP/LDCs, it can, with respect to some projects, benefit
from the “corporate social responsibility” attitude of
some firms who are willing to provide pro bono or
low-cost services. However, this interviewee noted
that “when it comes to a contentious and hot issue
like ISDS, you have the added challenge of eating
someone else’s lunch.”371 In other words, the program
will be directly competing with profit-making firms in
this area and recognizes that this is a potential conflict
for those firms.372 The extent to which this is a hurdle,
and if so, whether this hurdle can be surmounted,
remains to be seen.

4.1.3.4 Scalability

4.1.3.3 Funding

One interviewee familiar with ISP/LDCs’ operations
views the program as very well-designed to be
scalable.373 ISP/LDCs has secured commitments for
pro-bono services from all members of its current
roster and envisions adding more experts as it grows.
Thus far, commitments from listed roster-members
are anywhere from 10-20 hours, to “unlimited,” and
everything in between.374 Of course, for any given
project this could mean hundreds or even thousands
of hours over the course of a year or two. Scalability
will thus depend, to a large extent, on the dedication
and extent of the program’s strategic partners.

With respect to operational funds for the program,
in its initial phase, the ISP/LDCs program is aiming
to raise €2 million, a large portion of which has been
pledged,367 although it remains unclear to CCSI how
much has actually been donated. At the IDLO ISP/LDCs
kickoff event at UN Headquarters in September 2017,
for example, the Director General for International
Cooperation and Development of the European

It remains to be seen whether certain services may
be more scalable than others. For example, several
interviewees raised concerns that even the largest
private firms would not do an entire ISDS claim probono, and also stated that in any event, such services
would not qualify as “pro bono” eligible in some
jurisdictions.375 One private practitioner stated that
“[t]he ability of a firm to represent a state with any
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amount of competency from a pro bono perspective
with that amount of money on the [claimant]
side is unimaginable.”376 Noting that some firms
do represent states at a loss, often for tactical/
marketing reasons, “there is no capacity for taking
on a pro bono client at a $4-$6 million loss for your
firm,” particularly when the state has paid in other
cases, or could conceivably pay, this fee.377 One
interviewee noted that this kind of pro bono is not
ethically within the scope of what such interviewee’s
jurisdiction would define as a pro bono client.378
As established, the ISP/LDCs program has very slim
overhead and a lean institutional set-up required
to oversee the program. It is not envisioned that
more than three individuals would be necessary to
oversee the program, given the ability to call upon
and coordinate with IDLO’s larger staff of eighty-plus
individuals as specific needs and expertise arise.379
Specific fund-raising or other efforts may require an
additional staff member.380

4.1.3.5 Beneficiaries
Beneficiaries of the ISP/LDC program include
governments, as well as state-owned enterprises and
small and medium private sector entities, listed as
(or originating from) one of the 47 Least Developed
Countries, as defined by the UN Committee for
Development Policy.
One interviewee familiar with this boundary
recognized that even in countries that are wealthier
than the 47 Least Developed Countries, there
are pockets of need that could benefit from the
ISP/LDCs program, and acknowledged that how
program boundaries are drawn has impacts on
a mechanism’s ability to be of service when some
entities fall outside of the line but otherwise fit the
model.
Thus far, no SOEs or private sector entities have
applied for assistance.381 The ISP/LDCs program
focuses, in particular, on supporting businesses
owned by women and individuals from marginalized
and excluded groups and promoting their access to
economic opportunities.382

4.1.4 An investment law “hotline”
Drawing on their experience with the ACWL, several

government officials, representing each of the four
economic development levels, noted the potential value
of an Assistance Mechanism that could act as a “hotline”
(which may complement other services offered). There
is, certain officials stated, a need in the investment law
sphere for ad hoc, trusted, state-oriented, expert advice
that is similar to that which the ACWL provides in the
trade arena, and which is not always available in-house.
It was stated that this is one of the most valuable aspects
of ACWL membership.
A wide range of issues were noted by governments as
areas in which they would envision relying upon such
assistance, including questions related to policy-making
in other sectors (e.g. how certain actions may impact
investment law obligations), investment law policymaking, dispute prevention, early dispute management,
and questions that may arise during the course of an
active dispute. It was noted that unless there is an actual
dispute warranting a full procurement, it is difficult to
find the opportunity to ask these kinds of questions to
outside experts.383
Regarding dispute settlement, one government official
noted that part of the value-add of outside counsel
is the wealth of knowledge accumulation gained
by handling disputes for government-clients, and a
state-oriented center that could provide this kind of
knowledge service would be valuable.384 A government
that is focused on moving a larger component of active
dispute management in-house stated that it would be
valuable to call upon a “hotline” to ask specific questions
related to its own management of the claim.385 One
government stated that it is not always confident that
advice received from paid outside-counsel is necessarily
in its best interest and would value the opportunity to
“get a second opinion.”386
With respect to the value of this service in the policymaking (in contrast to the dispute) arena (e.g. does a
certain regulatory action violate an investment treaty),
its value may be more limited or nuanced, in the context
of investment law. For example, as one government
official interviewee pointed out, unlike WTO-law,
which is the focus of the ACWL’s advice, investment
law is not based on a common set of treaties and is
also a heavily standard, as opposed to rule-based,
legal system.387 However, several governments noted
that certain idiosyncratic issues that arise during the
course of policy-making or dispute prevention can
easily strain government capacity, and the answers to
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these discrete questions can be critical.388 Another
stated that it is “usually not a question of whether or
not the government can do something but how the
government can do something.” In certain cases,
a “hotline” may be able to assist governments in
advancing their policy objectives in this way. It may be
able to focus on procedural matters and thus navigate
to a greater extent the policy-heavy matters that may
be the focus on investment-law related questions.
A related issue that may increase the difficulty of more
abstract legal questions or opinions in the investment
as opposed to WTO context is that ex ante, it may
be difficult to anticipate and understand the world of
possible “covered” investors, as well as the treaties
pursuant to which they may select to advance claims.
As every treaty would include its own provisions
definitive legal guidance may prove somewhat elusive.
Finally, to the extent that a center was to give states
policy-oriented (as opposed to dispute management)
advice, concerns regarding regulatory chill or
overdeterrence may arise (see Section 2.2.3) and such
issues should thus be considered in determining the
role of and scope for this kind of assistance, including
how to mitigate undesirable impacts.

4.1.5 Clearinghouse models of negotiation and
litigation support
In addition to ALSF and ISP/LDCs discussed in
more depth in the subsections above, various
other clearinghouse models of legal support exist.
For example, CONNEX389 and the International
Senior Lawyers Project,390 among others, connect
beneficiaries with external support providers at no
cost to the beneficiary, although funding models
between clearinghouse support providers can
differ. For example, while many existing Assistance
Mechanisms offer support to the beneficiary at a
no-cost basis, some Assistance Mechanisms pay the
support provider for the service, while some rely on
pro-bono provision of services.
One interviewee advised that if an Assistance
Mechanism for investment law engaged in matching
outside counsel to client countries there would need
to be a database of lawyers who are considered
both state-friendly and credible.391 This interviewee
recommended the same for arbitrators but noted that
in that case “politics” is more of an issue.
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4.2 Institutionalized, multi-service
support (not including direct legal
representation of client governments)
There are a wide variety of Assistance Mechanisms that
offer multiple services to governments. Unlike those
described above, the existing Assistance Mechanisms
described in this section do not provide or facilitate
legal representation. Many are not described in depth
here as they receive more robust treatment and
description in other sections of this Scoping Study.

4.2.1 International organizations
The extensive work of UNCTAD, the OECD, and the
World Bank Group, and the various areas of support
that they offer to governments, particularly in the
policy-making arena, are described in various places
throughout this Scoping Study (particular in Section
2.2).

4.2.2 Arbitration centers
While many arbitration centers provide quality training
and other support services to governments and other
beneficiaries, International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID), the Permanent Court
of Arbitration (PCA) and the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce (SCC) are specifically highlighted here.

4.2.2.1 ICSID
ICSID staff members host events and provide training
on arbitration-related issues around the world.392 ICSID
also offers a half and full-day course on ICSID practice
and procedure in English, French and Spanish.
ICSID’s Practice Notes for Respondents in ICSID
Arbitration393 addresses questions frequently asked by
ICSID member states or investors. It highlights issues
of interest to respondent states related to prevention
of disputes, contract and treaty drafting, the prearbitration phase, managing claims, critical issues for
consideration (including case strategy and budgeting),
an outline of the steps of an ICSID arbitration,
specifics regarding ICSID hearings, and post-award
processes, among other topics. This document
provides general organizational suggestions and
questions that states should be considering before
and during an arbitration. However, this publication
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does not provide legal advice or policy guidance
and is not an exhaustive guide to the arbitration
process. While it is thus extremely useful for all ICSID
respondents as a reference that flags certain issues
and promotes a greater understanding of the ICSID
process, respondents that have little experience in
investment disputes will likely require further, more
specific, guidance as to implementation and strategy
surrounding a claim. Moreover, while certain aspects
of this guidance are more general, some are specific
to ICSID, so to the extent a claim is proceeding at
another arbitral center, some of the guidance would
not apply.

4.2.2.2 The Permanent Court of Arbitration
The PCA maintains a Trust Fund (described in greater
detail in the following Section 4.3.1.1) to provide
financial assistance to certain qualifying states to
enable them in whole or part to meet certain defined
expenses.394 Qualifying states include states party to
a PCA Convention (or an institution or enterprise
owned or controlled by such state) that are listed on
the OECD’s DAC List of Aid Recipients.395
In addition to the PCA Trust Fund, the PCA also
conducts training for its member states upon
request.396 The PCA’s training’s are tailored to the
specific request.397 Each training is conducted by a
PCA lawyer who has experience with PCA cases.398
The PCA’s trainings typically focus on states of the
arbitration process and seek to value in terms of
the experience that the PCA lawyers can share.399
The PCA benefits in this regard from its permanent
regional offices in Singapore, Mauritius, and Buenos
Aires that have a mandate to raise awareness of
and teach on international dispute settlement in
these regions.400 Regional offices permit greater
exchange and engagement with member states and
discussions with a broader range of audiences (e.g.
political and technical actors).401

4.2.2.3 The Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
The Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, like ICSID
and the PCA, hosts events and provides regular
trainings in investment arbitration for counsel, state
officials, and students.
The SCC (along with ICSID, the Energy Charter
Secretariat, and the PCA) co-hosts the Energy Charter

Treaty Forums. In co-operation with the ECT Secretariat,
SCC staff organizes and contributes at annual workshops
in Brussels, including a mock investment arbitration
under the SCC Rules. The workshop’s program is
designed primarily for state officials and deals with
substantive and procedural law issues commonly raised
in ISDS cases but has also raised for example issues of
mediation.
The SCC supports the annual Frankfurt investment moot
and usually organizes a side event during the moot for
the purpose of knowledge-building and development
of advocacy skills among the students attending the
moot. A pre-moot event has been hosted for a number
of years as well, addressing specifically investment
arbitration procedure under the SCC Rules.

4.2.3 Academic institutions
Academic centers offer a range of services to
governments including trainings, forums for information
sharing, technical legal assistance, and tools to facilitate
policy development. CCSI, for example, offers a widerange of these services, and other academic centers offer
support ranging from ad hoc to broader programmatic
support.

4.2.4 Non-profit centers
Various non-profit centers, such as IISD, offer multiple
services to governments, including trainings, forums
for information sharing, technical legal assistance, and
tools to facilitate policy development.

4.3 Financial or in-kind inputs directly to
client governments
In addition to models that focus, more directly, on
facilitating legal advice to client governments by
providing or connecting the beneficiary directly with
a support provider, as described in Section 4.1, an
Assistance Mechanism may also focus, to a greater
extent, on financial transfers being made to client
governments to offset the financial obligations of
services that the client itself procures.
It must be noted, however, that some of the models
described below, in addition to a focus on a financial
or in-kind transfer, also help facilitate procurement of
services, more in line with the models in Section 4.1 and
those in this section represent a spectrum of services
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offered to beneficiaries rather than being categorically
separate as only financing mechanisms, although we
have attempted to focus on certain primary elements
of the models and distinguish them for the purposes
of this Scoping Study. Each of the models below,
litigation/arbitration trust funds, third-party funding
for respondent states, contingent fee representation,
and insurance products and loans, emphasize financial
assistance to facilitate representation.

4.3.1 Litigation/arbitration trust funds
Various international dispute resolutions institutions
have established trust funds to financially assist
certain litigants with arbitration/litigation costs and/or
costs related to execution of awards.402 As a general
matter, these funds provide some financial assistance
for parties to hire outside counsel. In some cases,
the funds are more institutionalized and also provide
matching services with counsel (and could thus
be categorized as a more multi-service Assistance
Mechanism discussed Section 4.1).
The examples below provide insight into how funds
are currently used and are being, or could more
robustly be, applied in the investment law context.
In CCSI’s consultations, reactions to a trust fund in the
context of investment law were mixed, and depended
a great deal on what the particular interviewee deemed
to be the objective of an investment law Assistance
Mechanism as well as whether or not capacity building
should play a prominent role in such mechanism’s
mandate. While facilitating more financial resources
that can be used to pay for certain investment-law
related services, namely ISDS defense, to states was
generally welcomed by interviewees, qualifications
often followed, or concerns were raised. For example,
one concern was that if capacity building, in any of its
broad or narrow conceptions, is to be an objective of
an Assistance Mechanism, a trust fund would not (or to
a very limited extent) address capacity challenges.403
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Other issues were identified in connection with a
trust fund. For example, one lower middle-income
government official stated that grants and loans may
provide value in efforts to obtain outside support, but
more money does not change the level of trust that this
official could have in the quality of advice received, or
the internal capacity necessary to assess whether that
advice is in the state’s interest.404 It addresses only the
issue of high costs of disputes without addressing any
of the other challenges that countries experience with
the IIA/ISDS system.
One high-income government official stated that from
that country’s perspective, a litigation fund would
not be something it would support for a couple of
reasons.405 First was that this approach has too narrow
of a focus on litigation, whereas in this country’s
experience with its treaty counterparties, there needs
to be broader attention given to resources available
to governments to manage and prevent disputes,
including capacity building.406
This official also
noted that it would be politically challenging for it
to support a fund that would ultimately be used by
governments to defend against claims brought by this
country’s outward investors.407 This official stated that
unlike direct financial support directed at litigation/
arbitration, support of capacity building efforts have
a less-direct link to, and conflict with, the country’s
outward investors’ interests.
One member of a non-governmental organization that
works with governments stated that a fund may make
accountability easier - there is a direct link between the
services provided and the government to whom they
are to be provided, but that audits would need to be
carefully conducted as money can easily be misused or
abused.408 Indeed, the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda’s diligence in this area (discussed below in
this section) brought to light certain economic abuses
of funds.409 Moreover, this NGO interviewee noted
that each government and each government’s needs
are unique, and some governments may benefit from
more money to strengthen in-house capacity rather
than more money to spend on hiring outside counsel,
which may be a better long-term outcome.
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4.3.1.1 Permanent Court of Arbitration
Financial Assistance Fund
The Hague-based PCA, an intergovernmental
organization established by the Hague Conventions
for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes
of 1899 and 1907 (PCA Conventions), is the oldest
existing system for the peaceful settlement of
international disputes.410 Recognizing that there
may be instances when states are deterred from
recourse to international arbitration (or other means)
offered by the PCA Conventions because they find
it difficult to allocate the necessary funds (including
fees and expenses of tribunal members; expenses
of implementing an award; payments to agents,
counsel, experts, and witnesses; and operational
and administrative expenses connected with oral
and written proceedings), the PCA established in
1994 a Financial Assistance Fund for the Settlement
of International Disputes (PCA Fund) to provide
financial assistance to certain qualifying states to
enable them in whole or part to meet certain defined
expenses.411 Qualifying states include states party to
a PCA Convention (or an institution or enterprise
owned or controlled by such state) that are listed on
the OECD’s DAC List of Aid Recipients in disputes
before the PCA.412
The PCA Fund is financed through voluntary
financial contributions of states, intergovernmental
organizations, national institutions, and natural and
legal persons, although in practice states are the
primary donors.413 Qualifying states may submit
written requests for financial assistance to the
PCA Secretary-General, along with, among other
items, an itemized list of estimated costs for which
assistance is requested, and an undertaking to
provide an audited list of actual expenditures.414
While the PCA’s International Bureau implements
the fund,415 disbursement decisions are made by a
Board of Trustees composed of seven members with
experience in international dispute resolution.416
Members are appointed by the PCA’s SecretaryGeneral and serve a renewable term of four years.417
In practice Members that are appointed are of the
highest moral character with deep knowledge of
public international law (e.g. individuals who have
served as ICJ judges) but are not those whose
primary income or financial interests derive from
investment law-related work (which may also simply
be reflective of the PCA also handling disputes

outside of investment-law).418 While the PCA SecretaryGeneral chairs the Board of Trustees and participates in
meetings, he or she does not vote on funding decisions.419
In deciding to allocate funds, the board is to be guided
by the financial needs of the requesting State and the
availability of funds,420 and will determine the amount of
financial assistance to be given, for what costs it is to be
allocated, as well as any terms and conditions deemed
appropriate.421
Donations to the PCA Trust Fund ebb and flow. Every
year the PCA Secretary General calls upon member
states to donate to the PCA Trust Fund, with varying
levels of success. On the one hand, donations have been
more forthcoming when high profile cases (thus far, of
the public international law, state-to-state nature) are
being administered by the PCA and governments have
a more concrete understanding of where their pledged
funds will go.422 As a general matter, however, the PCA
Trust Fund has found difficulty in soliciting funds when
there is not a specific case where the need, and public
international law benefit, is clear. Of note, one individual
familiar with the PCA Trust Fund has characterized
this reality not as an unwillingness of governments to
financially support other states with respect to their
needs, but one of governments being less (or in some
cases not at all) willing to make general budgetary
contributions for the broader “rule of law” objectives of
the PCA Trust Fund, such as general equality of arms,
that are not (implicitly) tied to a specific case.423
Since 1995 when the Fund was established, ten grants
have been made in eight separate cases (with at least
one case having more than one grant) and two of
these grants have been with respect to investment law
cases.424 In the experience of one person familiar with
the PCA Trust Fund, no requests for assistance have
been rejected and at least a portion of the requested
funds have been granted in all cases in which requests
have been submitted.425 Notably, the amount granted
has never been at the level that would be required to
pay the fees of, for example, a commercial law firm
representing a party to a dispute.426 Rather, grants tend
to be sufficient to cover institutional and arbitrator costs.
Notably, in at least a few ISDS cases being administered
by the PCA, the PCA Secretariat has notified the
respondent state of the existence of the fund and the
eligibility of the state to apply for financial assistance
and the state has not applied.427 Reasons for the failure
of eligible states to apply for financial assistance in the
context of ISDS disputes remain unclear.
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4.3.1.2 The International Court of Justice Trust
Fund
In 1989 the United Nations Secretary-General
Javier Perez de Cuellar established a trust fund to
financially assist developing states litigating before
the International Court of Justice (ICJ), or with the
execution of a judgment of the ICJ (ICJ Trust Fund).428
The International Court of Justice is the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations established in 1945
and seated at the Peace Palace in The Hague.429 The
ICJ’s role is to settle, in accordance with international
law, legal disputes submitted to it by states and to
give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to
it by authorized UN organs and specialized agencies.
Between 22 May 1947 and 1 July 2019, 177 cases were
entered in the General List.430
Recognizing that the costs of appearing before the
ICJ are considerable, and that such costs can be a
factor in deciding whether a case is referred to the ICJ
by a state, the ICJ Trust Fund was viewed as financial
assistance helpful to states that lack the necessary
funds to appear before it or to execute judgments.431
States, inter-governmental organizations, national
institutions, non-governmental organizations, and
natural and juridical persons may all voluntarily
contribute to the ICJ Trust Fund,432 which is
implemented through the UN Office of Legal Affairs433
and an annual report is intended to be made available
to the General Assembly,434 although an annual report
has apparently not been made since 2012. Available
funds in years preceding 2012 were in the high $2
millions.435
States may request financial assistance by submitting
an application to the ICJ, which should include an
itemized statement of estimated costs for which
assistance is requested and an undertaking to provide
a final, audited accounting of actual expenses.436 A
panel of experts, “composed of three persons of the
highest judicial and moral standing” is then convened
by the Secretary-General to evaluate each request for
assistance to examine the request and recommend
to the Secretary-General the amount of assistance
to be given and the types of expenses for which the
assistance may be used.437 The experts work is to be
confidential,438 and recommendation guided solely
on the financial need of the requesting state and
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the availability of money in the ICJ Trust Fund.439 The
Secretary-General will then provide assistance based
on the evaluation and recommendation of the expert
panel.440

4.3.1.3 International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea Trust Fund
In 2000 the United Nations Secretary-General
established a trust fund (ITLOS Trust Fund) to
financially assist developing states litigating before
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(ITLOS), located in Hamburg, Germany.441
The ITLOS is an independent judicial body, composed
of 21 independent members, that was established by
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
which entered into force in 1994.442 UNCLOS
establishes a comprehensive legal framework to
regulate all ocean space, its uses and resources. ITLOS
adjudicates disputes arising out of the interpretation
and application of UNCLOS.
As the costs of legal fees and travel to Hamburg
can be considerable, the ITLOS Trust Fund was
established with the intention that the burden of costs
would not need to be a factor in a state’s decision to
bring a dispute before the ITLOS or to respond to an
application to ITLOS made by others.443 There is no
cost to states party to the UNCLOS for submitting
a case to ITLOS, but non-state parties pay a fee
fixed by ITLOS.444 Developing states that are parties
to a dispute before ITLOS may request financial
assistance from the ITLOS Trust Fund to help them to
cover the costs related to lawyers’ fees or travel and
accommodation of their delegation during the oral
proceedings in Hamburg.445 The ITLOS Trust Fund is
maintained by the UN Office of Legal Affairs, Division
for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea.
States may apply to ITLOS for funds, and a panel of
independent experts is convened to review applications
and make recommendations to the Secretary-General
on the amount of financial assistance to be given.446
States, international organizations, non-governmental
organizations, as well as natural and juridical persons
are invited to make financial contributions to the ITLOS
Trust Fund.447 Donor contributions to the ITLOS Trust
Fund are slow, despite repeated General Assembly
entreaties, and are considered insufficient in light of
the mandate and need.448 The balance of the fund at
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the end of 2006 was $70,621.17.449
The ITLOS Secretariat also maintains a list, available
upon request of a member state, of offers of
professional assistance, which will be provided on
a reduced fee basis by suitably qualified persons or
bodies.450

4.3.1.4 Trust Funds Maintained by
International Criminal Courts
International criminal courts maintain funds that,
among other activities, serve to provide for the
costs of defense counsel appointed in the case of
indigent defendants. Some of these institutions
maintain lists of counsel that can be appointed in
such circumstances or even will appoint appropriate
counsel under certain circumstances.

4.3.1.4.1 The International Criminal Court
The International Criminal Court (ICC), based in
The Hague and established by the Rome Statute,451
began operations in 2002. It investigates and, where
warranted, tries individuals charged with the gravest
crimes of concern to the international community:
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and
the crime of aggression.452 The ICC seeks to hold
criminals accountable and prevent crimes from
happening again.453 In order to achieve this goal it
acts as a court of last resort and thus complements
and does not replace national judicial systems.454

The ICC maintains both a Legal Aid System for accused
as well as a Trust Fund for Victims.
With respect to the Legal Aid System, the Rome Statute
provides that accused individuals have certain rights,
including legal assistance of the defendant’s choosing,
or to have legal assistance assigned by the court if justice
so requires and without payment if the accused lacks the
means to pay for it.455 Legal aid is thus mandatory for
indigent defendants. (In contrast, provision of legal aid
for indigent victims in discretionary).456
A List of Counsel is maintained by the ICC’s Counsel
Support Section.457 Legal support providers that meet
certain criteria are able to apply to be included in this
list; and defendants seeking legal aid are to choose their
counsel from the list.458
The Legal Aid System caps its payments to the defense
team. (Table 7).
The ICC’s Legal Aid System covers the costs of legal
representation of indigent defendants by seeking
to ensure that they receive adequate resources to
cover all costs reasonably necessary, as determined
by the ICC Registry, for an effective and efficient legal
representation. The Registry assesses both the likely
costs of the defense case, and the financial status of the
defendant, and applies a formula to determine what
contribution the person should make, if any. The ICC also
provides some funding for investigation and experts.
Specific operative and objective principles are used to
determine the need for aid, including obligations to
dependents, flexibility, and simplicity.459

Table 7 Maximum Total Monthly Payments (as of 2016)

Category

Maximum Total Monthly Payments

Counsel

€11,687763

Associate Counsel

€9,043

Legal Assistant

€5,622

Case Manager

€4,570

Source: Richard J. Rogers, ‘Assessment of the ICC’s Legal Aid System’ (2007), 5 January 2017, 17.
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On average, the Legal Aid System’s annual cost per
case through 2016 was estimated to be €286,548 for
pre-trial phases, €395,064 for trial phases, and €386,548
for appeals.460 This is reported to be lower than the
per-case legal aid expenditures of other international
criminal courts.461
The Legal Aid System struggles with budgetary
constraints, which, among other concerns, have
resulted in pressure from civil society to reevaluate the
legal aid budget along with a more holistic reform of
indigent representation at the ICC.462 The budget for
legal aid in 2016 was €4,521,000.30 (up from €2,355,600
and €2,866,400 in 2015 and 2014 respectively),
representing 3.25% of the total ICC budget.463 This is
less than 10% of the budget allocated to the Office of
the Prosecutor.464 The legal aid budget is a part of the
ICC’s overall budget, which is funded by ICC member
states. The contribution of each state is determined in
the same way that its UN dues are determined, which
is roughly based on income, population, and debt
burden. Additional funding is provided by voluntary
contributions from organizations, corporations, or
other entities.
The ICC also maintains a Trust Fund for Victims
(TFV), which was created in 2004 by the Assembly of
State Parties.465 The TFV’s mission is to support and
implement programs that address harms resulting
from genocide, crimes of humanity, war crimes, and
aggression. To achieve this mission, the TFV has a
two-fold mandate: (i) to implement Court-Ordered
reparations and (ii) to provide physical, psychological,
and material support to victims and their families.
Victims can apply to the ICC to be granted the right
to participate in all phases of an ICC proceeding.466
Victims are those who have suffered harm as a result
of the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction
of the Court.467 They are permitted to put their views
before the judges and if the accused is convicted,
may ask the court to order reparations, which may
be individual or collective, depending on what is
most appropriate from the perspective of the victims
in the case.468 Reparations may include monetary
compensation, return of property, rehabilitation,
medical support, victims’ services centers, or symbolic
measures such as apologies or memorials.469 The ICC
may order reparations be made through the TFV.
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4.3.1.4.2 The International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) was a UN court that dealt with war
crimes that took place during the conflicts in the
Balkans in the 1990s.470 Its mandate lasted from 1993
- 2017.
All persons indicted by and appearing before the
ICTY had the right to be represented by defense
counsel. This and other rights of the accused are
based in international human rights instruments and
were enshrined in the ICTY’s Statute and further
regulated by the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.471
If the accused wished to have defense counsel, he or
she could either choose his or her own or be assigned
one by the Registrar.472
Accused persons who could not afford to pay for
counsel were entitled to the assignment of counsel,
paid for by the Tribunal.473 If the accused had means
to remunerate counsel partially, the Tribunal only
covered the balance of the costs.474 The Office for
Legal Aid and Defense Matters within the Registry
dealt with all matters related to the issues of defense
and detention at the ICTY.475 Legal aid at the ICTY
was allocated from the general ICTY budget, which in
turn was approved by the UN and was $286,012,600 in
2010-11, $250,814,000 in 2012-13, and $179,998,600 in
2014-15.476
Accused requesting legal aid from the ICTY had to
make full financial disclosures of assets (including
those of all members of his or her household).477
Accused who request ICTY-paid counsel were then
appointed counsel from the list maintained by the
Registrar, known as the “Rule 45 List.”478 An accused
could also propose another counsel that met the
criteria set forth in Rule 45 of the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence of the ICTY.
The Registry maintained a publicly available and
transparent system of remuneration for defense
counsel.479 Rates were viewed as sufficient to attract
counsel on part with the prosecution’s senior trial
attorneys.480 Payment for defense was intended to
cover all aspects of the trial as well as preparation
of the case (evidence gathering, interpretation,
investigation, research, witness interviews and
preparation, and arguing in court).481
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Payment to defense counsel varied depending on
the complexity of the case as well as the phase of
proceedings and whether the accused selected
counsel from the Rule 45 List or choose non-Rule
45 List counsel.482 Complexity of the case was
determined by the Registry and was based on
various factors, including: “the accused’s position
within the political or military hierarchy; the number
and nature of counts in the indictment; the number
and type of witnesses and documents involved;
whether the case involves crimes committed in
a number of municipalities; and the novelty and
complexity of legal and factual arguments the case
will deal with.”483
With respect to Rule 45 List counsel, the legal aid
policy generally consisted of monthly, lump-sum
payments to permit the hiring of counsel, and
facilitate other payments, all of which remain publicly
available.484
Table 8 provides an example of ICTY legal aid
payments.

Self-appointed counsel outside of the Rule 45 List were
subject to a different compensation scheme.485 In this
case, invoices were required to be submitted to the
Registry and payments were made directly to counsel
in accordance with the maximum available rates.486
According to the ICTY’s Remuneration Scheme, for the
pre-trial phase there was a maximum of 150 hours per
month per team member, of two, three or five persons,
depending on the complexity of the case, and a total
of 3,000, 4,500 or 6,000 (respectively) hours total could
be remunerated.487 For the trial phase, a maximum of
two, three or five team members may be remunerated
for up to 150 hours per person, for a total of 300, 450 or
700 (respectively) hours total, and at the appeals phase
a maximum of 600 to 900 hours total could be billed for
the entire phase, with up to 100 hours per defense team
member per month.488
Support staff (legal associates, case managers,
investigators, and language assistants) each were
subject to a fixed gross hourly rate ranging from €16.80
to €28.40 depending on years of experience.489 Some
legal associates to self-represented accused, depending
on their function, applied to the ICTY and were granted
an hourly rate of up to €78.80.490

Table 8 ICTY pre-trial lump sum payments (as of January 2013)

Phase One

Phase Two

Phase Three

Total

Complexity
Level 1

€1,873

€45,163

€104,750

€151,786

Level 2

€1,873

€45,163

€213,858

€260,895

Level 3

€1,873

€45,163

€377,695

€424,731

Monthly
Allotment for
Interpretation
and Translation

€1,109 maximum

These amounts do not include the costs of Daily Subsistence Allowance ("DSA") and travel which
are covered separately in accordance with the applicable registry policies.
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4.3.1.4.3 The International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda

4.3.1.5 Legal aid provided by international and
regional human rights courts

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) was established by the UN Security Council
to “prosecute persons responsible for genocide and
other serious violations of international humanitarian
law committed in the territory of Rwanda and
neighboring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31
December 1994.” The Tribunal was located in Arusha,
Tanzania, and had offices in Kigali, Rwanda. Its Appeals
Chamber was located in The Hague.491 Its opened in
1995 and its mandate lasted until 2015.

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has,
pursuant to Rules 105 through 110 of the Rules of the
Court, the ability to grant legal aid to applicants in
connection with the presentation of his or her case to
the ECtHR.497 Legal aid shall be granted to applicants
when the President of the Chamber is satisfied (a)
that it is necessary for the proper conduct of the
case before the Chamber, and (b) that the applicant
has insufficient means to meet all or part of the costs
entailed.498 Applicants must complete a declaration of
income, assets, dependents, and financial obligations
in order to determine their eligibility.499 Legal aid may
be granted to cover lawyer fees as well as travel and
other expenses of the applicant and counsel to appear
before the Chamber. The Registrar fixes the rate of
fees, payable in accordance with legal-aid scales in
force, as well as the amount of expenses that will be
covered.500

All ICTR accused had the right to be represented
by competent counsel. This and other rights were
enshrined in Article 20 of the ICTR’s Statute and
are further regulated by its Rules of Procedure and
Evidence.492 Defense counsel were deemed critical to
uphold the principle of equality of arms between the
prosecution and defense and to ensure the fairness of
the proceedings.
The ICTR’s Defence Counsel & Detention Management
Section (DCDMS) assured the provision of competent
defense counsel to indigent accused persons.493
Defense counsel at the ICTR were not part of the
institutional structure but were paid as independent
contractors. The DCDMS was created as part of the
Registry that coordinated and facilitated the work of
defense counsel.
DCDMS compiled and maintained a list of defense
counsel, which, upon the request for assistance and
determination of eligibility, was submitted to an
indigent detainee or accused to permit the selection
of counsel. Over 200 lawyers from a wide variety of
countries were included on the DCDMS list.
The budget for the ICTR, through which the Legal
Aid Program was funded, was kept by the United
Nations Advisory Committee on Administrative and
Budgetary Questions.494 The defense of most of the
accused appearing before the ICTR was funded in this
manner.495 Funds available for legal aid in the ICTR were
very limited, although the ICTR Registry was vigilant in
monitoring funds and ensuring that professional and
ethical standards were maintained and the funds not
abused.496

74 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT

In practice it has been suggested that the ECtHR is
rather frugal in its granting of legal aid, particularly
as some years have seen funds unspent, and as the
ECtHR’s caseload has increased, the amount of legal
aid has not increased in proportion.501
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(OACHR) also maintains a Legal Assistance Fund. The
OACHR fund can be used to cover expenses related
to: gathering and sending documentary evidence;
expenses derived of the appearance of the alleged
victim, witnesses and experts in hearings held by
the Commission; and other expenses considered
pertinent by the Commission for the processing of the
case.
Applicants for OACHR Trust Fund benefits must
demonstrate that the applicant lacks sufficient means
to cover some or all expenses, and must specify which
expenses, as well as the relation to the case, intended
to be covered by funds of the OACHR Trust Fund.502

4.3.2 Third-Party funding for respondent states
Third-party funders are investment funds that invest
in assets with the expectation of a return on their
investment. In the context of ISDS, the assets are the
potential value of treaty-based legal dispute outcomes.
In exchange for investing in the claim and providing
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funds that will be used to pay the expenses that a
party incurs in pursuing the claim and enforcing an
award, the funder takes an interest in an eventual
financial award on a non-recourse basis.503
Increasingly, investors suing governments in ISDS are
turning to third parties to finance their litigation.504
Recent years have seen significant increases in
the number of funders as well as the number of
funded ISDS cases.505 The increased use of thirdparty funding in ISDS raises various policy issues,
many of which stem from the inherent asymmetry
of ISDS in which investors sue states, but states, as
a general matter, cannot sue investors, but some of
which are inherent to the introduction of (currently
largely unregulated) for-profit investments into ISDS
claims.506

4.3.2.1 Scope of potential aid
The most critical impact of the asymmetric nature
of ISDS is that, as a practical matter, third-party
funding is available to claimants and in most cases,
not to respondent states. This is because (1) under
nearly all existing treaties states cannot initiate but
can only defend claims, and (2) the possibility of
counterclaims is extremely limited. Therefore, states
do not have a financial “upside”; the best financial
position that a respondent state can usually hope
for as an outcome is an award for 100% of its costs,
with interest, and recovery for reputational harm
(e.g. as a safe destination for FDI).507 The profit
potential that attracts funders to claimant positions
does not currently exist for ISDS respondents
except in circumstances when contractual or other
counterclaims exist.
With that said, some forms of respondent
funding have reportedly been successful in some
circumstances. For example, a version of portfolio
funding, in which the losses of an ISDS defense could
be offset by another portfolio of cases in which the
state was pursuing contract-based claims (likely in
other fora, such as domestic courts or commercial
arbitration) where there was an opportunity for
financial recovery.508
Respondent funding may also take the form of an
insurance product. With an after-the-event insurance
arrangement, if a litigable event has occurred
and a claim has arisen against a respondent, the

respondent and funder could seek to agree on a valuation
of the claim - how will a tribunal apply the law to the
facts and what will the claimant’s award be, if anything?
And if the claimant prevails, will the tribunal shift costs?
If the price of downside risk can be agreed between the
respondent and the funder, the respondent could then
purchase a “policy” that would protect it against a higher
than anticipated award. The respondent would pay a
deductible for the expected judgment or settlement,
and for amounts that exceed that agreed threshold, the
funder would have a contractual obligation to pay. That
obligation to pay an award or other amount, such as
award for costs, is negotiated and context-specific, so
could be an obligation shared between the state and
funder based on various thresholds and permutations.

4.3.2.2 Potential beneficiaries
Third-party funding, based on the economic
opportunities largely absent from respondent-side
ISDS investments, primarily benefits claimants and not
respondents. Claimant use of third-party funding is
discussed further below in Section 6.

4.3.2.3 Scalability
While the use of third-party funding to support investor
claims in ISDS has apparently been on the rise in recent
years, there are several hurdles to greater third-party
funding for respondent states.
For one, it is plausible third-party funding could be
available for/linked to respondents’ counterclaims,
but most existing treaties, in their current form, do not
clearly permit the possibility of such claims against
investors. While in a few, limited cases, counterclaims
have been successful, absent a more extensive and
robust possibility for treaty-based counterclaims in ISDS,
the possibility of respondent-side third-party funding is
likely to remain limited.
Additionally, absent greater predictability in awards for
fees, third-party funders may be unable to predict with
sufficient accuracy in which cases the amount invested
can be recovered. To the extent states lack the liquidity
to finance a defense, third-party funding could act
similar to a loan. It may be that for any such market
to become robust greater predictability in fee awards
would be required. Uncertainty regarding damages
awards may similarly limit the market for after-the-eventtype insurance models.
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Overall, third party funders are private sector
participants in the ISDS field whose relevance for
respondent support seems limited under the current
system, though it could potentially be used in
some cases and even complement other Assistance
Mechanisms in some ways. For example, funders,
under certain circumstances, may be able to provide
necessary liquidity to the respondent state (or its
counsel) during the course of a proceeding, which
could then be used to pay an Assistance Mechanism or
another legal support provider. However, considerable
thought would need to be given as to the contractual
rights that would be granted to funders interacting
with the state as well as any kind of Assistance
Mechanism. Some funders require contractual rights
to remain involved in, and potentially even control,
certain aspects of how the case is managed by the
party, including, for example, decisions to settle, or
not. Moreover, third-party funders are not subject to
fiduciary obligations to the litigating party, nor any
ethical or conflict of interest obligations. Additionally,
the financial terms third-party funders need in order
to provide support may be unpalatable to respondent
states (and even investors) and their stakeholders.
A final consideration relevant to scalability is that
UNCITRAL’s Working Group III has identified third-party
funding in ISDS as a concern warranting multilateral
reform. Consequently, Assistance Mechanisms
involving the use or expansion of third-party funding
would likely need to take into account outcomes and
outputs from the Working Group in addition to any
other treaty-based or institutional reforms.509

4.3.3 Contingent fee representation for
respondent states
4.3.3.1 Scope of potential aid
Law firms may engage to act on a full or partial
contingency fee basis in representing respondents in
ISDS disputes. In this case, the law firm bears some
or all of the cost of the arbitration proceeding and
assumes some or all of the risk of loss. For example, a
client (or the law firm) may pay out of pocket expenses
and the law firm may forego payment of some or all
of its fees in exchange for an interest in any eventual
award or settlement. The more risk that the law firm
assumes, the greater share in the outcome the firm
would likely contract to receive. In this way law firm
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contingency arrangements may be viewed as similar
to (and by some definitions a form of) third-party
financing of claims. One difference between thirdparty funding (as the term is used in this Scoping Study)
and contingency fee arrangements, however, is that
law firms have fiduciary and other ethical obligations
to their clients (respondents or investor claimants).
Third-party funders’ duties do not run to their client
litigants. Instead, their obligations are owed to their
shareholders.
Law firm contingency financing will often be provided
in combination with other outside financing, such as
third-party funding or other loan services, either to the
law firm, the client, or both.

4.3.3.2 Potential beneficiaries
The largest hurdle to contingency arrangements in
ISDS respondent representation is, as with third-party
funding, the lack of a financial upside for respondent
states. There is not a contingent outcome (other than
fee awards) in which to take a financial interest.
Contingency funding is likely more readily available
for investors. Not only are investors potentially able
to enjoy an upside recovery, but studies indicate that
they are also, at present, more likely to be awarded
recovery of the legal fees and expenses incurred in
pursuing their claims.510 Investors as beneficiaries are
discussed further in Section 6.

4.3.3.3 Scalability
An increase in their ability to offset the funds necessary
for the defense (or pursuit) of a claim could address
liquidity problems experienced by some governments
(or claimants) in the context of ISDS cases.
To the extent counterclaims or other predictable feeshifting practices were introduced more systematically
in ISDS, respondent-side contingency arrangements
may become more attractive and available. However,
the cost of supporting, and risking, contingent fee
arrangements is not insignificant, and many law firms
are not able to assume significant financial risks,
particularly on the kind of large claims and expenses
that have thus far characterized ISDS disputes.511
Certain developments in insurance options, which are
enabling firms to hedge fee risks, and in third-party
funding arrangements, where portfolio arrangements
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can enable firms to take on more contingent fee work
while mitigating fee risk and cash flow concerns,
may make contingency arrangements possible on a
larger scale.512

4.4 Pro bono, ad hoc legal and expert
assistance to respondent states
The provision of pro bono legal and expert
assistance may be a useful way to provide services
to client governments, or to complement paid
services. CCSI’s consultations made clear that pro
bono legal support can be valuable and important
to respondent states in many contexts and
circumstances. Many pro bono-based Assistance
Mechanisms exist with varying degrees of focus on
investment law matters, and consideration could
be given to expanding existing services. However,
several concerns about reliance on more robust
provision of pro bono services were raised.
First, CCSI’s consultations revealed concerns on the
part of government officials that firms may not treat
pro bono clients in the same way as paying clients
when there are competing interests and demands
on time. For example, on a pro bono basis it would
be difficult for a law firm to take on a client for a
dispute that could last several years if that mean that
the firm would then be conflicted from accepting
certain paid investor-side work during or after the
dispute.513 These kinds of concerns were ultimately
about quality and responsiveness of counsel working
on a pro-bono basis.
Second, while many lawyers and law firms contribute
vast numbers of pro bono hours to respondent states
(and many firms have internal guidelines encouraging
lawyers to engage in at least a specified minimum
number of hours of annual pro bono service), the
scale at which pro bono services could be offered
was noted as being limited as compared to the
commitments required for handling ISDS cases. It
was questioned whether firms would ever be willing
to handle a case on a pro bono basis given the time
required and potential revenue forsaken.
In consultations conducted by CCSI, one highincome government official stated that it would be
useful to have an Assistance Mechanism that could
build up and draw upon pro bono relationships to
lessen the amount of support that may need to be

provided directly by center staff and, not unrelated, to
alleviate funding requirements that may be required by
an Assistance Mechanism with more robust in-house
expertise and projects.514 However, another high-income
government official noted that pro bono assistance can
be provided in ad hoc situations, but is not a scalable
model to address asymmetric outcomes and lack of
capacity experienced by many countries.
This section describes certain pro-bono models of legal
support.

4.4.1 The International Development Law
Organization’s (IDLO) Investment Support
Programme for Least Developed Countries (ISP/
LDCs)
Of all pro bono mechanisms analyzed for this Scoping
Study, the ISP/LDCs program, although in its early
phases, is the most specific with respect to investment
law matters. This existing Assistance Mechanism
is described in great detail in Section 4.1.3 and a
description is thus not repeated here.

4.4.2 TradeLab
4.4.2.1 Overview and scope of services
TradeLab is a global network of universities and training
centers that conduct pro bono projects for developing
countries, SMEs, civil society organizations, or other
stakeholders.515 TradeLab aims to “empower countries
and smaller stakeholders to reap the full development
benefits of institutions and rules that govern our
global economy,”516 including international investment
agreements and international investment law.
TradeLab is based on a system of legal clinics. Students
are paired with experts, who are then connected with
client beneficiaries on a given, typically semester-long,
project. Tradelab posts research memoranda and
other non-confidential output on its website,517 thereby
seeking to achieve three objectives: (i) help beneficiaries
build capacity; (ii) train students; and (iii) inform and
create awareness for the wider public.518 TradeLab sees
potential to democratize legal education and the legal
profession in the field of international economic law by
spreading learning and expertise beyond a handful of
highly specialized universities and large law firms.519
TradeLab seeks to move beyond litigation, recognizing
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that stakeholders need help in negotiation,
implementation and compliance with international
legal issues and agreements, which often must be
complemented by economic research, policy analysis
and translation support. There is a large emphasis
placed on capacity building, with TradeLab noting
that any law firm could answer a question, but often
what is lacking is a more in-depth analysis of what,
exactly the problem or question is, which requires a
deeper understanding of the rules and institutions
and how they affect the entity or organization, and
thus the ultimate interest and questions that should be
considered.520 Thus, TradeLab clinics hold exploratory
discussions to identify and define interests and needs
of beneficiaries, and then help to frame projects
around public interest objectives.521
TradeLab advertises its ability to assist client
beneficiaries with discrete questions relating to:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

research and analysis for treaty negotiations;
compliance assessment of domestic or foreign
laws;
compliance assessment of proposed or existing
legislation;
drafting model legislation;
drafting advocacy positions in the context of
existing agreements on trade and investment;
assessment of legal claims or defense strategies;
writing of party, third party submissions and legal
memoranda;
preparation of amicus curiae briefs; and
legal and economic research on cutting-edge
trade or investment law questions.522

Beneficiaries anywhere in the world can submit projects
directly via TradeLab’s online platform, or directly to a
TradeLab clinic or the TradeLab Coordinator.
One of the benefits of this kind of Assistance
Mechanism is that it can fill gaps where stakeholders
lack the resources to conduct research and answer
policy or other questions in-house or retain outside
counsel to do it for them.523 To the extent a state or
other stakeholder has general questions, issues, or
concerns, and has a several month window in which
to receive a memorandum, this kind of assistance
could help to overcome resource constraints. It is most
suited for in-depth questions that can be answered in
a several months’ time-frame.
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TradeLab has an extremely lean staff and expenses
limited to one paid coordinator, who facilitates the
network and provides institutional, administrative
and legal/substantive support, including outreach to
beneficiaries and alumni, and the expenses necessary
for running the TradeLab website.524 It has received
several grants, and benefits from the in-kind, voluntary
service of students and their expert mentors, and,
by extension, the universities that pay professor
salaries and facilitate the clinical teaching experience
necessary for each TradeLab project.525

4.4.2.1.1 Beneficiaries
TradeLab assists on a no-cost basis developing
countries, SMEs, civil society organizations, or other
smaller stakeholders.526

4.4.3 Other pro bono networks
Various other pro bono networks exist that are able
to field requests from states and other stakeholders
for discrete pro bono assistance, typically pairing the
requestor with an appropriate lawyer/law firm who
will engage directly with the client in representation
for the matter. Examples include the International
Senior Lawyers Project527 and the Thompson Reuters
Foundation’s TrustLaw.528 Resources available for
assistance, and eligible beneficiaries and projects vary
based on the specific partner engaged.

4.5 Intergovernmental knowledgesharing hubs
Many of CCSI’s government interviewees, from each of
the four economic development categories, stressed
the importance and value of information sharing and
opportunities for governments to “compare notes”
and learn from one another. They noted existing, ad
hoc opportunities to engage, and certain existing
efforts to create more organized platforms for
governments to convene, discuss relevant investment
law topics, and learn from other governments that
had or were currently considering similar issues. Many
interviewees felt that while some opportunities to
engage with other governmental officials exist, there
is more that could be done from an organizational
perspective to facilitate engagement, and that certain
existing efforts could be better funded or more
institutionalized. Certain existing knowledge-sharing
opportunities that were highlighted during CCSI’s
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consultations are described below.

4.5.1 Informal “sideline” knowledge-sharing
On the sidelines of organized events at which
government officials are otherwise gathering
- UNCTAD’s World Investment Forum or other
UNCTAD events; the OECD’s Freedom of Investment
Roundtable, Investment Treaty Dialogues, and
annual conferences on investment treaties; or other
trainings or meetings (such as those hosted by
ICSID,529 CCSI, or IISD, for example) - officials get to
know one another and find the time to ask questions
and share knowledge. One lower middle-income
government official noted that “while organized
trainings are useful, a lot of the value comes from
the unplanned interactions, not from the slides.”530

4.5.2 Formal knowledge-sharing
opportunities
Some existing Assistance Mechanisms as well as other
organizations, recognizing the value of knowledgesharing among government officials, have planned
and established more formal opportunities to allow
this to occur.
For example, IISD has organizes an Annual Forum
of Developing Country Investment Negotiators in
partnership with various international and regional
organizations that are regularly represented.531
The Annual Forum is hosted on a rotation-basis by
developing country governments in Africa, Asia,
and Latin America. The 13th Annual Forum will
take place in early 2020 in Thailand. The meeting
aims to ensure that developing countries are able
to attract responsible investment that advances
sustainable development while safeguarding their
legitimate policy space. More than just a meeting,
the Annual Forum has evolved into a community
of government officials from developing countries
who are determined to work towards a systemic
reform of the international investment agreements
(IIA) regime so that it better serves their countries’
interests. Around 100 officials from more than
50 countries and regional organizations attend
annually, giving participants an opportunity to listen
to international investment law experts; discuss
emerging issues, trends, and legal developments in
the field; and engage in peer learning with fellow
negotiators. Forum participants remain engaged in

the community through an online mailing list, regional
meetings, and peer-to-peer exchanges.
As an example of a regional knowledge-sharing effort,
the Center for the Advancement of the Rule of Law in
the Americas (CAROLA) at Georgetown Law hosted a
workshop on ISDS Reform in Latin America, which brought
together delegates from Latin American countries to
share their experiences surrounding the negotiation,
administration, and arbitration of investment treaties
and identify areas of concern and potential reform.532
This workshop is part of a broader effort by CAROLA to
provide a permanent platform for regional cooperation
focused on investment law reform. This kind of regional
platform, largely conducted in Spanish, permits informal
knowledge sharing and relationship-building that can
be beneficial to long-term government objectives.
As noted in Section 4.1.2, the ALSF has attempted to
do formal and informal “information sharing” among
governments. One interviewee familiar with the ALSF’s
efforts in this area stressed that formal networks with the
purpose of information sharing can bring challenges (e.g.
anti-trust concerns if there is collusion around pricing).533
Through experience, ALSF found that the best way to
promote information sharing was by organizing peer-topeer regional events on certain topics, with a requirement
that whomever attended had to present on what his or
her government was doing to address certain issues.534
In so doing, ALSF found that governments naturally will
also speak to each other during breaks, or at dinner or
lunch, and that other, more informal information-sharing
often happens in this context.535

4.5.3 Informal or treaty-based knowledge-sharing
networks
Government officials often reach out to other
government officials with general or specific questions
through informal or treaty-based networks. For
example, in CCSI’s consultations one high-income
government official stated that many countries (pointing
to both developing and developed states) have an
enormous amount of expertise in specific areas and
other states could greatly benefit from learning how
other governments have achieved certain objectives, or
managed certain obstacles.536

COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT | 79

SCOPING STUDY

This official’s government has engaged both formally
(through workshops) and informally with many
different governments over the past several years.537
The official noted that it often happens that a treaty
partner will approach with specific questions about,
for example, dispute avoidance or management, and
would like to understand in greater detail how the
government has internally organized around these
issues, and what steps it takes when it is gearing up for
an actual dispute.538 This official’s government has also
fielded very specific questions from other countries,
such as how it finances its defense, how it selects
and contracts with outside experts, how it manages
the discovery process, what considerations it gives to
arbitrator selection, among others.539
Relatedly, this developed country official stated that
it has a more general interest, and sees great value,
in engaging with treaty partners on a technical level
to ensure the coherence of the investment law system
generally, and specific treaties, in particular.540 Such
engagement could involve discussions around treaty
use or interpretation, the role for joint interpretations, or
the use and value of non-disputing party submissions.
Based on these experiences, this developed country
official suggested that a promising path forward for
an Assistance Mechanism would be to build upon
and perhaps make more robust the existing networks
and information sharing that is already occurring,
and clearly valued, among government officials.541
This kind of knowledge-sharing would then permit
states to approach with, and take away, information
relevant to the state’s own approach to defense and
to build expertise at various stages of its own internal
process.542 Another high-income government official
reiterated similar ideas, and also suggested that
regional and language-based networks could also be
useful for certain topics.543
One high-income government official, and several low
and middle-income government officials, suggested
that sharing information in this way would greatly
facilitate their countries’ efforts to gain greater control
over defense of ISDS cases, as they would like to
have more information on the specific ways in which
other governments approach or have moved in-house
certain aspects of the defense, including, for example,
which aspects may easiest to move in-house, which
are more difficult, and specific hurdles that may be
encountered along the way.544
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4.6 Discrete capacity building
mechanisms
Identification of capacity challenges, and capacity
building, as a general matter, were identified as a
thematic issue that may impact consideration and
formulation of any Assistance Mechanism. The ways
in which this study has conceptualized the meaning
of capacity is more broadly addressed in Section 2.1.
Certain discrete capacity building mechanisms are
discussed below. Assistance Mechanisms could be
developed or expanded to address certain discrete
capacity challenges.

4.6.1 Capacity building provided by
international organizations
As discussed in Section 4.2.1, many international
organizations provide investment-law related capacity
building services to states. These include UNCTAD,
the OECD, UNCITRAL, the WBG, among others.

4.6.2 Investment law trainings
Several organizations conduct investment law training
programs aimed specifically at government officials.
Arbitral institutions, including ICSID, the PCA, and the
SCC (among other arbitral institutions) offer various
kinds of training, often of a procedural nature. These
trainings are further described in Section 4.2.
CCSI’s annual Executive Training on Investment
Treaties and Arbitration for Government Officials
takes place at Columbia University, in New York City,
over the course of two weeks every summer.545 CCSI’s
training is limited to officials currently employed
by their government in order to most appropriately
and effectively tailor course content and better
equip officials to gain a deeper understanding of
investment law and policy and the implications that
this complex and ever-evolving field has on host state
policy-making and treaty-based liability. The first week
of the training focuses on substantive elements of
investment law, and the second week on procedural
aspects of ISDS disputes. Sessions are taught by CCSI
staff as well as a broad network of highly experienced
lawyers from the private sector, governments, and
international organizations. This training also provides
an opportunity for informal discussion, learning, and
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network-building among officials that many training
alumni have found extremely valuable. This training
is offered on an at-cost basis to participants, and
scholarships are available for participants from
low- and in some cases middle-income countries,
depending on the availability of funds. CCSI also
conducts in-country trainings upon request, which
can be useful if a larger number of officials from one
country plan to participate.
The International Institute for Sustainable
Development (IISD) designs and carries out incountry training courses for officials from developing
country governments and regional organizations.546
IISD’s training courses are aimed at assisting
negotiators and policy-makers in developing
investment policies, laws, treaties, and contracts
in ways that support the achievement of the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), align with
their countries’ national development priorities, and
limit the negative impacts of investment treaties on
their governments’ right to regulate. Typically, IISD’s
trainings on international investment law cover
substantive and procedural aspects of traditional
investment treaties; novel approaches in modern
treaties and models; strategies for international
negotiations on investment; and national, regional,
and multilateral initiatives to reform international
investment law and investor–state arbitration. IISD
develops the agenda of each training in collaboration
with the host government or regional organization
in order to tailor the event to the host’s needs.
These trainings are delivered by teams of highly
qualified international lawyers. Typically counting
on funding from development aid and philanthropic
organizations, IISD’s training courses are offered
free of charge for developing country governments.
In some cases, countries may be requested to
contribute toward reasonable expenses. In case of
insufficient funds, priority is given to least developed
countries.
The ability for non-profit organizations to provide
these kinds of trainings, particularly for low-income
or middle-income economies, is, for the most part,
dependent on availability of grants.

4.6.3 Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs)
In recent years, Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs),
free online courses that are available to anyone to enroll,
have increased in popularity. While organization of a
MOOC requires one-time financing for content creation
and production,547 many MOOCs are offered several
times a year, starting on a designated date and lasting
several weeks, with lecturers perhaps one time a week
and assignments and quizzes in the interim (estimated
time per week is typically 5-10 hours). The cohort
completing the MOOC can engage in online forums
and information exchange. Often, lecturers featured in
the MOOC are on-call during these times. Université
Catholique de Louvain, with Professor Yannick Radi,
offers a 10-week investment law MOOC.548

4.6.4 Contractual arrangements or secondments
As described in various sections of this Scoping Study,
the ACWL, many law firms, and even some states
provide secondments to government officials from
developing countries. These secondments are valuable
opportunities for government officials to join an
experienced legal team and to transfer knowledge back
to the official’s own ministry or department.

4.6.5 Efforts to “democratize the law” through
transparency and knowledge sharing
In recent years there has been broader recognition of the
public nature and public interest implications of many
ISDS disputes and efforts to bring greater transparency
to this field, such as by making public filings and awards.
In many cases, however, related knowledge or easily
searchable information is held behind paywalls that may
prove too great a luxury for some governments to easily
afford. For example, Columbia University’s subscriptions
to roughly 20 different investment law-related databases
and online or print publications cost in the aggregate
approximately $45,000 per year. This cost is after each
is negotiated to achieve the lowest possible price,
and after benefitting from academic as opposed to
commercial rates.
Various existing mechanisms and other organizations
have taken steps to make more information about
investment law and arbitration publicly available on a
no-cost basis, and some of those services are described
below.
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It is important to stress, however, that several Scoping
Study interviewees and many other stakeholders have
raised concerns that it is not merely transparency of
information, but actual democratization of knowledge
that will be required to truly move toward a more
level and equal playing field as between developed
and developing states, as well as vis-a-vis the rights
and interests of other stakeholders in the system.
For example, when states outsource legal services to
private sector actors, states reduce their own learning
and knowledge capture and thus perpetuate a cycle
by which more and more knowledge is held in law
firms rather than in-house. In many cases, language
barriers greatly exacerbate these issues.

4.6.5.1 UNCITRAL
4.6.5.1.1 UNCITRAL’s Transparency Registry
UNCITRAL’s Transparency Registry is a repository for
the publication of information and documents in treatybased ISDS.549 It was established by the UNCITRAL
Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based investor-State
Arbitration (Rules on Transparency) in 2014.550 Subject
to certain qualifications, the documents listed in Article
3 of the Rules on Transparency are to be made available
to the public, which include, among others, written
statements and filings of the parties, non-disputing
party submissions, transcripts, and awards. The Rules
on Transparency apply in relation to disputes arising
out of treaties concluded after April 1, 2014 when the
arbitration is initiated under the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, unless the parties otherwise agree. The United
Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based
Investor-State Arbitration (Mauritius Convention) is
an instrument by which parties to treaties concluded
prior to April 1, 2014 consent to apply the Rules on
Transparency.551 Five states are party to the Mauritius
Convention as of the writing of this report.

4.6.5.1.2 UNCITRAL’s WGIII website
UNCITRAL’s WGIII website has grown to include
a wealth of information about its ISDS reform
project.552 This website includes all submissions from
governments made throughout the reform project as
well as substantive background notes prepared by the
Secretariat to better assist the WGIII in its work. All
audio recordings and reports of all sessions are readily
available. The page provides links to substantive
submissions made by observer organizations and
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other non-states (e.g. the G77, United Nations Special
Procedures Mandate Holders) to assist the WGIII in
its work, as well as to selected research material (e.g.
by the OECD) and work produced by the academic
forum.553 A bibliography of recent writings related to
investor-state dispute settlement is also linked to this
page.554

4.6.5.2 UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Hub
UNCTAD has by far the most comprehensive publicly
available resources on investment policy-making and
disputes. In addition to UNCTAD’s investment-policy
resources and services, including the Investment Policy
Framework and Investment Policy Review program
described in Section 4.2.1, UNCTAD’s Investment
Policy Hub makes publicly available a wealth of policy
tools and resources.555
UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Monitor includes
information that has been collected by UNCTAD on
changes in national FDI policies on an annual basis
since 1992, and which provides input into UNCTAD’s
annual World Investment Report, its quarterly
Investment Policy Monitor, and the UNCTAD-OECD
Reports on G20 Measures.556 The Investment Policy
Monitor provides country-specific, up-to-date
information about the latest developments in national
foreign investment policies.557
UNCTAD’s Investment Laws Navigator is a
comprehensive and regularly updated collection
of national investment laws that includes tools for
searching and filtering.558 It is designed to provide
information that can contribute to international policy
discourse and to help advise and provide technical
assistance to countries interested in reviewing or
reforming their regulatory frameworks.559
UNCTAD’s International Investment Agreement
Navigator includes all publicly available IIAs.560 Users
can browse by country, country grouping, recently
concluded, or use an advanced-search function to
find more specific agreements.561 Relatedly, the IIA
Mapping Project maps the content of IIAs and the
database can help to understand trends, approaches,
and examples.562
Finally, UNCTAD’s Investment Dispute Settlement
Navigator contains information and filings of known
international arbitration cases initiated under IIAs.563
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This site also permits searching by various categories,
including respondent state, sector, treaty, breach,
among others, and includes an advanced-search
function.564

4.6.5.3 PluriCourts Investment Treaty
Arbitration Database
Outside of intergovernmental efforts at transparency
and disclosure of information, the PluriCourts
Investment Treaty Arbitration Database (PITAD) is a
comprehensive, regularly updated and networked
overview of all known international investment
arbitration cases.565 The database contains more than
1000 ISDS cases, coded with a series of searchable
variables, and raw and analyzed data.

4.6.5.4 italaw
italaw is a comprehensive, regularly updated, and
completely free database on investment treaties,
international investment law, and investor-state
arbitration.566 It is searchable and contains links to
cases and other information.

4.6.5.5 Jus Mundi

4.6.5.7 TradeLab
TradeLab, discussed above in Section 4.4.2 is a global
network of universities and training centers that conduct
pro bono projects for developing countries, SMEs, civil
society organizations, or other stakeholders.571 Tradelab
posts research memoranda and other non-confidential
output on its website,572 thereby seeking to achieve three
objectives: (i) help beneficiaries build capacity; (ii) train
students; and (iii) inform and create awareness for the
wider public.573 TradeLab sees potential to democratize
legal education and the legal profession in the field
of international economic law by spreading learning
and expertise beyond a handful of highly specialized
universities and large law firms.574

4.7 Legal assistance and resources
clearinghouse
As described in this Scoping Study, there is already a
wealth of resources available to states to assist with
investment-law related issues. A very basic form of
Assistance Mechanism may provide great value by simply
compiling, organizing, and disseminating information
about existing resources to relevant government
officials.575

Jus Mundi is a search engine that aims to empower
lawyers worldwide to conduct comprehensive and
efficient research on international legal matters.567
While its most comprehensive services are on a
paid basis, it also provides open and free access
to international law through the light version of its
search engine.568

4.6.5.6 International Arbitration Case Law
International Arbitration Case Law (IACL) is a notfor-profit project that aims to disseminate at no cost
summaries of important ISDS decisions relevant
to legal practitioners and scholars.569 IACL aims to
summarize, edit, and coordinate the publication of
awards and decisions in international arbitration.
It also seeks to eliminate language barriers and
to facilitate the content of decisions in various
languages.570
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During the course of CCSI’s analysis of issues
described during interviews and regarding Assistance
Mechanisms,
several
thematic,
cross-cutting,
substantive areas of consideration emerged that are
agnostic to the eventual institutional or ad hoc form
that an Assistance Mechanism may take. We set forth
thematically these cross-cutting areas for further
consideration.

5.1 Quality, reliability, reputation, trust
Multiple interviewees from governments, existing
Assistance Mechanisms, academia, and civil society
highlighted that key factors determining the success
of any Assistance Mechanism would be perceptions
regarding its quality, reliability, credibility, and
trustworthiness, as well as its actual performance in
these areas (which are distinct, but not unrelated.

Quality, reliability, reputation

Quality, reliability and reputation matter to
government officials on several different levels. At the
broadest level, governments are responsible for, and
answerable to, their populations. According to one
official,

[i]f we have a WTO dispute and we say, ‘we’re
hiring ACWL,’ we can point to their experience,
pedigree, and general reputation. They’re used
by pretty much everybody in the developing
world, so we can sell that counsel to policymakers and the public. If we hire more expensive
counsel, we have to be able to point to their
accomplishments and reputation to justify
their retention. Unfortunately, the well-reputed
external counsel is extremely expensive because
of their reputation. What developing countries
need, I think, is a “rubber stamp” of sorts on the
lawyers, so that we can pick them without any
worry. I think that’s our biggest concern, to be
honest.578

Government officials stressed that the crucial factors
in any decision to use an Assistance Mechanism, Similarly, individual officials within governments are
particularly in the context of dispute settlement, are subject to immense political pressure in choosing
legal counsel.
the quality, reliability and reputation of the support
provider. These factors were of greater importance
If you are an agency director and lose a case, there
than cost.576
is political pressure and responsibility. You have
to hire the best, most well-respected lawyers. The
Interviewees familiar with the establishment or
political implications of hiring a small firm can be
operations of existing Assistance Mechanisms
large. If the case does not go well, people will
stressed that ensuring that a mechanism is able to
ask why that firm was hired rather than the most
provide the highest quality of advice to clients, and
well-known. With an advisory center that was of
that it has a stellar reputation, are critical. According
high quality and trusted, it would make it easier
to several such interviewees, “public relations” efforts
577
for states to migrate away from large, expensive
are essential and building trust takes time. It is one
firms.579
thing for a state to sense an insurmountable capacity
challenge or even to decide that it needs assistance,
In the context of IIAs and ISDS, this means that
but it is entirely a different thing for a government to
states will need to be convinced that any Assistance
put its reliance in an outside mechanism. Government
Mechanism operates at the same level as private
officials must be confident in the utility, the advice, the
practitioners – obtaining the best representation will
quality of the service, and the long-term sustainability
often be prioritized over cost, particularly when public
of the mechanism.
interests are at stake.580 One government interviewee
noted that attention to reputation should not be
underestimated as the first reaction of any country
facing an ISDS dispute, which in most cases are
infrequent but of the highest stakes, will be to turn to
a well-established law firm.
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Quality will need to be demonstrated. Leadership and
institutional placement can also help. Having strong
and well-respected leadership at the beginning
can be critical to putting an organization on the
map. Such leadership must be viewed as legitimate
in the eyes of all stakeholders in any Assistance
Mechanism (beneficiaries, donors. One interviewee
noted that some attention should be given to the
extent to which an Assistance Mechanism will need
to “weather political storms,” and how it should be
established institutionally to ensure the greatest
success in this regard.581 The ability to benefit from
the reputation of an existing institution as, for
example, the ALSF benefitted from its affiliation with
the AfDB, and the ISP/LDCs program has benefitted
from its affiliation with IDLO, and by extension, the
United Nations, can be beneficial to an Assistance
Mechanism in both of these respects.

Trust
Closely related to issues of quality, reliability, and
reputation is the issue of trust. Interviewees
stressed that with any legal service, trust is
a necessary component.
Trust is essential to be able to provide effective
representation. Interviewees stated that a support
provider’s credibility and trustworthiness were
crucial for government clients to be candid and
open with the support provider. Many government
and other interviewees stressed that trust must
be built over time; that the financial and policy
interests of support providers must be understood,
and ideally aligned, with that of the government.
They stated that during their internal procurement
process, great attention is paid to the interests and
perspectives of outside legal assistance. Explicit
consideration is given to which counsel they can
trust to handle politically, economically, socially, or
otherwise sensitive legal matters and truly represent
the country’s interest.582 If an Assistance Mechanism
were constructed to be attuned to the perspective
and interest of states and, according to some
interviewees, to not have a financial interest in the
claim or the ISDS system more broadly, it would be
easier for governments to engage such a mechanism
for direct representation.583
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The sensitivity to alignment of perspectives and
avoidance of even perceptions of conflicts of interest was
stressed not only with respect to direct representation
in claims, but also with respect to more general policy
advice or discrete questions.584 One government
would value a neutral place for a “second opinion”
with respect to what had been suggested by outside,
private sector legal counsel because this official has in
the past had doubts about whether such advice is truly
in the legal (and social and political) interest of a state.585
Another interviewee stated that it would be helpful for
a center to be affiliated with an existing international or
other organization that the government already trusts,
as this would build on an existing relationship.586 One
interviewee with experience working for an Assistance
Mechanism stressed that for certain tasks, even highly
qualified private sector lawyers may not be appropriate
because their experience and interest (financial or
otherwise) is sometimes not truly and fundamentally
aligned with that of a government and its interests.587
Some successful Assistance Mechanisms have built up
significant levels of trust. With respect to the ACWL
there is a generally high level of intimacy between it
and its clients.588 They are close because they foster
relationships that both predate and outlast litigation
and are thus less ‘transactional.’589 Trust is built through
hosting of trainings, other events, and personal
relationships. Individuals familiar with the ACWL have
found that governments are more willing to be candid
and open, and that trust is a huge advantage.590
The ALSF has similarly, through years of work, built up
trust relationships. As noted earlier, key traits that were
noted by one interviewee as contributing to the ALSF’s
success were also that it was a regional initiative, and
not something that came from the G20, G7, or other
organizations outside of the region, and that it started
with African institutional support (the AfDB), and thus
benefitted from trust relationships that were already
established.591

5.2 Scope of services and funding
The scope of services an Assistance Mechanism can
provide will be entirely dependent on and interrelated
with available funding – the more money available,
the more services can be provided. There will also be
tradeoffs in the nature and breadth of services offered
and depth in the number of countries to whom those
services might be offered. Thus, comparisons in this
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section to existing Assistance Mechanisms will
attempt to incorporate contextual comparisons to
the investment law context. This section primarily
discusses comparisons with the ACWL, but also
incorporates references to other funding and support
mechanisms.

5.2.1 Scope of services
This section first focuses on the most robust form of
service provision, that of the ACWL-model, but moves
on to discuss more discrete areas.
With respect to the ACWL, this mechanism plays
a valuable role in the WTO context, but differences
between these two legal systems, and the role that
the ACWL plays in one versus what an investment law
assistance mechanism could play in the other, should
not be underestimated.
One major difference between the ACWL and service
provision in ISDS cases is that the time and cost
budgeted by the ACWL for any given WTO dispute
seem to be dramatically lower per case than is
common for ISDS disputes. This issue is addressed in
more detail in the following Section 5.1.2.2.
A second difference relates to the nature of WTO law
as compared to investment law, where in the former
firmer lines may be drawn between legal and policy
assistance and advice. Particularly if an investment law
assistance mechanism were to engage in negotiation
assistance and other training and capacity building
work, one issue that might arise is whether it is feasible
(and/or desirable to maintain a line between the
provision of legal and policy support in the IIA context.
As noted routinely by interviewees discussing
the ACWL, key to its success is its focus on legal,
and not policy, input. While that line is not always
clear – and, indeed, some users have reported
particularly valuing the ACWL’s services because of
a development lens applied to its work592 – it may
be even more difficult to maintain in the investment
law context where the standard-based nature of core
IIA obligations provide a greater space for integrating
policy considerations into those
obligations’
593
interpretation and application.
While private
sector law firms currently advise states on legal
matters, where and how these issues stray into
policy questions is not as closely scrutinized as
such advice may be if delivered by an ACWLlike mechanism. While the ACWL notes its
avoidance of

policy issues in the WTO area as key to its legitimacy
and acceptance, this distinction may be more difficult
to draw in investment arbitration.
Another issue that may arise is whether and
how negotiation, training, and legal support or
representation in the IIA context might need to look
and be structured differently than for WTO-focused
activities, or where cost implications may arise. In
contrast to WTO negotiations and disputes, where
the hub of activity and relevant delegations are in
Geneva, IIA negotiations take place around the world
and are not tied to any particular existing institution,
secretariat, or negotiating framework or agenda.
WTO disputes similarly occur in Geneva whereas
IIA-based disputes have several hubs. In addition to
raising logistical challenges regarding where and how
to provide support, it may also be harder for support
providers to know, and be known to and trusted by,
potential users, and to keep abreast of the relevant
developments in the different spheres of activity.
With respect to the issue of litigating position, one
commonly cited benefit of the ACWL is that it enables
developing countries to better advance and enforce
the rules of the multilateral trading system and helps
open global markets. With ISDS support, however,
this function and role is not present. An Assistance
Mechanisms that participated in ISDS defense may
help states avoid or minimize liability and/or reduce
their defense costs, and could potentially increase the
legitimacy of the ISDS system; but the overarching
aim of supporting client states as rule-enforcers and
market-openers, which helps generate buy-in for
the ACWL even among developed country funders
who may be respondents in cases they financially
support,594 does not appear to be similarly present for
ISDS defense. Rule enforcement arguably exists when
states employ legitimate defenses, but proactive
action to maintain the integrity of the investment legal
system is not typically taken up in a state-state context
available under treaties.
Not unrelatedly, one interviewee who had worked at
the ACWL noted that much of the ACWL’s early work
in dispute settlement had almost exclusively been
focused on supporting claimants (with a view toward
assisting developing countries help to maintain the
integrity of the WTO system), and that the subsequent
rise of respondent-side support raised issues as that
work “is more difficult in many ways.”595
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Of course, short of legal representation in disputes,
various services could be offered in different
combinations that could be explored. For example,
some Trust Funds also facilitate matching beneficiaries
to lawyers who have agreed to be available at belowmarket fees. An Assistance Mechanism may be
employed to facilitate knowledge-sharing among
government officials and may organically expand to
fill other roles as time, and trust in and demand from
such a mechanism, grew. A mechanism may start
by simply acting as a resource for governments to
better understand where, from whom, and at what
cost, existing mechanisms are available to assist in
specific contexts. The various models of existing
Assistance Mechanisms described in Section 4 are
useful to consider how an Assistance Mechanism
may best been the needs of states (and other
potential beneficiaries) for the least cost.

5.2.2 Required resources, cost allocation,
funding sustainability
5.2.2.1 Person-hours and associated resources
Relating to costs, the expenses associated with any
Assistance Mechanism will vary based on the type of
service being offered and the nature of the service
provider. For example, full support for prosecution
or defense of an ISDS arbitration averages $5 million
per case.596 While costs could be lower in a given
case, they could also be multiples of that sum,
reaching into the tens of millions of dollars. Even if
low probability events, such exceptional costs are
high-impact events that would need to be planned
for to help ensure quality and sustainability of
defense are not sacrificed due to financial and other
resource constraints.
Other services can be provided at lower cost.
Interviewees in CCSI’s consultations suggested, for
example, that support could be limited to discrete
aspects of ISDS litigation (e.g., provision of memos
on particular legal issues; access to information
and advice on counsel and/or arbitrator selection;
support on retaining and using experts for valuation
and damages; support on gathering and managing
documentary evidence). It was also suggested that
if resource constraints arose, support could be
directed to activities other than arbitration, such as
for provision of low- or no-cost access to databases
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and research tools; development of specialized online
course content; development of user-driven capacity
building workshops and peer exchanges; and support
for investment policy development, and as relevant, IIA
negotiation, review, and implementation.
For some types of expenditures, there will likely be
associated economies of scale enabling services to reach
a wider set of potential beneficiaries. Development of
training courses could, for instance, be reproduced and
replicated at relatively low marginal costs (although
this may address a different capacity need than more
tailored and unique capacity interventions would); and
special rates for or open access to online resources and
databases (along with a wider translation of relevant
materials) could support a relatively large number of
users. Costs of database and other subscriptions can
easily reach into the tens of thousands of dollars per year,
in aggregate, making it costly for a single government
to procure.
In contrast, it is unclear that litigation support in discrete
cases will have such economies of scale. If a service
provider expends $5 million in one case, it is uncertain
that that will mean the service provider can litigate the
next case for another client at a lower cost (though it
could potentially litigate another case for the same
client at a lower cost, especially if the facts are similar).
Even when arbitration involves repeat players, it does
not appear that that translates into reduced legal fees,
as has apparently been the case with the introduction
of the ACWL into the WTO context. Spillovers could be
generated, however, if work on individual ISDS cases
by an Assistance Mechanism was also used to train
lawyers for the respondent state as well as lawyers for
other governments, enabling more officials to gain skills
and experience necessary for handling disputes. To
the extent an Assistance Mechanism set a substantial
market bar on pricing or permitted states to credibly use
its pricing scale as a point of negotiation, it could also
introduce broader spillover impacts.
Of course, the services provided must respond to and
address the specific “capacity” gap that is being targeted
and must be appropriately narrow, or broad, to fulfill its
mandate. These issues of costs - and efficiency - are key
for understanding what types of Assistance Mechanisms,
if any, are desirable in response to identified concerns
and feasible with respect to resources.

Comparisons with the ACWL
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As noted above in Section 4.1.1 the ACWL uses
time budgets for its cases, estimating the resources
necessary and capping the fees that can be
charged. 597 This budget is crucial for estimating
staffing needs and associated costs. Table 9 below
shows the current time budget for ACWL work.598 As
noted, interviewees acknowledged that the ACWL
often exceeds its budgeted time for any given
case, so numbers below are indicative based on the
information that the ACWL makes publicly available.
Table 9, for comparison purposes, also illustrates the
number of hours required in an ISDS proceeding.
While it is difficult to find publicly available data
regarding the number of hours spent on legal
defense in ISDS cases, the information available
suggests a reasonable estimate of 20,000 hours per
case, although this number could, of course, vary
greatly depending on the complexity, duration, and
other unique attributes of any given case.599
Comparing a WTO panel phase with an ISDS
proceeding reveals that the ISDS proceeding may
require 40-50 times more hours worked.
Furthermore, over the past ten years, the ACWL has
handled between 0 and 5 new requests for dispute
settlement assistance each year. Notwithstanding
the ways in which an Assistance Mechanism in
investment law may craft rules to broaden or narrow

eligible beneficiaries, one could imagine a broader
desire for support in ISDS disputes, capacity building,
and other areas than in the WTO context given the
larger number of overall disputes.
Comparisons with other Assistance Mechanisms area
also useful. For example, as discussed in more depth
in Section 4.3.1.5, under the ICTY’s legal aid system,
monthly, lump-sum payments were made to counsel
for representation. Trials were assigned a complexity
level of 1-3 which was a proxy for hours required. For a
Complexity level 1 case, maximum amounts that would
be paid to legal counsel appearing on the ICTY “Rule
45” list were €151,786, for a complexity level 2 case,
€260,895, and for a complexity level 3 case, €424,731.600
For other legal counsel appearing before the
ICTY, maximum hours that could be submitted for
reimbursement were, in the pre-trial phase, a maximum
of 150 hours per month per team member, of two, three
or five persons, depending on the complexity of the
case, and a total of 3,000, 4,500 or 6,000 (respectively)
hours total could be remunerated.601 For the trial phase,
a maximum of two, three or five team members may
be remunerated for up to 150 hours per person, for a
total of 300, 450 or 700 (respectively) hours total, and at
the appeals phase a maximum of 600 to 900 hours total
could be billed for the entire phase, with up to 100 hours
per defense team member per month.602
Depending on whether an investment law Assistance

Table 9 Time budgets - WTO and ISDS

Proceeding

Hours

Cost to beneficiary of legal
services

WTO Consultations

147

CHF47,628 (max charge)

WTO Panel

444

CHF143,856 (max charge)

WTO AB
ISDS Case (Eli Lilly)764
ISDS Case (Mesa
Power)765

263

CHF85,212 (max charge)

20,142.71

CAD4,579,260.92

19,616.00

CAD4,225,547.67
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Mechanism also engaged in other activities of the
ACWL, such as capacity building or providing opinions
(among others that have been discussed in this Scoping
Study), the financial and personnel resources required
by an investment law Assistance Mechanism may
need to be greater by an order of some magnitude
when compared to the ACWL (or other Assistance
Mechanisms, such as the ICTY’s fund) to provide the
desired level of support in the investment law context.
Another interesting comparison between the ACWL
and investment law is the relative impact of the cases
that are supported. The ACWL’s work at the pace
described has enabled it to be involved in nearly 20
percent of all WTO dispute settlement proceedings
to date. In contrast, support at a roughly equivalent
pace (assuming three cases per year over the past ten
years) in ISDS would, based on the number of claims
over the past ten years (615), be closer to 5 percent.603
The value of an Assistance Mechanism to the overall
legal system and “rule of law” is also an area for
consideration. In the context of WTO law, there may
be low-value cases in which developing countries
participate that are nevertheless high in systemic
importance because WTO law is based on one set of
common treaties and, while a system of stare decisis
is not employed, reports issued by the Appellate
Body can be persuasive with respect to later disputes.
The ACWL may be especially important in providing
support for those types of disputes. In contrast, in
ISDS, cases are often high value for the parties to
the dispute but low value in terms of systemic effect
because of the thousands of different treaties forming
the basis of disputes, and the ad hoc nature of dispute
settlement (although in practice many arbitrators are
persuaded by earlier awards, but not in a predictable
nor systemic way). A state win in one ISDS case under
the present arbitration system, for instance, will
not produce systemic gains. It is possible that state
support by an Assistance Mechanism may produce
more frequent state “wins” on issues of substance or
procedure, and that those decisions may have spillover
effects in other ISDS cases arising under the same or
other treaties, but systemic impacts are less likely. This
is a notable contrast to the WTO, and the potential
impact and perceived benefits of the ACWL.
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5.2.2.2 Costs of support and who bears them
There are three general models for allocation of costs:

Legal service providers bear the costs of services
provided to users: In some cases, service providers
facilitated by an Assistance Mechanism bear the costs
of their services: Law firms and university-based legal
clinics or other non-governmental organizations may
provide pro bono support on discrete legal issues
relating to IIA policy, treaty negotiation, or dispute
management. This support is available at no cost to
beneficiaries. While these Assistance Mechanisms are
not cost-free, the direct costs of services are often
borne by the service providers (e.g., the law firms,
universities, or non-profit organizations) and the
overhead costs of the mechanism through external
donations.604 The existing ISP/LDCs program, for
example, fits this model.
Service users pay for (all or some of) the costs
of services provided to them: In other models the
service users may pay for the service provider at market
rates (which could be, for instance, based on the
market for the particular type of case, or on the market
for legal services in the host state), pre-set rates, or
negotiated rates. This is currently done, for instance,
in connection with the services provided (or, in the
case of engagement of external counsel, facilitated)
by the ACWL, and in connection with services
provided by the ALSF. While Trust Funds engage in
varying levels of pairing beneficiaries with actual legal
counsel, in some cases Trust Funds do have approved
counsel lists and/or specified rates that counsel may
charge. Another example in this category is the use
of third-party funding (which, for various reasons is
in practice largely limited to claimant-funding and is
discussed in Section 6.3.2.3.5) or other contingency fee
arrangements. Although third-party funding and/or
contingency arrangements do not involve the service
user paying money up-front to the service provider (or
funder of the service provider), the service user, in the
case of a financial upside, would commit to share a
portion of a favorable award or outcome.

SECURING ADEQUATE LEGAL DEFENSE IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS A SCOPING STUDY

Third-parties (i.e., neither the service
provider nor the service user) pay for costs
of services: Other models may rely more heavily
or even exclusively on third-party donors to fund
assistance. Those donors can be public (like
national government aid agencies), or private (like
Bloomberg Philanthropies and the Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation) and can potentially support a
range of activities from assistance with reviewing
and formulating IIA policy (as organizations such as
UNCTAD already do) to defense of particular ISDS
disputes. Different approaches can be taken with
respect to issues of:

Another approach involving contributions by investor/
claimants and potentially other litigants was suggested
by one interviewee. This proposal was for a novel, taxlike financing mechanism that could be explored to
fund an Assistance Mechanism.606 A fee that would be
paid as an element of jurisdictional requirements could
be built into treaties. For example, 1% of the amount
in controversy of any case could be paid to finance an
Assistance Mechanism.607 An economic assessment
would need to be conducted as to what percentages
(and if desirable, for all or a subset of kinds of claims)
would be sufficient to cover the expenses, or supplement
other financing, of an Assistance Mechanism.

•

These three general categories of cost-bearers– legal
service providers, beneficiary/uses, and third-parties -are not mutually exclusive: A law firm may, for instance,
agree with a respondent state to provide defense
at a fee that is lower than it normally charges, and to
also build training for government attorneys into its
services contract; and a third-party donor may agree
to pay a portion of the relevant defense costs, with
the respondent state paying the remainder. At least
one arbitral institution also is willing to help negotiate
arbitrator fees or waive some of its own administration
fees for certain governments.

•
•

•

who can contribute (e.g., just governments, or
also philanthropic foundations, private donors,
etc.);
to what can they contribute (e.g., to specific
cases, general funds, or only to core funding);
on what terms (e.g., in exchange for rights
to participate in management meetings, to
receive reports on work conducted, and/or to
also obtain services); and
with what degree of transparency.

Different
rules
may
apply
to
different
types
of
donors.
Assistance
Mechanisms
may develop comprehensive ex-ante rules
covering all permitted funding sources and
arrangements or build in flexibility to develop
new funding relationships and terms over time.605
Another approach under this category is the use
of fee-shifting, whereby the costs of services used
by client governments would be paid by their
adversaries in the dispute. A fee-shifting model
could provide that, if a state were to prevail in its
defense of an ISDS case, the investor would pay
for those defense costs. This fee-shifting can be
limited to certain contexts (e.g., when claims are
considered frivolous or abusive), certain amounts
(e.g., reasonable fees in a particular market), or
certain activities (e.g., for legal fees, but not expert
fees). A support provider could potentially be the
beneficiary of such fee-shifting awards in the client
government’s favor, while the client government
could potentially retain liability for fee-shifting in
an investor’s favor. Such an arrangement, however,
may raise concerns among client governments that
litigating parties would not have incentives to keep
costs low.

Not all models are desirable or viable for all types of
services, service providers, or service users. Several
private-sector providers indicated, for instance, that
while law firms may be able to provide legal services
at discounted or negotiated rates, and may be able to
do pro bono work on discrete tasks, they would not be
able to commit to fully support ISDS defense on a pro
bono basis. The time required and revenue forsaken
would be too great, as would the risk that the pro bono
work would give rise to conflicts of interests preventing
the firm from taking on other, paying, clients. Similarly,
it is questionable whether philanthropic foundations or
other donors would be able to support defense at a scale
desired by potential users.608 Likewise, potential service
users may not be able -- as a legal or policy matter -- to
equally employ those different cost-allocation models.
Some potential users noted that entering into pro bono
arrangements with private sector law firms may not be
possible due to procurement and anti-corruption laws
and policies. Others indicated concerns about whether
a lack of control over funding would translate into a lack
of control over policy or litigation strategy.
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5.2.2.3 Funding sustainability – different
models, approaches, and considerations
The long-term financial sustainability of an Assistance
Mechanism is important to its quality of its work,
impact, and reputation (and those factors, in turn, also
affect its financial sustainability).
The funding sustainability of an Assistance Mechanism
should be a major focus of any real effort to create
such a mechanism. Lessons and insights from some
existing Assistance Mechanisms may be useful in this
consideration. Some comparisons and experiences are
highlighted below. While the section above discussed
three main potential cost-bearers of support – service
providers, user/beneficiaries, and third-party donors
– this section focuses primarily the latter two since
contributions by service providers alone (e.g., through
ad hoc pro bono assistance) seems unlikely, under
current circumstances, to meet the demand sought by
respondent states.

5.2.2.3.1 Funding sustainability – support by
third-party donors
In a model that relies upon support from thirdparty donors, achieving financial sustainability will
require various ingredients, including securing (and
maintaining) buy-in from donors, having the trust of
beneficiaries and understanding their needs and
priorities, achieving desired outcomes, effectively
managing relationships and resources, and anticipating
and mitigating risks.609
Table 10 highlights some data on donor support
provided to other relevant initiatives. The text below
provides additional detail.

Example: ACWL
As noted in greater depth in Section 4.1.1.4, the ACWL
operates on a mix of user fees and donations to its
Endowment Fund with a view of becoming financially
independent, although a 2006 task force report
concluded that it was doubtful that the Endowment
Fund would ever reach a size necessary to ensure the
ACWL’s self-sufficiency.610 The ACWL’s Endowment
Fund is funded by developed country Members and
contributions count as official development assistance.
Each has contributed at least $1,000,000. At the end of
2005, the Endowment Fund stood at CHF18,000,000,
and at the end of 2015 at CHF26,000,000.
While, as discussed further below, the ACWL also
charges user fees for support in litigation, those fees
have been a relatively minimal source of revenue for
the Centre. They amounted to CHF300,000 for 2015,
and from 2002-2014 averaged only CHF161,000 per
year.611 Legal fees have constituted on average roughly
4 percent of the ACWL’s annual revenues.612
In 2016 the ACWL’s annual budget was roughly
CHF4,300,000;613 and for 2019, it was estimated at
roughly CHF4,700,000.614 The budget for the 2017-2021
period is estimated at CHF23,548,000 million in total.
Taking into account revenue from the Endowment
Fund that can be withdrawn to fund the ACWL over this
five-year window, CHF20,000,000 million in additional
voluntary contributions will be necessary to cover the
ACWL’s financial needs through 2021.615 These figures
illustrate that although the ACWL is extremely highly
regarded by users and commentators, it has not
achieved the financial sustainability anticipated and
must engage in ongoing quests for additional funding
to sustain its work.

Example: IDLO’s ISP/LDCs Programme
With respect to IDLO’s ISP/LDCs program, the program
is aiming to raise €2 million in its initial phase, a large
portion of which has been pledged.616 With a fullyfunded €2 million in donations, ISP/LDCs envisions
that it would be able to cover operational expenses
and make about twelve interventions of medium size,
which could take the form of arbitrations or large-scale
trainings.617 Unlike the ACWL, the ISP/LDCs program
provides all services to beneficiaries free of charge to
the beneficiary.

92 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT

SECURING ADEQUATE LEGAL DEFENSE IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS A SCOPING STUDY

Despite having received pledges of funding,
it is unclear to CCSI how much of ISP/LDCs’
pledged money has actually been received by the
program. At the IDLO ISP/LDCs kickoff event at
UN Headquarters in September 2017, for example,
the Director General for International Cooperation
and Development of the European Commission
announced a decision to set aside €1 million for the
ISP/LDCs program.618 The program finally received
those funds in December 2019.619

Example: Various trust funds
While the total amount in the PCA Trust Fund is
not known to CCSI, it is not at a scale that would
permit it to make grants to cover private sector legal
costs.620 Rather, grants tend to be sufficient to cover
institutional and arbitrator costs of disputes.621
While the PCA Secretary General appeals every
year to PCA members, varying levels of fundraising
success are realized. When a high profile public
international law, state-state arbitration is before

the PCA, the PCA has found that members are willing
to donate funds toward legal assistance.622 However,
the PCA struggles to a greater extent to maintain a
consistent flow of funds to generally upkeep the Trust
Fund. 623 One interviewee stated that in this interviewee’s
experience, states are not unwilling to donate, but
general “rule of law” objectives tend to be insufficient
to permit states to muster the political will to do so on a
large or sufficient scale.624
The ICJ Trust Fund, which helps states to offset expenses
of appearing before the ICJ as well as to execute ICJ
judgements, has never been known to have funds
exceeding $2 million.625
The ITLOS Trust Fund, despite repeated entreaties to
the UN General Assembly, has never reached amounts
considered sufficient in light of the mandate and need.
The most recent balance CCSI could locate was a 2006
balance of $70,621.17.626

Table 10 Budgets and Expenditures for Assistance Mechanisms: Select examples
ACWL

ALSF

ICC Legal Aid for Defense

Annual budget

CHF4.5 million (2018)

$25 million estimated
for 2020

€3.5 million estimated for
2020766

Select data on
resource/time
expenditures

This covered:
- 5 new disputes (17
ongoing or new
disputes in total that
year)
- 237 legal opinions
- 39 certificates for
training course
- 4 participants in a
secondment program

The “bulk” of funding
for 2020 is estimated for
supporting fair commercial negotiations.767

The 2020 budget estimates
this will support payment for
up to 11 external defense
teams at capped rates

From 2010-2018, $74.5
million of expenditures
approved. Of those
funds:
- 64% for advisory
services, 22% for
capacity building
- 10% for litigation
- 4% for knowledge
management.

Support provided by
12 lawyers, 3 administrative staff, and 4 participants in secondment
program
As of 2018, there were
33 in-house members
40-60 percent of time is of staff
on activities other than
litigation
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With respect to the International Criminal Court,
its budget for legal aid in 2016 was €4,521,000.30
(up from €2,355,600 and €2,866,400 in 2015 and
2014 respectively), representing 3.25% of the total
ICC budget.627 This is less than 10% of the budget
allocated to the Office of the Prosecutor.628 The legal
aid budget is a part of the ICC’s overall budget, which
is funded by ICC member states. The contribution
of each state is determined in the same way that its
UN dues are determined, which is roughly based on
income, population, and debt burden. Additional
funding is provided by voluntary contributions from
organizations, corporations, or other entities.

5.2.2.3.2 Funding sustainability – user fees
Any Assistance Mechanism providing support in
dispute settlement, negotiations, and other training/
capacity building could charge some or all users fees
for some or all services in order to cover costs and/or
discourage users from filing frivolous claims or raising
frivolous defenses.
ACWL experience discussed above, however,
highlights the trade-offs between charging fees
and encouraging/discouraging use of the services
provided, as well as the difficulties in charging fees
adequate to sustain such an Assistance Mechanism,
especially when services provided free of cost
constitute the bulk of demand for that Mechanism’s
time.629
It is uncertain that patterns experienced by other
Assistance Mechanisms, and namely the ACWL, will
apply in the investment law context – for instance,
how the demand for legal opinions (provided free of
charge by the ACWL) would relate to the demand for
direct representation (provided at staggered rates by
the ACWL) in ISDS. Thus, it is difficult to predict the
contributions of a user-fee model, but likely realistic
to assume that user-fees would represent only a small
share of overall funding.
Another distinction from the ACWL is that part of
the motivation of charging user fees is to discourage
frivolous claims. This rationale does not equally apply
in the context of ISDS defense given that states
currently do not make the choice to file the dispute.

Other existing Assistance Mechanisms also provide
certain services based on a user fee model. For
example, as described earlier, the ICTY caps user
fees at levels that are based on case complexity.
Defendants in cases before the ICTY can benefit from
reduced and/or capped fee legal representation. In
these criminal defense contexts, notions of frivolous
claims do not arise, and the rational for reduced fee
services is one based in international human rights
and the right to legal defense.
Overall, considerations regarding the appropriateness
of user fees may differ depending upon such factors
as whether the user is a state or private investor,
respondent or claimant, the policy rationales
for providing the assistance and the unintended
consequences or incentives that may arise due to the
subsidy.

5.2.3 Stakeholder tensions
Another cross-cutting theme relates to the actual,
apparent, or possible conflicts of interests that can
arise in the relationships between and among donors,
support providers, client governments, private- and
government-owned investors and investments, and
other stakeholders. Many of these types of issues are
not unprecedented, arising in other areas of domestic
and international law. As described further below
in connection with discussing various existing legal
support mechanisms, there exist myriad lessons and
tools for trying to avoid and address these challenges,
including care in establishing independent governance
mechanisms for legal support institutions; clear and
transparent rules on allocation of decision-making
authority; and appropriate, comprehensive, and
effective rules regarding professional responsibility.

5.2.3.1 Tensions between client governments
and donor governments
Various concerns have been raised regarding potential
tensions or conflicts, perceived or actual, that could
arise between, on the one hand, client governments
of an Assistance Mechanism and, on the other, donor
governments (funders) of the Assistance Mechanism.
The extent of conflicts would in many ways depend on
the scope of an Advisory Center. Conflicts may include:

•
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interest in the content of the law generally,630 in
the outcome of negotiations (between states
and between investors and states), and/or in
the outcome in a particular case (state-to-state
or investor-state).631 One interviewee familiar
with ALSF’s work stated that, “[f]or investorstate disputes, I can see [managing conflicts
of interest between donors and beneficiary
governments] being a large challenge -- I
would probably emphasize the independence
of the management structure and make sure
that developing country governments have a
voice in the governance structure” in order to
alleviate conflicts and tensions surrounding
donors and specific cases.

•

•

Justifications for providing funding: Even
within donor countries, there may be different
perspectives regarding the objectives of the
funding and the Assistance Mechanism it
supports. Development agencies, for instance,
may view funding for Assistance Mechanisms
as important for supporting substantive and
process-related development objectives;632
and economic or trade ministries may view it as
being important for supporting and legitimizing
a system of international investment
liberalization and protection,633 and for
advancing their interests within that system.634
Those several objectives of donor governments
may, but do not necessarily, align. Moreover,
client governments may have a different view
from each of those donor country perspectives,
valuing the funding and Assistance Mechanism
based on the ability of such support to
empower them to make their own decisions
regarding objectives, formulation, use, and
application of international investment law.
Support in conflict with internal
stakeholders: Funding states may face
political difficulties supporting an Assistance
Mechanism focused on dispute settlement
because the general or specific support of
respondent states may be, or perceived to
be, at odds with those states’ support of their
outward investors. If an Assistance Mechanism
were supporting a respondent state’s defense
in a claim brought by a donor-state’s investor(s),
those tensions may be high.635 Additionally,
it may be difficult for states to fund defense

of claims that donor-governments’ stakeholders
do not believe should be claims at all. Some
examples of such claims could be the particularly
controversial cases targeting countries’ health
measures (e.g., the Philip Morris cases) or limits on
fossil fuel extraction. Rather than strengthening
support for international investment treaties, the
involvement of government-supported/taxpayerfunded Assistance Mechanisms may instead
generate additional awareness of and critiques
regarding the costs of the system.

•

The nature of the respondent government:
Funders may face political or policy difficulties
supporting some potential beneficiaries. In the
context of support for investor-state disputes, for
instance, these issues could arise due to concerns
about the conduct or nature of the respondent
host government (e.g., if there is evidence of
government corruption;636 if the government’s
leadership is contested;637 or if the government is
put on a sanctions list before or during a case638).

•

The nature of the claim: Funders may face
political or policy difficulties supporting the defense
some types of cases. If, for instance, the case
relates to direct nationalization of an investment
by a government, there may be concerns about
the use of public funds to support defense of such
conduct. These tensions may be exacerbated if the
expropriation is of (or has negatively affected) an
investment of a private or state-owned investor of
a donor country. They might also be triggered if
the expropriation is of (or has negatively affected)
the contributions of an international financial
institution.

Interviewees experienced with existing Assistance
Mechanisms stated that in this context, real or perceived
conflicts, and even the “optics” of who is financing an
Assistance Mechanism and where and under what
circumstances support is provided are critical issues that
should not be underestimated.
To the extent that funding from development agencies
is anticipated, it is important to consider whether and
what tensions may arise among, for instance:
•

those agencies’ needs to be able to monitor and
evaluate the use of public funds and ensure funding
aligns with their broader policy aims,
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•

•

the needs and priorities of client governments,
including the client governments’ interests in (1)
confidentiality and (2) avoiding circumstances of
tied aid,639 and
the needs of an Assistance Mechanism to secure
funding while also maintaining its reputation as
an independent provider of legal advice free from
political sway.

Governance documents relating to the ACWL suggest
that these issues can be navigated but are complex.
Developed country donors have emphasized in
ACWL General Assembly meetings, for instance,
that “the majority of the ACWL’s funding originates
from development agencies of developed country
Members that now have come to consider the ACWL
as a development organization, rather than a trade
organization,” and that, consequently, they needed
“real” and “results-based reporting” on relevant
performance indicators in order to justify their funding
decisions.”640 Developing country governments and
ACWL management, however, counseled against
reporting requirements that could impair the ACWL’s
independence, impartiality, and confidentiality.641
While a number of donor development organizations
have determined that their respective missions
align with the ACWL’s – particularly in supporting
developing countries and LDCs to understand,
advance, and defend their rights as litigants in a rulesbased multilateral trading system – the reluctance of
some developed countries to provide support, and the
interactions between existing donors and other ACWL
members on performance indicators, suggest that it
is important to carefully assess whether and to what
extent various stakeholders’ objectives may diverge
and create a governance structure able to manage
those issues. Such frictions could potentially arise out
of the users of the system, the identity of the parties
adverse to the funded litigants,642 the types of cases
being handled, and the outcomes of the disputes on
litigants and beyond.643
It is also useful to bear in mind the challenges the
ACWL has reportedly had with securing funds from
non-Member sources, including private foundations,
due to concerns about the conditions that such
funders might seek to place on those funds. It would
be important to consider whether and how those
types of potential conflicts between funders and
funded organizations might be different in relation
to work on IIAs/ISDS (including any potential work for
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claimants), and how those conflicts can be avoided
and/or addressed.

5.2.3.2 Tensions between client governments
and support providers
Other concerns raised in interviews and in literature
relate to potential tensions between client governments
and support providers (e.g. in clearinghouse models
where a support provider is an entity other than the
Assistance Mechanism’s own staff). Support providers
may have a financial interest in the contours of the
system and, in particular, a continuous flow of cases
providing revenue-generating opportunities. It was
noted by several interviewees, including existing
support providers, that this, in turn, could inform how
the providers
•

•

advise on the content of investment policies and
issues relating to IIA negotiations (e.g., whether
to negotiate investment treaties with ISDS, and
whether and how to regulate third-party funding);
and
argue (or not) certain issues of law in the context
of disputes.644

Any misalignment of perspective and interest between
a support provider and the beneficiary, or questions
on the part of the beneficiary that the advice is not in
its best interest, were noted as key causes for concern
among government official interviewees.645
Relatedly, it was noted that support providers may
have a financial interest that informs their case strategy
and tactics. If they are paid by hours worked, they may
have an incentive to raise even frivolous arguments
or engage in other actions that prolong or drive up
hours worked in proceedings. If they are paid based
on a flat fee, they may be reluctant to incur costs that
would result in their running the case at a loss or shrink
their profit. If they are paid based on a contingency
fee arrangement, they may push for (or against) any
pre-award settlement or other outcome that affects
their returns. The involvement of third-party funding
can further complicate these issues, exacerbated by
the fact that such funding and terms thereof are not
transparent, making it unclear whose interests are
driving decisions made by the disputing party.
Existing Assistance Mechanisms have, and continue
to, navigate ethical conflicts. The ALSF, for example,
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reports applying the stricter of jurisdictional or support
provider ethical obligations when more than one set
of rules may apply; but as stated by one interviewee
familiar with the ALSF, “ethics conflicts are a huge
nightmare.”646 In this context, tools such as the use
of advance waivers may be important to consider
for some Assistance Mechanism models, as would
be any treaties or other instruments establishing
the legal structure, governance, and liability of the
Assistance Mechanism(s). In this context, complex
issues arise regarding the appropriate protections
to be afforded, respectively, to users of Assistance
Mechanisms and to their support providers.

5.2.3.3 Tensions between donors and support
providers
Another set of tensions relates to those between
donors to any Assistance Mechanism and external
support providers, which can arise from mismatches
between each actor’s objectives and incentives, and
which may change over time. Questions may arise
regarding, for instance, the appropriate role of the
donor, its ability to control the type and content
of services provided by support providers, and
proper methods for exercising such control. This
control may be direct (e.g., by donors specifying
who or what is/is not eligible for support, shaping
the contents of training agendas, and/or approving
the types of arguments being raised in disputes);
or it can be indirect (through decisions to increase
or decrease funding for an Assistance Mechanism,
to designate certain support providers as eligible
or not to provide assistance or due to power over
staffing decisions).

5.2.3.4 Internal Assistance Mechanism
tensions arising from the scope of its
mandate
One interviewee with experience working for an
Assistance Mechanism raised the issue of internal
conflicts of interest that can arise when an Assistance
Mechanism tries to do both policy formulation
and legal defense.647 While bringing together
governmental officials working on these topics
makes sense, and the lack of cross-governmental
discussion and application of lessons learned was
an intra-governmental capacity challenging raised
by government officials in interviews, tensions may
arise to the extent an Assistance Mechanism tries

to provide substantive guidance in both of these areas.
The reasons for this go to the same issues that were
raised by a wide variety of government officials during
consultations related to issues of trust and alignment of
perspectives.

5.2.4 Identifying the client/beneficiary
Another cross-cutting consideration is how to identify
relevant beneficiaries of an Assistance Mechanism.
Determination of beneficiaries should be closely tied to
decisions about what concerns an Assistance Mechanism
is intended to address, and how its objectives are
framed.

5.2.4.1 Investment policy formulation and
implementation – potential beneficiaries
To the extent an Assistance Mechanism is intended to
address issues and capacity challenges related to IIA
policy formulation and implementation, beneficiaries
could be limited to investment treaty negotiators; or
they could be a wider set of stakeholders in domestic
jurisdictions, including national parliamentarians or
ministry/agency officials, state/provincial or local-level
government actors, and civil society organizations all
engaged in efforts to understand how to attract, retain,
and benefit from inward investment, and whether, how,
and when to promote outward investment. In CCSI’s
consultations one low-income government official
stressed that for this official’s government, many concerns
arise from the fact that only a handful of individuals
within the government have a deep understanding of
international investment law. This official sees it as critical
that much broader capacity across the government be
developed, prioritizing this capacity-building objective
over assistance with defense of ISDS claims.648
Decisions regarding intended beneficiaries in this context
will naturally depend on broader decisions regarding
what kind of capacity, if any, an Assistance Mechanism
is intended to address (e.g. narrow technical capacity,
or broader or longer-term organizational, institutional
and cross-sectoral capacities) and the nuanced context
of capacity needs and gaps experienced by and within
particular states.
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5.2.4.2 ISDS disputes – respondent states as
clients
5.2.4.2.1 Eligibility, entitlement, and
prioritization
In the context of investment treaty disputes, the
beneficiary most commonly identified for additional
support from Assistance Mechanisms is the respondent
host state (investors as beneficiaries are discussed
in Section 6). This category of beneficiary could and
would likely need to be further defined.
One commonly stated view is that is that services would/
should be provided to LDCs or developing countries
more broadly. Eligibility could be based, for instance,
on the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s
list of countries eligible for Official Development
Assistance or other economic development indicators.
Eligibility for all or some services (or tiered fees for
those services, discussed further below) could also be
based on factors such as:
•
•

•

•

•

whether the beneficiary had already received
support from the Assistance Mechanism and, if
so, how much,
the conduct of the potential beneficiary (e.g.,
whether a state would be barred if it had not
paid awards rendered against it in other disputes
or if it had not paid past amounts due in a
membership or fee-for-services based model),
the nature and implications of the claim (e.g.,
whether support would be conditioned on
the size of the claim relative to the GDP of the
country),
whether the claim arises in particularly complex
industries tending to make the cost of litigation
high (e.g., whether support would be limited to or
focused on energy-related disputes), and
the merits of potential claims or defenses (and
ability of the Assistance Mechanism to recover
costs).649

Related to eligibility are also important questions
about whether all eligible beneficiaries are entitled
to services provided by the relevant Assistance
Mechanisms, or whether service providers (or
funders) can decline to provide all or some services
requested and, if so, on what grounds, under what
circumstances, with what opportunities to challenge
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those decisions, and to whom. For example, could
the Assistance Mechanism decline a case if a state
wished to defend and staff in or management of the
Assistance Mechanism perceived the state’s defense
as unsound or otherwise thought the state should
settle? Could it decline to accept a case if it perceived
that the case would require too much in terms of
time and resources? Would it be required to prioritize
requests for assistance based on the time when they
were received and/or the development status of the
requesting country?
These decisions on eligibility, entitlement, and
prioritization likely depend on, or will shape decisions
regarding, scope of available services, costs of
providing those services, and decisions regarding
who will bear the costs of services provided.
If, for instance, an Assistance Mechanism were to
handle respondent state defense, the resourceintensive nature of ISDS defense could make it unlikely
that such a Mechanism would, at least in its initial
years, be able to handle more than one or two new
cases per year. This makes decisions on eligibility (and
prioritization) extremely important. Only a handful of
current respondent states would potentially be able
to directly benefit from this type of support.
Not all services, however, are as costly to provide as
ISDS defense. Thus, an Assistance Mechanism could
adopt a broader approach to eligibility and place
less emphasis on prioritization if it were to focus on
providing lower-cost services (such as legal opinions
or support with adjudicator appointment) or services
with a broader reach (such as providing access to
resources or a knowledge-sharing platform).
Other issues intertwined with eligibility and
prioritization are those related to user fees. An
Assistance Mechanism could, for instance, take
a broad approach to eligibility but employ tiered
fee structures for access to all or some its services.
Fees may be up-front membership fees, and/or fees
based on the services used. Any fee could further be
tailored depending on factors such as the economic
development of the host state, or the number of
times the respondent state had used the relevant
services. (These issues of costs are discussed further in
Section 5.1.3). In this context, however, it is important
to balance tensions between ensuring the financial
sustainability of any Assistance Mechanism dependent
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(at least in part) on user fees, and ensuring that
such Mechanism is able to serve the needs of those
countries that need it most and are least able to pay.

5.2.4.2.2 Identifying the government client
Another set of considerations relating to the
beneficiary of any Assistance Mechanism involve
the question of who is the actual client. In domestic
contexts when the government is party to the
dispute, the client of any government lawyer could
be viewed in various ways, including as:
(1) the public interest; (2) the government as a
whole; (3) the branch of government in which the
lawyer is employed (e.g., executive, legislative, or
judicial); (4) the particular agency or department
in which the lawyer works; and (5) the responsible
officers who make decisions for the agency.
Another possible answer exists where the lawyer
is employed by a different agency from the one
that is represented as a party to the litigation;
for example, where a lawyer who works for the
Department of Justice or a state attorney general’s
office provides legal representation to another
executive branch agency that is a party to a lawsuit.
In such circumstances, the client might be viewed
as being the employing “legal” agency rather
than the agency party to the case. Additionally,
it has been suggested that the President might,
in fact, appropriately be viewed as the client
whenever a federal agency is involved in litigation.
… Indeed, one commentator has effectively
argued that the question of who is the client of
the government lawyer has obfuscated, rather
than clarified, the important issues surrounding
attorney representation of government entities.650
The answer to the question of who is (are) the
government attorney’s client(s) can have important
implications for process-related issues such as who,
ultimately, will be able to make decisions on whether
and on what terms to settle a dispute. It also can
shape the content of advice and argumentation. If
there is a conflict within a respondent government
on the relevant positions that should be taken in
litigation, which branch or agency will be able to
resolve that? What happens if there is an apparent
tension between the government’s interest in
avoiding liability, and the public’s interest in not
funding pursuit of meritless positions and/or in

ensuring appropriate mechanisms for accountability?
Will the lawyer’s duty be to vigorously advocate for
the interests of its client irrespective of the nature of
the client’s position, or will there be some limits on the
bounds of arguments to be raised?
In the domestic contexts, rules of professional conduct,
law, and government policy will likely inform answers to
these questions. The questions and answers are likely
different in international investment law, and also may
vary depending upon whether the relevant lawyer is
a member of a firm or is employed by an Assistance
Mechanism. The nature of the Assistance Mechanism,
and policies and practices of funders, may further seek
to inform the answers to these questions regarding who,
precisely, is the attorney’s client, and to whom and what
principles the attorney owes its duties.

5.2.4.3 Other potential beneficiaries
In addition to the respondent host state in ISDS
proceedings, other beneficiaries for dispute-settlement
related services could be:
•
•
•
•

claimant or respondent states in state-to-state
proceedings;
non-disputing state parties seeking to provide
input into disputes filed under their treaties (but not
against them);651
amicus curiae;652 and/or
other potential intervenors.

5.2.5 Location, Staffing, Remuneration
The location and staffing of an Assistance Mechanism
can be critical decisions with respect to which finding
consensus may be challenging.653

5.2.5.1 Location
The location, or locations, of an Assistance Mechanism
could depend on a range of factors, including the form
that such mechanism takes, its mandate and roles, the
identity and preferences of its beneficiaries and funders,
its legal needs, and its budget. For example, with respect
to an Assistance Mechanism that is solely focused on ISDS
disputes using in-house counsel (such as the ACWL), it
may make sense to locate such a mechanism near major
dispute centers, such as Washington D.C. or Paris.654
However, some interviewees noted that this would place
the center physically distant from many countries and
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government officials that would be expected to use its
services: “[I]f the center is in DC, that will mean a lot of
hurdles for developing countries; however if you were
to establish a center in, for example, Addis Ababa,
that is also difficult to access for many countries.”655
It was stated during CCSI’s interviews that travel
costs are often prohibitive for developing countries,
and visas take time to obtain.656 If building trust and
relationships is a priority, it may prove more difficult
and less desirable in a decentralized system (such as
the current system of ad hoc arbitration) to have a
single location for an Assistance Mechanism.
It was suggested during CCSI’s consultations that
an Assistance Mechanism may have several offices,
located in different regions of the world, although this
may raise costs and associated funding challenges.
It was stated that physical proximity to an Assistance
Mechanism would be of the highest priority for
potential state users. One low-income government
official stated that if the objective of an Assistance
Mechanism is to help countries, it must be placed
in a location where they can fairly easily interact and
get advice.657 Moreover, this official felt that unless
a mechanism is physically located in various areas
of, in particular, the developing world, it would be
impossible for the staff of such a center to truly
understand the perspective of those regions.658 This
official felt strongly that regional centers are necessary
because, while some broad issues are common to many
countries, the experiences and needs of, for example,
West African countries vary greatly from those of East
Asian countries, Latin American countries, or indeed,
even East African countries.659
It was suggested that an Assistance Mechanism
may benefit from being housed within an existing
institution, which could help not only with institutional
resources but also to build on existing trust and
relationships. World Bank Group institutions were
suggested, including both ICSID and MIGA, although
others felt that any Assistance Mechanism affiliated
with the World Bank Group would raise actual or
perceived conflicts of interest, particularly with respect
to disputes at ICSID. In some consultations regional
development organizations were suggested, noting
that the ALSF is housed by the African Development
Bank.
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It was clear in CCSI’s consultations that preferences
differ regarding the location(s) of an Assistance
Mechanism, and that consideration of these issues
will be highly interrelated with questions of funding.
Notably, even with respect to the unsuccessful
UNCTAD-IADB-OAS-VCC regional effort, the location
was a serious negotiation challenge, with an interim
location in Washington D.C. agreed, to be followed
by a permanent location in Panama City (see Section
3.1).

5.2.5.2 Staffing
It was also stated that any institutionalized Assistance
Mechanism would need to have a diversity of staff,
including many staff from developing countries. This
was not to suggest that lawyers from the developed
world are incapable of adequately advising developing
countries, but that a wide variety of legal, social and
governmental backgrounds would be helpful to the
actual defense, as well as with respect to building trust
and legitimacy of such a mechanism: “it is important
for any [Assistance Mechanism] to understand the
perspectives of different systems, or else it is difficult
to adequately represent those interests.”660 All staff
must have a reputation as being high-quality lawyers,
equivalent to the top firms in the private sector. This
was directly related to perceived reputation and
quality that was widely regarded as critical in CCSI’s
consultations.
The kind of staff will also depend on the breadth,
scope, and mandate of an Assistance Mechanism.
Staff dedicated to investment policy formulation
and implementation can have a greater diversity of
backgrounds than staff focused only on disputes. The
diversity of staff also has budgetary implications.
It was stated during consultations that even an
Assistance Mechanism intended only to support
disputes should not focus solely on hiring the best
investment arbitration lawyers, but that it also
requires lawyers and other staff who have a deep
understanding of how international investment law
impacts the development objectives of states. For one
government official this was a critical issue of trust. For
this official, there was recognition that procedural and
technical expertise will be essential for an assistance
mechanism, and that many lawyers who have this
expertise are currently from or working in developed
countries, but this official stated that any staff of a
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mechanism should have experience actually working
in and with the countries that such individual is being
asked to advise.661 But on any advisory team, this
official also would seek individuals with a broader
focus on development impact (specifically naming
CCSI and IISD, along with other intergovernmental
or development organizations such as UNCTAD) in
order to have full trust in what was being advised.662
Great emphasis was placed on the senior staff of the
center. With respect to existing mechanisms, such as
the ACWL, ISP/LDCs, and ALSF, the original directors
and senior staff are widely credited as having been
essential to the development and success of the
center. In CCSI’s consultations, several participants
noted that any Assistance Mechanism director
would need to be someone who could command
and attract the attention of the existing “investment
law” community,663 but also someone who is seen
to represent the interests of the developing world.
It was stated that any Assistance Mechanism will
need to have a well-respected “champion” from
a developing country who is viewed as able to
“get other developing countries” on board, and
“imbue the center with legitimacy in the eyes of the
developing world.”664 The issue of trust was widely
stressed in this context.

5.2.5.3 Remuneration
Most interviewees felt that working with an
Assistance Mechanism would generally be viewed
as an attractive early or mid-career option, even
if remuneration were less than the private sector
because they offer other benefits that the private
sector does not. The two benefits most cited
were a better “work-life” balance and greater
responsibilities for junior lawyers. The ACWL, for
example, offers exposure and experience that is
typically not available to junior lawyers in law firms
– even junior counsel at the ACWL run cases, argue
cases and have more control of their own cases, than
a comparable private-sector associate.665
Existing Assistance Mechanisms pay less than the
private sector. ACWL salaries, for example, are
on a scale comparable to the WTO Secretariat.666
The WTO had historically followed the United
Nations Common System of Salaries, Allowances
and Benefits, but recently broke away from the UN
Common System because it wished to operate more

competitively (from a hiring perspective) against certain
international financial institutions (e.g. the IMF and the
World Bank Group), which employ markedly higher pay
scales than other intergovernmental institutions in order
to ‘permit recruitment and retention of the highest
quality, multinational staff – including personnel from
countries with the highest internal pay rates.’667
Considerations surrounding payment of staff will depend
on whether such staff are largely helping a beneficiary
to coordinate with external counsel (i.e. a clearinghouse
role), or directly acting as legal counsel. With respect
to the latter, it was stated by one interviewee that
the kind of people you want to work at an Assistance
Mechanism are the kind of people that would be willing
to forego some of the salary anyway.668 However, another
interviewee who had worked at an assistance mechanism
and has subsequently joined the private sector stated
that his earlier assumptions that highly qualified senior
counsel would accept the financial trade-off were “a
bit naïve” in in some respects, but as long as the salary
remains respectable it will still likely attract certain highly
qualified senior lawyers.
Options for an Assistance Mechanism include the UN
Common System scale, the WTO scale, the approach
of IFIs, or another approach or benchmark. Much will, of
course, depend on the role of an Assistance Mechanism,
the perceived “competition” from a hiring perspective,
and the personnel budget (which involves trade-offs
against other areas of an Assistance Mechanism budget).
It will also depend, to a certain extent, on whether the
Assistance Mechanism’s primary mandate is in capacity
building or actual legal representation in claims.

5.2.6 Institutionalized vs. ad hoc mechanisms
The degree of institutionalization of an Assistance
Mechanism will, naturally, be dependent on choices
regarding the services provided, to whom, ideal
governance of the Mechanism, and how funding and
finances are to function. Generally speaking, high-level
thoughts on the level of institutionalization were raised
by several interviewees.
For example, it was noted that negotiation of a formal
institutional, treaty-based Assistance Mechanism would
be quite a challenge and would take years. It was
suggested that a preliminary, and more informal, model
may be an interim solution.
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One interviewee with experience attempting to
establish an investment law advisory center noted that
the more formal and more political the establishment
of a center becomes, the more people become
involved, and the more difficult it becomes to achieve
consensus.669 This interviewee suggested that narrow,
technical solutions are easier to accomplish.
One government official suggested that building
upon existing mechanisms could help to build up
support where it is needed more organically and avoid
political challenges.670 Others suggested that regional
mechanisms, perhaps building on existing and trusted
institutions, may be well-received by states.

5.2.7 “Politics” surrounding the role of an
Assistance Mechanism
The creation, or expansion, of any Assistance
Mechanism cannot be removed from the geopolitical
and socioeconomic realities in which it has been
conceived, discussed, and may be placed.
In the context of IIAs and ISDS, one element of
that context is ongoing reform discussions. It was
expressed that any Assistance Mechanism should be
conceived as a flexible mechanism that could adapt
to eventual changes in underlying treaty and dispute
settlement mechanisms.

5.2.7.1 ISDS reform discussions
More specifically, the desirability of an advisory
center has specifically been included for further
consideration on the agenda of UNCITRAL’s Working
Group III.671 Perspectives expressed in consultations
on the value of discussing an Assistance Mechanism
in the context of the other reform solutions being
considered by the Working Group were mixed. On the
one hand, it was noted that ideally discussions of an
advisory center would not be considered an element
of reform discussions because it could easily become
integrated into trade-offs, and could become a carrot
that is given to developing countries in exchange for
support of something else that is not necessarily the
most useful to them.672 Some noted that this risk could
be lessened if reform solutions were all opt-in.673
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On the other hand, one low-income country stated
that placing an Assistance Mechanism on the
UNCITRAL reform agenda is viewed as a win.674 This is
an immediate need that will (if done correctly) benefit
developing countries participating in this system,
whereas it is unclear (at this time) to what extent
the other reforms being discussed will have actual
benefits.675
Some interviewees felt that an Assistance Mechanism
should be embedded in a larger package of structural
reform solutions to make it more feasible to develop.
Others noted that it would be important, for various
reasons, to ensure that discussions in Working Group
III surrounding an advisory center not be pegged to
any specific structural reform. This is both because
Assistance Mechanisms could be useful immediately,
and to peg them to a specific reform solution could
mean an extended period of time while such solutions
were negotiated, and also because an Assistance
Mechanism could be developed in a way that could
be entirely independent of any particular institutional
form.

5.2.7.2 Private practitioner perspectives
Of course, interest groups outside of states will also
be paying attention to the formation or expansion
of an Assistance Mechanism, including its intended
role and beneficiaries. For example, in the context
of other (unsuccessful) efforts at establishing an
Assistance Mechanism in the investment law context,
the opposition of private practitioners has been
noted. However, “private practitioners” do not have
uniform interests or perspectives. For example, while
some have advised that any Assistance Mechanism
should avoid direct competition with the services of
private sector law firms,676 others did not see private
sector opposition as an overwhelming concern. From
one private practitioner’s perspective, most firms that
represent states still make most of their money from
representation of claimants, as state-representation
is typically billed at a lower rate and also forms a
smaller percentage of the overall client base, so the
development of an Assistance Mechanism will, in
reality, not be real economic competition for these
firms.677
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According
to
several
private
practitioner
interviewees, with respect to the small number of
firms that only represent states, they would expect
such firms to attempt to differentiate themselves
from any Assistance Mechanism based on value,
service, and reputation, but not to be openly
opposing any competition from an Assistance
Mechanism.678 However, it was also stated that “firms
can be very jealous about the information that they
handle because, in the end, information is power.
A process intended to democratize information,
and thereby take power from law firms, means less
capacity to bill clients.”679 Greater transparency and
wider available services to government officials are
already making information about investment law
available to a much greater extent, but “if you put
into place an advisory center, that is just another
source of competition.”680

5.2.7.3 Civil society perspectives
With respect to NGOs, there were mixed perceptions.
All interviewed NGOs emphasized that to the
extent an Assistance Mechanism is developed or
expanded it should respond to needs and concerns
that have been identified from the perspective of
intended beneficiaries, in actual coordination with
and leadership by such beneficiaries.681
NGOs interviewed recognize that there are
systematic inequalities between and among
respondent states in their ability to participate in
the IIA/ISDS system, but some want to ensure that
the structure, goals, and funding of any mechanism
would not simply make a flawed system work more
smoothly, permitting more cases to be brought
and entrenching asymmetry by making defense
less costly, while at the same time not addressing
the actual causes of the systemic inequalities
experienced by developing states (which NGOs
view as not being primarily at the defense phase,
but much earlier in the negotiation, implementation,
and dispute prevention processes).682

Some NGOs see an Assistance Mechanism as a bandaid, noting that the focus of efforts to assist respondent
states should focus on the cause of the wound - the
flawed substantive and procedural elements of IIAs and
the existing ISDS mechanism.683 NGOs recognize that
states need help with respect to current investment
policy challenges and defending against existing
claims, which will inevitably continue to occur until more
fundamental changes are made.
Some NGOs are more supportive of ad hoc mechanisms
to assist states in the interim, while broader reforms
occur, rather than a fully institutionalized Assistance
Mechanism that further legalizes and entrenches
the current ISDS mechanism.684 As such, they advise
separating any Assistance Mechanism from any
particular reform solution, and also ensuring that it is
flexible to respond to other IIA/ISDS reforms advanced
by states.685

5.2.8 Intersections with other reforms
Consideration of the desirability, role, and mandate
of an Assistance Mechanism should also consider the
extent to which other reform efforts (particularly those
proceeding multilaterally through UNCITRAL’s Working
Group III) may interact. For example:
•
•
•
•

other efforts to reduce costs may mitigate some of
the need for expanded low-cost options;
the introduction of counterclaims may make more
market-based financing products available to
respondent states;
inclusion of domestic exhaustion requirements
may make the anticipation and prevention of ISDS
disputes more manageable; or
more robust state filters on certain kinds of claims
may similarly make prevention of unwarranted
disputes easier to achieve.
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Many of the models of Assistance Mechanisms
discussed in this Scoping Study could be adapted to,
or indeed already do, provide services to investors.
Indeed, certain of them, such as third-party funding,
contingent fee arrangements, and political risk and
other forms of insurance, are already available to
investors on a much greater scale than they are to
respondent states. Depending on the services offered,
role, and mandate of any Assistance Mechanism, it
could provide certain services to states and investors
(e.g., capacity building), but certain services only
to states (e.g., direct representation in defending
claims).686
Whether or not, and to what extent, states, as the
creators of an Assistance Mechanism, would desire to
include investors as beneficiaries will largely depend
on the nature and scope of concerns that an Assistance
Mechanism is intended to address, and also will likely
depend on a state’s role as primarily capital-exporting,
-importing, or both (particularly vis-à-vis its treaty
partners). Overall, there were significant differences
of opinion among states and other interviewees
regarding whether and under what circumstances
additional assistance should be provided to investor
claimants.
Some interviewees, for instance, considered
beneficiaries to be deserving claimants akin to those
in international human rights fora in which indigent
claimants may have access to services or funds that
permit them to bring international legal claims.687 The
ability for investors who cannot otherwise afford to
bring ISDS claims to secure support for such cases was
likened, in this context, to ensuring “equality of arms”
on both sides of an ISDS dispute. Similarly, a highincome government official indicated openness to the
idea of including support for investors in the context
of an Assistance Mechanism, stating that “the focus
should be on ensuring [IIA] obligations are respected
on both sides, so assistance in helping small and
medium-sized enterprises determine whether their
claims should be brought might be helpful as well.”688
However, most interviewees either had certain
hesitations, or opposed, the provision of Assistance
Mechanism services to investors, and did so for varying
reasons.

One interviewee with experience working for an
arbitration center, for example, expressed caution. The
interviewee felt that in theory it is absolutely necessary
to provide services to at least SMEs because the inability
of SMEs to access ISDS impacts the credibility of the
ISDS system as a whole, and lamented a system that
only benefits larger MNEs. However, this interviewee
went on to say that “there are already complicated
conflict of interest problems in the system; an advisory
center would have its own and adding in SMEs would
complicate it even more.”689
In consultations with some states, similar sentiments
were expressed. One upper middle-income state
official supports “justice for all” but felt that “because
[an advisory center] is so complex, and there are a
number of extremely difficult issues involved, adding
SMEs into the equation might overburden any kind
of institution. A center for states alone is already
extremely difficult, and I don’t really foresee any
practical benefit of including SMEs.”690 This official is
not opposed to adding services for SMEs at a later
date, once an Assistance Mechanism for states is
functioning and deemed sustainable.
Other governments were much more categorically
opposed to inclusion of investors as Assistance
Mechanism beneficiaries. Several reasons were given.
For one, in several consultations it was noted that while
SMEs, in particular, may need or benefit from certain
services, most primarily capital-importing states
would not seek to assist SMEs in bringing more claims
against them and thus any Assistance Mechanism that
did benefit investors may need to be designed to not
increase the absolute number of claims by an order of
magnitude.691 It was questioned whether benefits to
investors translated into benefits for governments. In
the words of one upper middle-income government
official, “we are not very happy with the idea of service
provision to SMEs. I think I speak for all developing
countries - we don’t really have SMEs as international
investors around the world, so that would not serve
our interests at all.”692 Even were developing countries’
outward investors to expand in number, it was unclear
to interviewees whether those investors would benefit
from treaty protections in a way that would outweigh
the country’s position as a capital-importing country
vis-à-vis other treaty partners.
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Additionally, states expressing opposition to SMEs
as beneficiaries of an Assistance Mechanism felt
that ISDS should be an extraordinary remedy, and
not a default dispute settlement mechanism. It
was noted that domestic mechanisms, alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms, and commercial
arbitration are typically also available to investors,
including SMEs, often at much lower cost.693 One
official felt that granting easier access to ISDS would
make ISDS more of an ordinary recourse, and that
such an outcome was a possibility that governments
must consider when considering how and under
what circumstances to ease access by claimants.694
It was also noted that it would be politically difficult
for governments – particularly poorer governments
– to say that they are funding claims against
themselves (for example, by contributing to an
Assistance Mechanism through membership fees)
from foreign investors. “That would be the headline
of every newspaper”695 if the state were to be sued
by an investor benefitting from the services of an
Assistance Mechanism.
Some interviewees also felt that supporting SMEs
would potentially be the fatal blow to efforts to
establish an Assistance Mechanism for states.
In several consultations it was stressed that
past experience demonstrates that advancing
a comprehensive, defense-oriented Assistance
Mechanism is extremely challenging, and questions
of how much a center should try to take on, at least
in the beginning, should be high on the list of issues
to address, as taking on SMEs could sink the project
before it floats.696 Several interviewees noted that
inclusion of SMEs would be highly controversial
with some states, with one interviewee stating that
however much sense it would make to provide
services to SMEs, a center is going to extremely
challenging in and of itself, and including SME’s
“fractures different support groups”.697
A final set of concerns related to the particular
needs of SMEs and how an Assistance Mechanism
would purport to resolve any capacity challenges
experienced by SMEs. For example, some NGOs
wished to understand more information about
hurdles and issues that SMEs are experiencing
and whether there is an actual access to justice
issue, and how access to ISDS fits into that broader
picture.698 As a general matter, representatives of
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NGOs interviewed did not support provision of services
to SMEs in the current ISDS system, particularly absent
greater evidence of disputes evidencing actual access
to justice (as opposed to ISDS) needs.
This section reviews in more detail current knowledge
of SMEs’ use of ISDS, challenges those entities may
be facing, and existing options for addressing those
challenges. In light of the many unknowns about SMEs’
actual and potential experiences with ISDS, the following
subsections a framed as a series of questions.

6.1 What is an “SME”?
A threshold issue to consider is what is an “SME”. There
is no universal definition, and differences among the
definitions that are used “can be substantial.”699 Those
differences, which not only vary between countries and
institutions, but also within them, arise from to the various
objectives of and contexts in which each definition was
crafted.700
According to one comparative analysis of definitions
used across the world, the definitions used are “generally
exclusively quantitative,” with the “most unanimously
accepted criterion being the number of employees.”701
Other criteria, if used, include annual turnover, assets,
and/or investments, again with different users commonly
employing different quantitative thresholds (see, e.g.,
Table 11).702 Definitions also diverge in terms of whether
and how other issues, such as the relevant sector of
operations and ownership structure of the enterprise,
are taken into account. While, for instance, the EU’s
definition does not vary depending on the relevant
sector, Canada, China, Japan, Korea, and the United
States are among the countries that do have specific
definitions for SMEs that are based upon relevant sector
of the firm.
These definitional issues complicate this Scoping Study’s
analysis. While, for instance, there are some studies
looking at SMEs’ experiences with ISDS, it is not always
clear what definitions are being used, how rigorously
they are being applied, and what the nature of the firm
really is. Indeed, as one study noted, "Regarding IFC/
MIGA standard, 'The [United Nations development
Programme] and World Bank [IFC] definitions would
include the manufacturing subsidiaries of both Nestle
and Unilever in Ghana, clearly not the intended objects
of development interventions.’”703
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A deeper examination of these definitional issues
would help better identify whether and what types of
issues different types of SMEs are facing when seeking
remedies for host-government-caused harm. To draw
from a World Bank evaluation of its interventions to
support SMEs, in order for the term to serve as a
“meaningful category of enterprises, it should be a
group of firms that is specifically differentiated from
others by the way that it experiences particular policy,
institutional, or market failures or the way it benefits the
economy or the poor.”704 Once the relevant category
is identified, it is possible to determine whether and
what type of policy interventions are appropriate, and
also assess the cost associated with them.

6.2 What are SMEs’ experiences with
ISDS?
6.2.1 Are they using it (more/less than other
firms)?
There have been several efforts to look at whether and
to what extent SMEs are using ISDS. They illustrate
that conclusions regarding SME invocation of ISDS
are hard to draw, and that data gaps are significant.
Franck finds that the “median claimant was a privately
held entity” of unstated size “that might – but also
might not – be related to a publicly listed corporate
entity.”705 Another study, published in 2015, found
that two-thirds of 105 cases filed at ICSID by American
investors were brought by individuals or SMEs. It does
not, however, reveal the breakdown between those
two categories of claimants.706 Bechky’s examination
of ISDS disputes regarding “microinvestments” notes
that data on the size of investors and investments
is hard to access, and so analysis of cases by small
investors may need to use amount of damages
claimed as a proxy.707 Karl’s research on ISDS claims
by SMEs uses UNCTAD data to conclude that those
firms accounted for “approximately 15 percent of all
disputes from 2008-2013.”708 There is no explanation
of the dataset of cases used or of the definition of an
SME employed for the analysis.709 Similarly, Gebert
reviewed publicly available information about 70 cases
filed in 2015, and found that at least 12 were filed by
SMEs (using the EC’s definition) and 4 by individuals or
groups of individuals.710

under-represented as claimants? And/or are they overor under-represented in terms of the value of their
investments? What are sectoral and country patterns?
Once the answers to these and other questions are
better known, more accurate answers can be obtained
regarding why usage rates are where they are, what
problems exist, and what solutions are needed.

6.2.2 Do SMEs need ISDS (more than other
firms)?
In addition to the question of whether SMEs are using
ISDS, and what their usage patterns are as compared
to other firms, it is useful to understand whether
they are facing more or fewer challenges in the host
government (and whether those challenges are the
types that ISDS is meant to address). Do they need
ISDS, or improved access to ISDS, more than other
foreign firms?
Some have theorized about responses. It is often
remarked, for instance, that larger companies may be
able to protect themselves vis-à-vis the government,
and can secure access to arbitration that can better
insulate them from the risks of host-state courts,
because they are more likely to have negotiating
power and be in sectors and activities where it is
possible to negotiate direct investor-state contracts.
Caplan has identified other reasons why larger foreign
firms may be less needful of or interested in ISDS:

While larger enterprises sometimes pursue
arbitration, they may feel, as a general matter,
that it is less necessary or even desirous to do so.
Their stronger economic and political influence
may bring host state governments to the
negotiating table more readily and with better
settlement terms … Because larger enterprises
are typically more financially resilient than SMEs,
they are likely to be in a better position to pursue
a broader dispute settlement strategy that is less
reliant on investor-state arbitration.711
Larger foreign firms may also be more likely to get
the attention and support of their home governments
when trying to resolve disputes with host countries.

These figures provide some insights but leave many of
the important questions unanswered. Relative to the
number of firms investing overseas, are SMEs over- or
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Karl has noted, however, how SMEs may be less at
risk, and less likely to encounter situations in the
host country that might cause them to turn to ISDS:

[B]eing small can also have some advantages.
SMEs investing abroad may be less on the ‘radar
screen’ of host country authorities, for instance
in respect of national security concerns or with
regard to potential ‘crowding out’ concerns
of local enterprises. SMEs may therefore face
less political opposition in host countries. SMEs
may also be more flexible than TNCs in their
business operations. This may allow them to
react to regulatory or political changes in the
host country more quickly, including through a
possible divestment if the investment climate
deteriorates substantially. 712
Moreover, while SMEs may find certain aspects of
operating in a foreign host country more challenging
than larger counterparts – such as navigating foreign
legal jurisdictions and identifying suitable business
partners – it is unclear that the particular issues they
are facing are the same as the challenges the treaties
aim to address. This issue goes to the objectives of
the treaties, and whether they are intended to be
exceptional tools of last resort, or legal options
enabling foreign investors to choose more favorable,
less risky, and/or less unknown dispute settlement
proceedings when they encounter issues in or with
the host state.713

6.2.3 What hurdles to accessing international
arbitration do SMEs face?
During
CCSI’s
consultations,
interviewees
highlighted several hurdles that companies, and
particularly SMEs face when their investments are
impacted by host-state action that may violate an
investment treaty.

6.2.3.1 Evidentiary and reporting challenges
In the experience of a C-level executive who has
been involved in investment law matters and
arbitrations in different states on more than one
occasion, the early phases of company loss are
critical, and many companies are not in a position to
take advantage of this time.714 For example, when a
company still has an office, is still operating, and/or
when employees are still on the ground, it could be
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incredibly helpful to companies to collect evidence that
could be validated for subsequent use. From a time and
cost perspective, it is extremely time-consuming to track
down evidence at a later time, and evidence (physical as
well as memories) are often impaired.
Relatedly, smaller, particularly non-public, companies
may not have robust analysis and reporting systems in
place that can easily assess damages.715 A mechanism
that could help companies to view their records with a
view toward understanding whether they have a claim,
and if so, what kind, would, according to this interviewee,
be extremely valuable.

6.2.3.2 Uncertainty in the law
In this C-level executive’s perspective, the uncertain
legal standards in investment law create a wide variety
of challenges that increase the risk and cost to investorusers of this system. This makes it difficult for them to
understand what protections may be due, whether there
has been a breach, and whether to pursue a case. SMEs
might be less able than other firms to understand this
area of law and its implications for them. This uncertainty
and lack of awareness may discourage investors from
engaging with investment law and invoking it when
warranted and appropriate; and it may cause them to
waste resources by pursuing losing ISDS cases that
ultimately only benefit the legal advisors involved.
According to one interviewee, it can often be difficult
to determine what kind of claim a company may have,
for example, whether a company is in a total loss
situation (from an investment law perspective, indirect
expropriation) or one of other damages. In this user’s
experience, even the company’s own counsel may often
be unwilling to give a clear answer on this threshold
issue, and the company may spend a lot of time and
effort to try to determine how to approach and formulate
a claim.716 If a company is really in a total loss context,
then pursuing an ISDS claim often makes sense from a
cost-benefit perspective.717 But if lesser damages may
be awarded, there may be a greater role for mediated or
other alternative dispute resolution outcomes.718 Clearer
law could greatly help in this area.
Second, and relatedly, because of the web of treaties
(along with other laws and contracts) and varying
definitions of who may benefit under such treaties, it can
be difficult for investors to properly identify the claimant
and the investment.719 This can have serious implications

SECURING ADEQUATE LEGAL DEFENSE IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS A SCOPING STUDY

if a non-covered investor appears on a notice or filing,
even if another investor in the corporate family may
have met the jurisdictional requirements. Investors
who do not hire counsel with experience in investment
law can make these kinds of mistakes.720
Third, an executive felt that because of the lack of legal
certainty in investment law, it is more “bespoke” and
thus for any proceeding of consequence it becomes
absolutely necessary to hire the best counsel because
when compared to other legal areas, the outcome
often will depend on the counsel rather than clear-cut
law.721 If the law were more clear, it may be able to rely
on regional or lower-ranked (and priced) firms.
Fourth, it has been suggested that if and when tribunals
apply one of the four so-called “Salini” criteria used in
some ISDS disputes to determine whether a tribunal
has jurisdiction over the investment dispute – namely,
the criterion occasionally applied that looks at whether
the investment has contributed to the economic
development of the host state -- SMEs may be less
likely than larger firms to pass the jurisdictional test.722
To the extent jurisdictional questions arise, it could
discourage SMEs from pursuing claims, and could
discourage others (such as third-party funders) from
investing in and supporting SME cases.
A number of the Assistance Mechanisms discussed in
this Scoping Study as useful for states may aid SMEs
here. In particular, efforts to democratize the law
(discussed in Section 4.5), and initiatives to support
ongoing activities of engagement with IIA policymakers, negotiators, and implementers in home and
host states are among those that can help increase
understanding of what IIAs mean, and do not mean,
in practice. Additionally, support in ongoing reform
processes could help states engage with SMEs (and
others) to craft solutions bringing more predictability
and certainty regarding issues of treaty coverage and
outcomes of adjudicative proceedings.

6.2.3.3 Costs of representation and arbitration
A more widely cited barrier is the costs and fees of
arbitration. As discussed above, the costs of ISDS
proceedings are well known and appear to be slightly
higher on average for claimants ($6,000,000 according
to one 2017 study) than for respondents ($4,850,000).723
In addition to the costs of representation are costs
of the arbitration. Those costs, which include the

fees and costs of arbitrators and arbitral institutions,
have been estimated by the same study as being on
average $920,000 for ICSID disputes and $1,090,000
for UNCITRAL cases.
The costs incurred in pursuing ISDS claims have been
cited as being particularly difficult for SMEs to fund.
Some responses to that stated challenge can specifically
target issues faced by SMEs (e.g., challenges SMEs
face in accessing finance); other responses, such as
efforts to reduce the costs of arbitration, are broader
but can benefit SMEs (and other claimants). Further,
some responses are more market-related, though they
could also benefit from policy interventions designed
to address market-related difficulties that SMEs may
experience especially acutely.724

6.3 Ways forward regarding investor
beneficiaries
6.3.1 Which investors should benefit from what
services?
To the extent an Assistance Mechanism supports
investor claimants, questions may arise as to which
investors it should support, and to what extent.
First, the category of beneficiary could be defined by
the identity of the claimant. For example, should only
investors from certain countries benefit? And if so,
how is the “nationality” of a company determined?
What is the “nationality” of, for example, a Ghanaian
company that is the subsidiary of a multi-billion dollar
Delaware corporation with an intermediate holding
company in the Netherlands? Does the constitution
of the Board of Directors matter? Or percentage of
Ghanaian management? Or the extent to which the
Ghanaian company sources from local suppliers? Or
the extent of profits retained in Ghana? Or where
decisions are taken? Or whether the claim is being
brought by the Dutch holding company on a reflective
loss basis, or directly by the Ghanaian company with
respect to its investment in, for example, Liberia?
Alternatively, should only investors of a certain size
be eligible? Again, similar issues arise. Section 6.3.1
discusses the various considerations that arise when
determining what, exactly, is an “SME”, for example.
Should limitations be placed around both size and
“nationality”?
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The categories of investor beneficiaries could also
be defined by the nature or size of the claim.725 For
example, if investors are having financial difficulties
advancing claims under a certain value threshold,
should these smaller claims be eligible for Assistance
Mechanism services? Would or should claims based
on allegations of direct expropriation, for example,
be prioritized over other categories of claims,
particularly if resources of an Assistance Mechanism
were limited?
Finally, it could be that a limited category or
other specific services could be made available
to investors, but not others. For example, policymakers may decide that investors can benefit from
certain capacity building support, but not from
direct support in advancing specific claims.

6.3.2 Types of Assistance Mechanisms for
investors
As with states, consideration of what would be the
most appropriate solution to problems experienced
by investors will largely depend on the intended
beneficiaries, funding available, and prioritization of
hurdles experienced.

6.3.2.1 Ombuds-type office
One potential solution to both pre- and postestablishment hurdles experienced by investors
could be the creation of an ombuds-type office.
As described in Section 2.3.3.1.2, the Korean OFIO
and Brazilian CFIA models are intended to prevent
disputes by managing investor concerns before a full
dispute has matured. They are intended to get the
parties to the table and talking, and to attempt to
find mutually beneficial outcomes. To the extent any
third-parties are impacted by the investment and
the concerns of the investor an ombuds-mechanism
may also include such parties in its procedures.
One interviewee indicated that in some cases,
governments may be politically challenged (e.g.
when they have taken an action in response to
domestic political pressure) to come to a discussion
or negotiating table, so having a treaty or other legal
obligation to engage in discussions in appropriate
cases could help encourage governments to
take these pre-dispute and/or alternative dispute
resolution steps.726
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6.3.2.2 Pre-dispute assistance
Several interviewees stated that in most cases where
they see investors, and particularly small investors, make
mistakes it is in the early phases of crafting the details
of the claim. Interviewees also noted that in many cases
investors may simply not have adequate guidance as
to how to participate. For example, if an investor has
been dealing with the ministry of mines throughout the
investment, it will probably be likely to send a notice of
intent to that ministry as well, even if this would not be
the most efficient approach. A mechanism that could
assist SMEs to frame and engage at the initial phases of
disputes was suggested as an area where there could be
a lot of impact.

6.3.2.3 Market-based assistance
The discussion below and in Table 12 note different
potential market-based options for supporting SMEs
in ISDS claims. The attractiveness and viability of these
options depend on various factors, including the location
of the SME, and its access to experienced counsel; the
operational strength of the SME, which is relevant for
its ability to secure loans; the strength of a claim, which
can impact the ability to secure contingency-based
representation and third-party funding; and the size of a
claim, which can impact the SME’s ability to secure thirdparty funding.

6.3.2.3.1 Improving the market for counsel
A significant portion of SME costs in ISDS disputes relates
to costs for counsel.727 The fees charged by the top tier
international firms that often handle ISDS cases drive up
those costs.728 Reducing the fees charged by and paid
to counsel could, therefore, reduce overall costs and
difficulties SMEs experience in financing claims.
One option is for SMEs to rely more on lower-priced
options. If, for instance, the dispute relates to actions
taken by a developing host country, or is brought by a
developing country investor, the investor could use firms
in the host and/or home country charging local rates, as
opposed to using international firms with rates based
on the market in London, New York, Paris, etc. If more
than one team is used,729 then the allocation of work and
responsibilities between the higher and lower-priced
teams could potentially be adjusted. Similar to the issues
discussed in connection with the challenges states face
in accessing low-cost support, barriers to entry for new
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firms may not be high: Franck’s data indicates that
the majority of firms in ISDS arbitrations have only
handled one case each, another cluster a modest
two to five, and there are important players in
developing country markets.730

6.3.2.3.2 Contingency fee arrangements
Another option for investors (including SMEs) is
to pursue contingency fee arrangements in which
attorneys only are paid representation costs (and
potentially a premium) upon completion of a
successful outcome. The meaning of a successful
outcome, like other aspects of the contingency
fee arrangement, would be defined on a case-bycase basis subject to applicable law, regulation,
and rules of professional conduct. In general, these
arrangements can be used to support resourceconstrained claimants (which may include SMEs)
pursue a case they otherwise may not be able to
advance or engage counsel they would otherwise
not be able to afford.
Although helpful in principle, contingency fee
arrangements may be of limited use in practice if
counsel are unwilling to take the risk of loss. Short
of a few firms, many firms may not have the financial
capacity to provide a contingency arrangement

completely in-house, and thus may also need to
supplement this arrangement with outside financing,
which may, for example, take the form of “third-party
funding” (as described below). With contingency fee
arrangements, advisors will incur costs (e.g., staff time,
travel costs, discovery-related costs, and opportunity
costs) they may ultimately not be able to recover,
although in some cases a claimant may pay a portion
of these costs, or outside financing may also lessen the
burden on both parties. The less risky the case – for
instance, the lower the costs of pursuing it, the clearer
the law, the more likely the victory – the more attractive
it may be to contingency-fee-based service providers.

6.3.2.3.3 Improved access to finance
One issue considered to be more frequently faced by
SMEs, especially SMEs from developing countries,
is access to finance. A large company without the
immediate cash flow to fund litigation may nevertheless
be able to rely on the strength of the company’s credit
rating and its collateral to secure a loan and then pursue
a dispute. SMEs, in contrast, may face a harder time
doing so, especially when the value of their business or
collateral is low relative to the cost of a claim. One investor
interviewed stated that corporate lending is simply not
available for these kinds of claims.731 Thus, in addition to
ISDS-specific interventions, it may be useful to consider

Table 12 Market-strategies and links to characteristics of SMEs and SME claims

Option

Significance for SME Constraints

Improving the market for counsel

Linked to the market for legal services
available to the SME

Use of contingency fee arrangements

Linked to the strength of the SME’s claim

Improved access to finance

Linked to the value & operating context
of the SME

Use of litigation insurance

Linked to the insurance market & litigation risk of the SME

Use of third-party funding

Linked to the size of the SME’s claim
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what types of initiatives are being deployed to support
SME access to finance more generally, and whether a
concessional finance product (e.g. a first-loss position)
could be used to assist investors in accessing liquidity.

6.3.2.3.4 Litigation insurance
To the extent that litigation/arbitration expenses are
or are expected to be a significant business cost,
firms may secure insurance to help cover those fees.
This is distinct from, but can overlap with, other forms
of insurance such as political risk insurance. The
availability and attractiveness of this option depends
on the relevant market and characteristics of the
insured.

6.3.2.3.5 Claimant-side third-party funding
Like definitions of SMEs, definitions of third-party
funding vary. Broad versions overlap with some of
the other options descried in this section addressing
costs, such as options for loans, insurance, and
contingency fee arrangements, discussed above,
and other possible Assistance Mechanisms, such as
pro bono support, discussed below.732 The narrow
version used here is meant to exclude contingency
fee arrangements and focus on funding provided to
the claimant (or claimant’s counsel) on a non-recourse
basis in exchange for a success fee or other form of
monetary remuneration wholly or partially dependent
on the outcome of the proceeding.
This type of funding is currently being used in ISDS
cases, but the lack of transparency surrounding
it makes it difficult to know how prevalent it is, and
whether and to what extent it is supporting SME
claims. Reports that claim size must be multiples
of expected litigation costs in order for funders to
investment in claims seem to mean that it is unlikely,
though not impossible, that smaller firms on the SME
scale would be attractive candidates. Smaller claims
that would otherwise not fit a single-claim third-party
funding model, may, however, be more easily funded
in the context of a portfolio of claims. Nevertheless, it
is the size of the potential award, not the size of the
business, that is the key determinant for third-party
funders’ funding decisions (along with other factors
such as the strength of the claim and recoverability of
any award).
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In CCSI’s interviews, the ability of smaller companies
to access third-party funding was questioned from
a practical matter. According to one interviewee,
sophisticated third-party funders tend to (if not
almost exclusively) work with “magic circle” or other
extremely exclusive law firms:733
If you are an investor, how do you even access this
well-connected professional advisory circle? This is
not your typical law firm in Milwaukee. Wall street or
magic circle firms must ply the space. Allen & Overy,
Freshfields, they dominate the space for funded
claims. You cannot find a lower rate regional firm
that has this level of expertise. If you are looking
for continuing practice exposure you have to pay
these rates. This is where the expertise is residing.
Whether there is a pricing model that is more
accessible is an open question. 734
However, even if smaller investors are able to access
reputable third-party funding sources, it is unclear
that this option is going to be a panacea. Third party
funders expect sizeable returns on their investment.
According to one investor who is cautious of the
opportunity cost of this kind of financing, “I have my
antenna up for how much value of the potential claim
is actually going to be available to the stakeholders
of the enterprise from a successful arbitration – and
this is real. Bentham and other classic funders take 30
points in their traditional model – hedge funds take an
even more onerous position. For an SME this is a real
issue that a funder would take 30% or more.”735 Other
preferred creditors of a claimant may include, for
example, employees, local companies, local banks,
and shareholders. It is a policy question where the
value of financing should fall in this spectrum, and if the
current model is inappropriate, how a different model
may be crafted to better achieve policy objectives.

6.3.2.4 Institutionalized multi-service center
including legal representation of investors
6.3.2.4.1 Political tensions
As discussed in greater depth in Section 5.1.9,
interviewees cited hurdles as to the political feasibility
of creating (or expanding) an Assistance Mechanism
that would benefit both states and investors. The
importance of these perspectives should not be
underestimated.
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6.3.2.4.2 Other stakeholder tensions

6.3.2.5 Other Assistance Mechanism models

In addition to political challenges, certain other
conflicts and tensions should be born in mind,
including those that may arise as between an investor
benefitting from an Assistance Mechanism and (1)
donor governments and (2) support providers.

Many of the models of Assistance Mechanisms that were
described in Section 4 in the context of states could also
be considered for investors.

With respect to donor governments, to the extent
an Assistance Mechanisms also supported claims
by investors, there may be additional questions
about tensions and conflicts that could arise due
to relationships between investors and donor
governments, such as circumstances in which:
•
•
•
•
•
•

investors are investors of donor governments;
investors are suing donor governments;
investors are suing client/beneficiary
governments;
investors are pursuing claims that are
inconsistent with donor governments’
objectives for the dispute settlement system;
investors are raising arguments of interpretation
that are inconsistent with the relevant donor
government’s interpretation of the treaty; or
investors are pursuing claims that are
inconsistent with donor governments’
objectives for providing funding support.

Questions also arise regarding how to ensure proper
alignment of interests between support providers
(i.e. when not employed directly by an Assistance
Mechanism) and client investors. These include the
questions of:
•

•

•

how to ensure support providers do not raise
frivolous arguments or engage in other actions
that prolong or unnecessarily drive up costs in
proceedings in order to increase their bills;
how to ensure support providers do not
underspend or under-deliver (risks of which
might be particularly acute if there is little
competition for support, if support providers
charge a flat fee for services, or if they are
providing services for free or at a discount they
deem too great);
how to ensure that the attorney-client
relationship is not unduly harmed by
relationships the support provider has with its
funders or employer (if different from the client
investor), and/or its other clients (which may be
governments).

For example, an Assistance Mechanism could focus
on capacity building (e.g., for in-house teams or
private firms in developing host countries, in order to
try to lower costs of counsel). The ALSF, for example,
opens its ALSF Academy to private sector lawyers from
developing countries such that they may be better able
to advise developing country governments. One could
imagine similar support for in-house or outside-counsel
that advises smaller investors.
It was suggested that an Assistance Mechanism may
help states to understand where to turn for available
options, and such a mechanism could similarly benefit
investors. For example, helping them to navigate
mediation or conciliation, available domestic relief,
identifying political risk insurance programs (including
ones targeting SMEs), and seeking diplomatic support
and protection. An SME may be less aware of and face
more challenges in pursuing these alternative options
than a larger firm. Thus, one set of options could be
working with internationalized SMEs to identify, evaluate,
and pursue these alternative paths.
Whether and to what extent each option is desirable and
feasible, however, depends on a clearer articulation of
the challenges facing different investors relating to the
costs of ISDS, the evolution of those challenges due to
other reforms and market patterns, and the objectives,
advantages, disadvantages, costs, and benefits of the
different policy interventions.

6.3.3 Interaction with other reform proposals
As with states, other proposed ISDS reforms, particularly
in the context of UNCITRAL’s WGIII, may have an impact
on the hurdles that investors are experiencing, or the
way that assistance to such investors may be crafted.

6.3.3.1 Using rules on cost allocation and fee
shifting
Rules regarding cost allocation and fee shifting will not
enable claimants (or their funders) to avoid incurring
expenses when advancing an ISDS claim but can
influence the claimant’s (and funders’) cost-benefit and
risk analysis regarding the affordability and desirability
of pursuing a case. The law and practice of cost-shifting
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Table 11 Illustrative quantitative thresholds for SMEs

Criterion

European
Commission

Kenya768

Mexico769

Singapore

Vietnam770

United
States771

Number of
Employees

< 250

≤ 99

< 250 (industry)
< 100
(trade)
< 100 (services)

< 200

< 300

< 500 (most
manufacturing
and mining
industries)
< 100 all
wholesale and
trade industries)

Turnover

< € 50 million

<Ksh 800
million

Balance
Sheet

< €43 million

Capital/Investment
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< S$100
million

< $6.5 million
(most retail and
service industries)
< $31 million
(most general and heavy
construction
industries)

< VND 10
billion
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in ISDS is presently complex. Treaties are often silent
on the approach to be followed and, while some
arbitration rules give guidance, that guidance is not
a clear directive. Rather, it often provides tribunals
significant discretion to determine the proper
approach to cost-shifting based on factors such as
the circumstances of the case.
The different approaches to cost-shifting can have
different implications for SMEs. Under a “pay-yourown-way” approach, each side is able to better
control its legal fees and costs. This can be useful
for those SMEs that have identified quality, low-cost
counsel and enable them to pursue a case. Another
approach is the “loser-pays” approach, under
which, generally speaking, the losing party pays its
own as well as the winning party’s legal fees and
costs.736 This increases the risks of pursuing claims. If
SMEs are particularly unable to pay those fees and
costs, and/or are particularly risk averse, it could
disproportionately dissuade them from bringing
cases.737 Like contingency funding arrangements,
fee shifting may also have the effect of filtering out
weaker claims.
One commentator has suggested supporting
claimant access to ISDS by using a one-way fee
shifting rule. Schill contends that in order to
appropriately facilitate and encourage claims,
tribunals should (and do) shift costs in favor of
successful claimants, but not require them to pay
the state’s costs when they are unsuccessful. 738 CCSI
has not identified any treaty, state, or arbitration rule
calling for this approach. However, as Schill hinted,
data indicates that there is in fact “a one-way loserpays rule that reliably operate[s] to investors’ benefit
– rather than to the benefit of states or operating in
a neutral way.”739 Tribunals do not always shift costs,
but when they do, they more frequently shift them in
favor of the successful claimant than the successful
respondent. While such one-way shifting, and any
ISDS reforms further solidifying that approach, would
benefit SME (and other) claimants, its expressly
imbalanced nature would likely exacerbate concerns
among those states and other stakeholders already
troubled by the asymmetrical nature and high costs
of the ISDS system for states.740

Overall, clearer rules on cost allocation could be one
reform approach that would affect SMEs’ access to
ISDS by improving the quality of calculation they (or
their funders) would engage in when deciding whether
to bring a case. Each approach will have different
implications not only for the ability of SMEs to bring
claims, but also on issues such as (dis)incentives to file
frivolous claims, and (dis)incentives to control costs.

6.3.3.2 Reforming ISDS procedures generally to
reduce costs overall
There are various reform initiatives aiming to reduce the
unjustified costs of ISDS. The outcomes of those efforts
could potentially also lower the hurdles SMEs face in
bringing claims.741

6.3.3.3 Reforming ISDS or adopting specialized
rules to reduce costs specifically for SMEs and/or
small claims
In addition to general reform efforts relating to costs,
there are some examples of initiatives aiming to make
it easier for SMEs and/or investors with small claims to
pursue cases.742 Interviewees suggested, for example,
sole arbitrators, small claims-type courts, or expedited
procedures for certain kinds of claims. Again, the
outcomes of these initiatives will influence whether and
what other interventions may be appropriate.
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Section 7. Conclusion

This Scoping Study provides a broad and inclusive
overview of issues, concerns, empirical evidence,
opinions, lessons learned, and proposed solutions
as they relate to a potential or expanded Assistance
Mechanism for International Investment Law.
This Scoping Study reflects input received on
a confidential basis from: government officials;
individuals who have experience establishing
or working for existing or attempted Assistance
Mechanisms; individuals who have experience
working for an arbitral institution; academics who
have written on and/or advised states with respect
to international investment law; private practitioners;
representatives of non-governmental organizations;
and representatives of private sector foreign
investors. While this study captures the perspectives
of each and all of these categories of individuals
(but is naturally reflective only of individuals actually
interviewed, and insights provided through desk
research), it is the perspective of those who are
experiencing and articulating capacity challenges
that should serve as the primary guide for both
identifying critical areas where assistance is needed,
and also in developing potential solutions.
As an initial matter, IIAs, and the ISDS mechanism
frequently provided for therein (which may also
be provided for in domestic laws or contracts),
have come under increasing levels of scrutiny,
particularly as the expected benefits of the treaties
and additional legal protections are not perceived
to have materialized, and the number of claims
against states, and defense costs incurred by them,
have increased dramatically. Absent fundamental
changes to these legal frameworks and/or the
dispute settlement mechanisms contained therein,
concerns regarding these costs show no signs of
abating.
CCSI’s consultations conducted for this Scoping
Study revealed that the concerns about IIAs and
ISDS are much more fundamental than only the
financial costs of participation in this system.
Interviewees relayed challenges from investment
policy formulation at the domestic level through
and including effective engagement in formal ISDS
proceedings. As such, this Scoping Study considers
the range of problems that states and other actors
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have in engaging with and benefiting from international
investment law and in participating effectively in
investor-state dispute settlement processes. The Study
does so through the lens of “capacity challenges,”
capturing different challenges related to: investment
policy-making; IIA negotiation; implementation and
management of their IIAs and associated policies;
dispute prevention; and pre-dispute management and
consultations. It then considers in depth the capacity
challenges that arise in the context of managing actual
ISDS disputes, including: case staffing; anticipating,
and potentially resolving, ISDS cases at an early phase;
appointing arbitrators; dealing with uncertainty and
ambiguity; working with experts; and engaging in
discovery of and managing information.
Some identified challenges are acknowledged and
shared by all or many states, and some differ, based on
a state’s economic development level, its experience
with ISDS claims, and its role as a capital importer or
exporter (or both) particularly vis-a-vis its investment
treaty partners, among other factors. States expressed
different priorities in addressing these challenges,
some of which seem to be loosely held preferences in
light of anticipated resource constraints, and some of
which were more fundamentally held policy priorities or
limitations.
The Scoping Study considers previous attempts to
establish an advisory center on international investment
law. A key theme that emerged from interviews with
those involved in or knowledgeable about these efforts
was that policy-makers should not underestimate large
and, perhaps moreso, small policy differences among
and between states, as an unanticipated difference of
opinion can stall or halt efforts, even when the finish line
seems near.
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Following the identification (and prioritization) of
capacity challenges, it will be necessary to consider
the model(s) that an Assistance Mechanism could take
in order to address them. The Scoping Study surveys
a wide variety of models that Assistance Mechanisms,
both with respect to international investment law as
well as those employed in other legal fields, may take
to address various concerns. Models that are explored
in depth in the Scoping Study include:

•

•

•

•

•

Institutionalized, multi-service support
including legal representation of client
governments. Examples that are discussed
in this category include the Advisory Centre on
WTO Law, the African Legal Support Facility,
and the International Development Law
Organization’s Investment Support Programme
for Least Developed Countries, as well as an
investment law “hotline”.
Institutionalized, multi-service support
not including legal representation of client
governments. Examples that are discussed
in this category include the kinds of support
provided by international organizations (such as
UNCTAD, the OECD, and the World Bank Group),
arbitration centers (such as ICSID, the PCA, and
the SCC), and academic and non-profit centers
(such as CCSI and IISD).
Financial or in-kind inputs. Examples that are
discussed in this category include arbitration trust
funds (such as that provided by the PCA), thirdparty funding for respondent states, contingent
fee representation, insurance products, and loans.
Pro bono, ad hoc legal and expert support
to respondent states. Examples that are
discussed in this category include IDLO’s ISP/
LDCs program along with other NGO and
university-based programs that deliver services to
states on a no-cost basis.
Intergovernmental knowledge-sharing hubs.
Examples that are discussed in this category
include formal opportunities for government
officials to share knowledge (e.g. IISD’s Annual
Forum of Developing Country Investment
Negotiators) as well as ad-hoc treaty-based or
other networks.

•

Discrete capacity-building networks.
Examples that are discussed in this section
include trainings and discrete capacity building
offered by various Assistance Mechanisms,
academic and non-profit institutions, law firms,
and other governments, as well as Massive Open
Online Courses.

•

Legal assistance and resource
clearinghouse. Finally, a very basic form
of Assistance Mechanism may provide great
value by simply compiling, organizing, and
disseminating information about existing
resources to relevant government officials.

Various cross-cutting issues emerged from analysis
and experience with existing Assistance Mechanisms.
These cross-cutting issues should be considered by
policy-makers as they consider the breadth and depth
of services as well as the model(s) that an Assistance
Mechanism could follow. The cross-cutting issues that
are explored in depth in the Scoping Study include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Quality, reliability, reputation, and trust;
Scope of services and funding;
Costs of support and who bears them;
Stakeholder tensions;
Identifying the client/beneficiary;
Location, staffing, and remuneration;
Institutionalized vs. ad hoc mechanisms;
“Politics” surrounding the role of an Assistance
Mechanism; and
Intersection with other reforms.

Interviews reflect a great diversity of perspectives
as to how capacity challenges should be prioritized
and addressed, and an even greater diversity of
perspectives as to the feasibility and desirability of
how cross-cutting concerns should shape outcomes.
Finally, the Scoping Study includes a section devoted
to investors, with a focus on small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) as potential beneficiaries of any
Assistance Mechanism. The Scoping Study revealed
that although SMEs and states face some of the same
issues with respect to their participation in ISDS, the
rationales for, considerations regarding, and optimal
modes of supporting each group may vary significantly.
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The Scoping Study explores evidence related to
SMEs’ use of ISDS, as well as the hurdles that SMEs
are having in effectively relying on IIAs and ISDS
as a method to limit risk and resolve disputes. The
Scoping Study explores how one might determine
the scope of beneficiaries who may benefit from an
Assistance Mechanism.
Based on the hurdles experienced and concerns
expressed, the Scoping Study considers the forms of
an Assistance Mechanism that may best assist SMEs
in overcoming ISDS access issues. These include
an ombuds-type office, pre-dispute technical
assistance, market-based Assistance Mechanisms,
capacity-building models, and a model incorporating
institutionalized defense and legal representation.
Depending on the type of assistance that would be
offered to investors, consultations suggested fairly
widespread hesitation of, or even strong opposition
to, also including investors as beneficiaries of an
Assistance Mechanism that is created or expanded
to benefit states.
International investment law and ISDS are evolving,
and outcomes of that evolution remain uncertain.
Those developments must be kept in mind when
assessing needs, and the options for addressing
them, as each may change in the short-, medium-,
and long-term. An Assistance Mechanism
developed to be sustainable will need to be flexible
to accommodate these developments. It will be
important to consider whether and to what extent
concerns regarding IIAs and ISDS are best resolved
through reforms to treaties and dispute settlement
thereunder, and whether and to what extent the
costs of concerns that are not addressed should
be shifted from beneficiaries of an Assistance
Mechanism (e.g. certain respondent states and
SMEs) to an Assistance Mechanism’s funders (e.g.
other states).
With respect to both states and investors, this
scoping study has set forth a wide variety of existing
capacity challenges and detailed existing Assistance
Mechanisms that are available. Depending on the
issue, robust, some, or no assistance is currently
available. Any creation or expansion of an
Assistance Mechanism should take into account
existing support, building upon and using it, and
complementing it as necessary and desirable.
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In UNCITRAL’s most recent 38th Session, government
delegates commenced a substantive discussion on
the contours of an Assistance Mechanism (referred to
in that context as an advisory center).743 While general
support was expressed for establishing an Assistance
Mechanism, particularly as such a mechanism could
complement other reform options being developed
by WGIII, preliminary thoughts and consideration
of questions regarding the establishment of such
a mechanism revealed much work yet to be done.
Delegates discussed a wide range of possibilities as
they relate to: potential beneficiaries of a mechanism,744
the potential scope of services that a mechanism could
provide (with those outlined in Secretariat Note A/
CN.9/WG.III/WP.168 providing a good basis for further
discussion),745 the possible structure of an Assistance
Mechanism and how it could be financed,746 and other
considerations and issues that must be born in mind
(e.g. quality and reliability of services, staffing and
remuneration, stakeholder tensions, a mechanism’s
impact on the ISDS system as a whole, and long-term
sustainability of an Assistance Mechanism).747
The Working Group provided guidance to the UNCITRAL
Secretariat in conducting certain preparatory work to
assist the Working Group in these considerations.748
Requested information related to potential conflicts
of interest and burdens on an Assistance Mechanism
(particularly as they relate to the scope of its mandate),749
information on Assistance Mechanisms that are already
providing services,750 criteria that may be applied
to determine beneficiary states and services,751 how
capacity building may apply to various elements of
investment treaty practice and dispute settlement
proceedings,752 and options for financing and staffing an
Assistance Mechanism.753
As the content and contours of any Assistance
Mechanism take shape, the authors are grateful for the
opportunity to contribute the evidence and perspectives
in this Scoping Study to that discussion.
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I. Phase-Specific Questions
A. Country Representatives
a. Formulation of IIA Policy.
(1) Does your country have a (formal or informal) policy towards international investment agreements?
To what extent is this policy the result of binding legislation, and to what extent is it the result
of policy discretion within administrations and civil service organizations?
(2) Is this policy applied consistently in dealings with all counterparties, or are there certain
regional neighbors, allied countries, rival countries, etc. who are negotiated with according to
substantially different policies?
(3) Do you feel that the development and implementation of IIA policy is limited by financial,
technical, or capacity constraints, or do you feel that such policies have been thoroughly
developed and implemented?
(4) Do you feel that policy support provided by another stakeholder in the international IIA regime
(for instance, wealthier countries, international civil society organizations, arbitrators and arbitral
council acting in a pro bono capacity, etc.) would be useful to the formulation of national IIA
policy? Have you had experience with getting support from any of these groups?
(5) Would third-party advice or technical support raise conflict-of-interest or capacity concerns?
How would those concerns differ depending on which parties were providing support? For
instance, if attorneys providing advice on IIA policy also bring ISDS claims or otherwise benefit
financially from the ISDS system, does that raise concerns?

b. Negotiation of IIAs
(1) Do you feel that the international investment agreements your country has entered into are only
entered into after a thorough and adequate assessments of impacts on domestic law, policy,
and economic outcomes? Do you think more resources for conducting such assessments would
be useful for negotiations (and subsequent ratification)?
(2) Are your country’s international investment treaties based on a model?
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

If so, did you receive external support in preparation of that model? [explain]
Do your agreements otherwise take a similar form from one to the next?
Are there some treaties that you believe represent your country’s interests better? Worse?
What role did in-house capacity/external knowledge play in shaping outcomes?
What other factors are important in shaping outcomes? (e.g., strength of negotiating party,
internal deadlines, trade-offs in terms of other issues being negotiated as part of an FTA)

(3) Do you feel that your country is well-positioned to negotiate equitable IIAs that serve its longterm interests? If not, why not?
120 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT

SECURING ADEQUATE LEGAL DEFENSE IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS A SCOPING STUDY

(4) Would technical support help improve negotiating outcomes from your perspective?
a. If so, what kind of support?
b. Are there limits or concerns?

c. Pre-Dispute Management of IIAs
(1) Briefly describe where you see risks of claims arising – e.g., natural resource concessions, actions
of local officials, etc.
(2) When and how do you become aware that there may be an ISDS claim against the country?
(e.g., notices of intent from companies/their attorneys, other communications by companies,
communications from relevant ministries or local government entities, diplomatic or other
communications from the home state, other?)
a. Are there variations based on the sector, size or home country of the investor, or other
factors?
(3) What, if any, steps does your country take to (x) avoid investor-state disputes prior to their
emergence, and (y) resolve disputes that have been identified.
a. If there are steps, are these designed specifically to anticipate/avoid ISDS claims or do
they exist as part of separate initiatives?
(4) If there are steps taken under #3,
a. what organizations, including non-state organizations (for example, industry
organizations, unions, etc.) are involved in the process of pre-dispute management?
b. To what extent does this dispute management happen at the national level versus the
subnational level? Are there national-level procedures and resources in place to reduce
conflict between investors and subnational government bodies?
c. How effective do you see these processes to be?
d. What would make them more effective?
i. to what extent are these processes limited by resource constraints or technical
capacity issues? To what extent are they limited by political constraints?
(5) If there are no existing processes under #3, to what extent do you think they would be useful
to establish generally or for the purposes of managing/avoiding ISDS claims? What are the
limitations to establishing such mechanisms?
(6) Do you believe there are any risks, concerns or limitations of these process (perceived or real?)
(7) Do you see a role for supporting inter-state engagement on potential disputes (as opposed to
just efforts relating to the host state and investor), such as good offices?
(8) Would external analysis of the IIA consequences of proposed activities by government or private
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sector actors be valuable to the pre-dispute management of IIA obligations?

d. Initial notices and cooling off periods
(1) Is there an established and widely understood intergovernmental process to manage the receipt
of the notice of intent and early steps to respond? Is it used? If not, what are the legal, technical
or resource constraints to implementing fully this process?
(2) What is your perspective of the utility of “cooling off periods”? Are there disputes that have been
pursued against you that you believe could have been avoided with better dispute avoidance
practices or better uses of cooling off periods? (If so, can you elaborate)?
(3) What could make cooling off periods more useful? Are there capacity or resource constraints
that are preventing them from serving the role you envisioned when including these provisions
in your treaties?

e. Handling Disputes
(1) What resources does your country apply towards IIA disputes?
a. Legal: Are these disputes handled by in-house council, law firms, or some combination
of the two?
i. If you use external counsel –
1. Why?
2. International and/or domestic?
3. How do you choose? (e.g., relevance of cost/quality)
4. For what issues? (e.g., do you use domestic for domestic law issues and
international for treaty-related questions)
5. Have you adjusted practices over time? Do you foresee/would you like
further evolution?
6. What have been your experiences?
ii. If you use domestic solely –
1. Why did you choose that route?
2. Can you explain your staffing (e.g., how many people are on staff, from
what department, how do you accommodate ebbs and flows?)
iii. If you use a combination of both?
1. Why did you choose that route?
2. Can you explain your internal staffing (e.g., how many people are on
staff, from what department, how do you accommodate ebbs and flows?)
3. Can you explain the distribution of labor internally and externally?
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b. Technical/expert:
i. What is your perception of internal capacity on issues of valuation/damages?
ii. What is your perception of internal capacity on technical issues of discovery,
evidence gathering and document management?
iii. Would you want additional support doing due diligence and discovery on
claimant investors’, their conduct, claims, etc?
c. (If relevant) On a scale of 0-5, with zero being very unsatisfied and 5 being extremely
satisfied, how satisfied have you been with the –
i. Quality of external legal representation you have received
ii. Cost of external legal representation you have received
(2) Do you feel that the resources and legal and technical capacity your country has available to
handle IIA disputes are sufficient? do you believe that you are at a disadvantage compared to
other litigants within the IIA system?
(3) What additional resources or approaches do you feel would support your capacity to effectively
handle active disputes? What are your perceptions of approaches such as:
· Access to capacity-building programs for internal staff.
·
·
·
·
·
·

·
·

Access to specific technical assistance, like discovery related to investors/investments, and
document management systems.
Access to subscription services/databases (e.g., on arbitrators, investor-state law guide, iareporter)
Access to special negotiated rates for private-sector assistance.
Pro-bono services.
Access to a dedicated advisory center.
Setting up a litigation fund.
i. Loans.
ii. Grants.
iii. Insurance
Reducing costs, e.g.,
i. Better enabling identification and dismissal of frivolous claims.
ii. Capping of fees for arbitrators? Capping fees for counsel? Other?
Any other (please specify).

(4) How do your experiences with handling disputes under IIAs compare with handling disputes
under other areas of international law (e.g., WTO, human rights) or other areas of domestic law?
Are challenges of capacity and resources different? Why? How?

f. Managing Post-Award Processes.
(1) Do you feel that your government is well-positioned to challenge the results of adverse ISDS
awards, resist enforcement? If not, what are the issues you face in this phase?
(2) Do you believe that your IIA counterparties consistently honor the results of ISDS awards,
such an award for costs? If not, do you feel that this is the result of internal state enforcement
capacity or is there another reason? What?
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B. Private Sector Representatives
a. Formulation of IIA Policy.
(1) To what extent have you, either in a paid or pro bono capacity, participated in or assisted in the
formulation of a sovereign state’s IIA policy?
a. What resources were required to thoroughly prepare for and conduct negotiations?
i. Human resources (support staff, junior, mid-level, senior, partner, specialized
experts, etc.)
ii. Financial resources (rough cost)
iii. Time (rough timeline)
b. Did you feel that your clients had adequate access to those resources?
c. What role did precedent documents and model legislation play in those negotiations?
i. What was the source of this precedent? (e.g., civil society groups, existing IIAs,
internal state resources, proprietary private sector documents).
ii. How was this precedent adapted for the specific circumstances of your clients?
iii. Did the source and format of this precedent raise any conflict-of-interest concerns?

d. What role did in-house capacity/external knowledge play in shaping outcomes?

(2) With respect to your sovereign clients, to what extent do they have a (formal or informal) policy
towards international investment agreements?
a. Is this policy applied consistently in dealings with all counterparties, or are there
certain regional neighbors, allied countries, rival countries, etc. who are negotiated with
according to substantially different policies?
b. With respect to your sovereign clients, do you feel that the development and
implementation of IIA policy is limited by financial, technical, or capacity constraints, or
do you feel that such policies have been thoroughly developed and implemented?
(3) Do you feel that policy support provided by another stakeholder in the international IIA regime
(for instance, wealthier countries, international civil society organizations, etc.) would be useful
to the formulation of national IIA policy? Have you had experience working alongside any of
these groups?
(4) To what extent could third-party policy support raise conflict-of-interest concerns? How would
those concerns differ depending on which parties were providing support? For instance, if
attorneys providing advice on IIA policy also bring ISDS claims or otherwise benefit financially
from the ISDS system, does that raise concerns? What steps could be taken to mitigate those
concerns?

b. Negotiation of IIAs
(1) To what extent have you, either in a paid or pro bono capacity, participated in or assisted in the
negotiation of IIAs?
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a. What resources were required to thoroughly prepare for and conduct negotiations?
i. Human resources (support staff, junior, mid-level, senior, partner, specialized
experts, etc.)
ii. Financial resources (rough cost)
iii. Time (rough timeline)
b. Did you feel that your clients had adequate access to those resources?
c. What role did precedent documents and model legislation play in those negotiations?
i. What was the source of this precedent? (e.g., civil society groups, existing IIAs,
internal state resources, proprietary private sector documents).
ii. How was this precedent adapted for the specific circumstances of your clients?
iii. Did the source and format of this precedent raise any conflict-of-interest concerns?

d. What role did in-house capacity/external knowledge play in shaping outcomes?

e. What other factors are important in shaping outcomes? (e.g., strength of negotiating
party, internal deadlines, trade-offs in terms of other issues being negotiated as part of
an FTA)

(2) Do you feel that the international investment agreements under which you practice were entered
into after a thorough and adequate assessments of impacts on domestic law, policy, and
economic outcomes?
(3) Do you feel that your sovereign clients are well-positioned to negotiate equitable IIAs that serve
their long-term interests? If not, why not?
(4) Would technical support help improve negotiating outcomes from your perspective?
a. If so, what kind of support?
b. Are there limits or concerns?
(5) To what extent could third-party negotiation support raise conflict-of-interest concerns? How
would those concerns differ depending on which parties were providing support? What steps
could be taken to mitigate those concerns?

c. Pre-Dispute Management of IIAs
(1) Briefly describe areas where you see risks of claims arising for your clients – e.g., natural resource
concessions, actions of local officials, etc.
(2) When and how do you become aware that there may be an ISDS claim against a country?
(e.g., notices of intent from companies/their attorneys, other communications by companies,
communications from relevant ministries or local government entities, diplomatic or other
communications from the home state, other?)
a. Are there variations based on the sector, size or home country of the investor, or other
factors?
b. To what extent does a pre-existing relationship with a country dictate at which stage
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of the dispute you will be engaged?
c. What resources were required to thoroughly prepare for and conduct pre-dispute
management?
i. Human resources (support staff, junior, mid-level, senior, partner, specialized
experts, etc.)
ii. Financial resources (rough cost)
iii. Time (rough timeline)
d. Did you feel that your clients had adequate access to those resources?
e. What role do resource constraints play in your clients’ decisions to engage you at one
stage of a dispute versus another?
(3) What, if any, steps do your sovereign clients take to (x) avoid investor-state disputes prior to their
emergence, and (y) resolve disputes that have been identified.
a. If there are steps, are these designed specifically to anticipate/avoid ISDS claims or do
they exist as part of separate initiatives?
(4) If there are steps taken under #3,
a. what organizations, including non-state organizations (for example, industry
organizations, unions, etc.) are involved in the process of pre-dispute management?
b. To what extent does this dispute management happen at the national level versus the
subnational level? Are there national-level procedures and resources in place to reduce
conflict between investors and subnational government bodies?
c. How effective do you see these processes to be?
d. What would make them more effective?
i. to what extent are these processes limited by resource constraints or technical
capacity issues? To what extent are they limited by political constraints?
e. To what extent have you or other outside experts been involved in formulating these
steps?
(5) If there are no existing processes under #3, to what extent do you think they would be useful
to establish generally or for the purposes of managing/avoiding ISDS claims? What are the
limitations to establishing such mechanisms?
(6) What resources are required to thoroughly develop a pre-dispute management plan?
a. Human resources (support staff, junior, mid-level, senior, partner, specialized experts,
etc.)
b. Financial resources (rough cost)
c. Time (rough timeline)
(7) Do you believe there are any risks, concerns or limitations of these process (perceived or real?)
(8) Do you see a role for supporting inter-state engagement on potential disputes (as opposed to
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just efforts relating to the host state and investor), such as good offices?
(9) Would external analysis of the IIA consequences of proposed activities by government or private
sector actors be valuable to the pre-dispute management of IIA obligations?

d. Initial notices and cooling off periods
(1) With respect to your sovereign clients, do you see that there are established and widely
understood intergovernmental processes to manage the receipt of the notice of intent and early
steps to respond? Are they used? If not, what are the legal, technical or resource constraints to
implementing these processes fully?
(2) What is your perspective of the utility of “cooling off periods”? Are there disputes that have been
pursued against you that you believe could have been avoided with better dispute avoidance
practices or better uses of cooling off periods? (If so, can you elaborate)?
(3) What could make cooling off periods them more useful? Are there capacity or resource constraints
that are preventing them from serving the role you envisioned when including these provisions
in your treaties?

e. Handling Disputes
(1) What resources do your sovereign clients apply towards IIA disputes?
a. Legal: Are these disputes handled primarily by law firms, or some combination of inhouse counsel and private sector firms?
i. If primarily external counsel:
1. Why?
2. Do you clients primarily use international or domestic counsel?
3. For what issues? (e.g., do you use domestic for domestic law issues and
international for treaty-related questions)
4. How have these practices changed over time, and do you foresee further
evolution?
5. What have been your experiences?
ii. If your clients use a combination of both:
1. Why did they choose that route?
2. Can you explain the distribution of labor internally and externally?
b. Technical/expert:
i. What is your perception of your clients’ internal capacity on issues of valuation/
damages?
ii. What is your perception of your clients’ internal capacity on technical issues of
discovery, evidence gathering and document management?
iii. To what extent do you think sovereigns’ due diligence and discovery on
claimant investors’, their conduct, claims, etc. is limited by a lack of expertise,
manpower, or financial resources?
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(2) Speaking generally, what resources are required to thoroughly prepare for and conduct
negotiations?
a. Human resources (support staff, junior, mid-level, senior, partner, specialized experts,
etc.)
b. Financial resources (rough cost)
c. Time (rough timeline)
(3) Do you feel that the resources and legal and technical capacity your sovereign clients have
available to handle IIA disputes are sufficient? Do you believe that they are at a disadvantage
compared to other litigants within the IIA system?
(4) What additional resources or approaches do you feel would support your clients’ capacity to
effectively handle active disputes? What are your perceptions of approaches such as:
· Access to capacity-building programs for internal staff.
· Access to specific technical assistance, like discovery related to investors/investments, and
document management systems.
· Access to subscription services/databases (e.g., on arbitrators, investor-state law guide,
iareporter)
· Access to special negotiated rates for private-sector assistance.
· Pro-bono services.
· Access to a dedicated advisory center.
· Setting up a litigation fund.
i. Loans.
ii. Grants.
iii. Insurance
· Reducing costs, e.g.,
i. Better enabling identification and dismissal of frivolous claims.
ii. Capping of fees for arbitrators? Capping fees for counsel? Other?
· Any other (please specify).

f. Managing Post-Award Processes.
(1) Do you feel that your sovereign clients are well-positioned to challenge the results of adverse
ISDS awards? If not, what are the issues you face in this phase?
(2) Do you believe that your IIA counterparties consistently honor the results of ISDS awards, such
an award for costs? If not, why not?
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C. Civil Society + Academic Representatives
a. Formulation of IIA Policy.
(1) Do you feel that states have clear and consistent policies towards international investment
agreements? To what extent does the presence of a consistent policy seem to vary, and based
on what factors? (e.g., capital importing vs. capital exporting states)
(2) Do you feel that the development and implementation of IIA policy is limited by financial,
technical, or capacity constraints, or do you feel that such policies have been thoroughly
developed and implemented?
(3) Do you feel that policy support provided to sovereign countries by another stakeholder in
the international IIA regime (for instance, wealthier countries, international civil society
organizations, arbitrators and arbitral council acting in a pro bono capacity, etc.) would be
useful to the formulation of national IIA policy?
a. Do you have any experience working with sovereign states to develop IIA policy? If so,
what were the results of that process?
(4) Would third-party advice or technical support raise conflict-of-interest or capacity concerns?
How would those concerns differ depending on which parties were providing support? For
instance, if attorneys providing advice on IIA policy also bring ISDS claims or otherwise benefit
financially from the ISDS system, does that raise concerns?
(5) Do you think that formal mechanisms or institutions that provided financial or technical ISDS aid
to poorer countries would result in systemic changes to ISDS mechanisms, or would it represent
an international commitment to existing systems? How much do you think the governance and
funding structures of such institutions would affect their role?
(6) If systemic changes to ISDS mechanisms are proposed, what role would you want to see an
Advisory Center or other aid institution play? Would you be concerned that conflicts of interests
between stakeholders might arise if the institution provided support during policy debates or
state-state negotiations?

b. Negotiation of IIAs
(1) Do you feel that the international investment agreements you have seen and worked with are
only entered into after a thorough and adequate assessments of impacts on domestic law,
policy, and economic outcomes? Do you think more resources for conducting such assessments
would be useful for negotiations (and subsequent ratification)?
(2) What is your perception of the usefulness of “model” IIAs in negotiation processes?
a. How well-positioned are states to negotiate based on their preferred model?
b. What conflicts of interest might arise when third-party models are used or third-party
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advisors assist states in developing a model?
c. What capacity issues would you expect to limit the usefulness of such models?
(3) Do you feel that countries are well-positioned to negotiate equitable IIAs that serve their longterm interests? If not, why not?
(4) Would technical support help improve negotiating outcomes from your perspective?
a. If so, what kind of support?
b. Are there limits or concerns?

c. Pre-Dispute Management of IIAs
(1) Briefly describe where you see risks of claims arising – e.g., natural resource concessions,
actions of local officials, etc.
(2) What is your perception of processes taken by states to (x) avoid investor-state disputes prior
to their emergence, and (y) resolve disputes that have been identified?
a. How effective do these processes seem to be at reducing the volume and cost of ISDS?
b . What would make them more effective?
i. To what extent are these processes limited by resource constraints or technical
capacity issues? To what extent are they limited by political constraints?
(3) Do you believe there are any risks, concerns or limitations of these process (perceived or real?)
(4) Do you see a role for supporting inter-state engagement on potential disputes (as opposed to
just efforts relating to the host state and investor), such as good offices?
(5) Would external analysis of the IIA consequences of proposed activities by government or private
sector actors be valuable to the pre-dispute management of IIA obligations? What conflicts of
interest can you foresee arising from external advice, and how do those conflicts change based
on the parties providing support?

d. Initial notices and cooling off periods
(1) What is your perspective of the utility of “cooling off periods”? Are there disputes that
have been pursued against you that you believe could have been avoided with better dispute
avoidance practices or better uses of cooling off periods? (If so, can you elaborate)?
(2) What could make cooling off periods more useful? Are there capacity or resource constraints
that are preventing them from being effective, or do they seem to function as intended?

e. Handling Disputes
(1) Do you believe that some countries are at a disadvantage compared to other litigants within
the IIA system when addressing active ISDS claims? If so, what creates those disadvantages?
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(2) Do you feel that the resources and legal and technical capacity countries have available to
handle ISDS are sufficient?
(3) What additional resources or approaches do you feel would support countries’ capacity to
effectively handle active disputes? What are your perceptions of approaches such as:
· Access to capacity-building programs for internal staff.
· Access to specific technical assistance, like discovery related to investors/investments, and
document management systems.
· Access to subscription services/databases (e.g., on arbitrators, investor-state law guide,
iareporter)
· Access to special negotiated rates for private-sector assistance.
· Pro-bono services.
· Access to a dedicated advisory center.
· Setting up a litigation fund.
i. Loans.
ii. Grants.
iii. Insurance
· Reducing costs, e.g.,
i. Better enabling identification and dismissal of frivolous claims.
ii. Capping of fees for arbitrators? Capping fees for counsel? Other?
· Any other (please specify).
(4) How do your experiences with disputes under IIAs compare with disputes under other areas of
international law (e.g., WTO, human rights) or other areas of domestic law? Are challenges of
capacity and resources different? Why? How?

f. Managing Post-Award Processes.
(1) Do you feel that governments well-positioned to challenge the results of adverse ISDS
awards, resist enforcement? If not, what are the issues you see them facing in this phase?
(2) Do you believe that IIA parties consistently honor the results of ISDS awards, such an award for
costs? If not, why not?

II. Institution-Specific Questions
A. Institutional Forms
a. Advisory Center for International Investment Law
One institutional form that has been proposed to address capacity issues and disparities in ISDS is
the “Advisory Center.” Such an Advisory Center would take the form of an independent institution
dedicated to ensuring that less-well-resourced states have an equal opportunity to defend their
interests in ISDS proceedings. Such a Center might give free legal advice and training on IIA law and
provide direct support in ISDS proceedings for free or at discounted rates.
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(1) Are you familiar with the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) set up to assist countries in
international trade law and international trade disputes?
a. Are you a member of the ACWL?
b. Have you used the services of the ACWL? (explain)?
c. What are the advantages/disadvantages of the ACWL from your perspective?
d. Do you think that support and assistance could be rendered through a centralized
Advisory Center (perhaps patterned on the ACWL)?
(2) Do you see any disadvantages of a centralized Advisory Center from the standpoint of
participating governments? Of investors?
(3) How would you rank (from 1: less important to 5: more important) the following criteria for setup and provision of services by an Advisory Center?
· High standard of quality of services.
· Governance of the Advisory Center.
· Impartiality (i.e., not favoring any government, investor, or class of governments or
investors).
· Neutrality (i.e., not advocating for particular interpretation of existing laws).
· Transparency (in terms of its policies and activities).
· No competition with law firms.
· Professional liability.
· Accountability (if so, to whom?).
(4) What other important criteria are there?
(5) Do you envision that the Center would, could or should have any restrictions in terms of the
cases it could take, governments it could support, or arguments it could raise?
(6) Do you think that an Advisory Facility should work with in-house experts only, rely solely on
technical assistance from outside experts, or rely in part on in-house experts and in part on
outside experts?
(7) How do you see the relationship between an Advisory Center and academics/experts, arbitrators,
counsels, other governments (non-beneficiaries)? What types of relationships do you believe
would increase the Center’s legitimacy among both direct participants in the ISDS system, as
well as other observers and stakeholders, and which would decrease it?
a. Would affiliation with any of the aforementioned stakeholders raise concerns about
organizational conflicts of interest?
b. Do you have concerns that the funding source of any such Advisory Center could
create (real or perceived) conflicts of interest (e.g., if the funds come from states whose
investors are frequent claimants)? If so, what funding or governance structure do you
believe would minimize these conflicts?
(8) How should an Advisory Center deal with possible cases involving supported States and/or
SMEs as opposing parties?
(9) Do you think that beneficiaries should pay for the services of an Advisory Center?
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b. Ad hoc Capacity-Building and Technical Assistance
Another possible solution could be to offer technical assistance and training to government officials
on how to manage the investment dispute process. This capacity assistance could be delivered by
a range of actors, from intergovernmental organizations to local civil society groups to professional
associations. Such assistance might also be expanded to build capacity and technical competence
within the private sector, potentially including companies based in less developed countries and small
and medium-sized investors.
(1) What capacity-building tools and technical assistance projects do you believe would be most
(from 1: least important to 5: most important)
· Model documents and training modules related to negotiating investor-State dispute
settlement provisions in international investment agreements.
· Intensive training courses covering a range of technical topics relevant to investor-State
dispute arbitration and managing investment disputes.
· Seminars on emerging issues in investor-State dispute settlement.
· Training for the national judiciary to create awareness among the judiciary at various
levels about issues of international investment law, international arbitration or investment
treaties.
· Courses on ADR to create awareness about alternatives to investor-State dispute
settlement, to develop an institutional/legal framework in the host country conducive
to avoiding disputes and proposing alternatives, and to train conciliators in the host
country.
· Direct provision of technical experts and legal experts to support a government’s
internal negotiation and policy processes.
· Any other (please specify).
(2) What institutions do you believe can deliver capacity-building assistance in a way that is seen as
legitimate and unconflicted? (from 1: less legitimate to 5: more legitimate)
· Delivered by universities.
· Delivered by private sector entities.
· Delivered by governments.
· Delivered by international organizations.
(3) What types of assistance and capacity-building do you believe would be most valuable at each
stage of the IIA cycle?
· Formulation of IIA Policy.
· Negotiation of IIAs
· Pre-Dispute Management of IIAs
· Notices of Intent
· Handling Disputes
· Managing Post-Award Processes.

c. Private-Sector Solutions
a. Access to subscription services/databases (e.g., on arbitrators, investor-state law
guide, iareporter)
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b. Access to special negotiated rates for private-sector assistance.
c. Pro-bono services.
d. Setting up a litigation fund.
i. Loans.
ii. Grants.
iii. Insurance
e. Reducing costs, e.g.,
i. Better enabling identification and dismissal of frivolous claims.
ii. Capping of fees for arbitrators? Capping fees for counsel? Other?
f. Any other (please specify).

(4) What mechanisms
(5) What role, if any, could fee award systems
a.
b. What conflicts of interest do you see fee award systems creating in

d. Direct Funding
Yet another proposed mechanism to secure adequate defense for states in ISDS involves the direct or
indirect funding of
(1) What types of direct and indirect financial support do you think would best meet the needs of
disadvantaged IIA participants? How does this change at different stages of the IIA cycle?
· Loans.
· Grants.
· Access to special negotiated rates.
· Setting up a dedicated litigation fund.
· Any other (please specify).

B. Scope of Aid
a. Negotiating IIAs & Developing IIA Policy
(1) What role could, and should, an aid institution play in supporting the negotiation and development
of specific IIAs? Does that role change based on the institutional form (e.g., direct financial aid
being used to hire third-party experts vs. institutional experts being provided by an Advisory
Center)?
(2) Would substantive policy advice and capacity-building programs be within the appropriate role
of such an organization?
(3) Would the generation of model interpretive statements or declarations be within the appropriate
role of such an organization?
(4) Could a single organization effectively provide negotiation and policy support for both/all states
negotiating an IIA with each other? What types of internal “firewalls” would be needed to
enhance the legitimacy of such support? If support could only be provided to one side, what
would be the criteria for determining who gets such support?
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b. Pre-Dispute Management and Alternate Resolution
(1) Would external analysis of the IIA consequences of proposed activities by government or
private sector actors be valuable to the pre-dispute management of IIA obligations? Would such
analysis be tainted by or taint the legitimacy of subsequent support activities of the institution?
(2) Could an aid institution serve as or provide access to third-party mediators? What do you see
as the advantages and disadvantages of such support?
(3) Could /should an aid institution help with state-state engagement, e.g., by providing “good
offices” to facilitate conclusion of joint interpretations, pre-dispute filters, state-to-state
resolution of disputes?

c. Handling Disputes
(1) Legal opinion. An aid institution could provide analysis and legal opinions and expert reports
to arbitral tribunals on all aspects of international investment law and jurisprudence. What do
you think should be the range of such services?
a. If an aid institution were to remain at arm’s length to the litigation, would this be useful
and sufficient?
b. Do you see any problem or possible conflict of interest arising from an aid institution
providing legal opinions while also representing (or supporting the representation of)
ISDS parties?
c. Could these problems be addressed if said aid institution created a “fire wall” and if
so, what kind would be required?
(2) Public Party Defense. An aid institution could provide specific assistance to resourceconstrained governments, either directly or by retaining third-party experts and private-sector
law firms. What do you think should be the range of such assistance?
· Practical issues relating to setting up an international arbitration defense.
· Advice about the internal organization of government defense efforts (cost estimates,
technical ability requirements, staffing considerations, etc.).
· Selection of procurement procedures and selection of counsel or arbitrators.
· Technical assistance at various stages of the procedure.
i. Discovery (e.g., to understand corporate value chain, identity of investors)
ii. Valuation and damages
iii. Due diligence on counsel/arbitrators
· Direct legal representation.
i. Shaping/informing arguments and strategy
ii. Doing legal research sought by the state
iii. Writing briefs
iv. Reviewing/editing briefs written by state counsel
v. Arguing motions or hearings
· Should the institution be able to assist in inter-state disputes?
· Should the institution be able to assist in the pursuit of counterclaims?
· Any other (please specify).
(3) What would be the key factors or criteria that must be addressed to ensure that the results of
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services undertaken by an aid institution that performs direct representation are equivalent in
quality to those performed by private sector practitioner?
(4) Do you see questions re quality? If so, how could those questions be resolved?
(5) Do you see possible conflicts of interest for an aid institution to provide the services detailed
above? If so, how could these conflicts be avoided?
(6) Would you be willing to pay to use such a institution? (e.g., if rates were tied to prevailing rates
for legal services in your country) Would you be willing to contribute to the cost of running such
a center?

d. Post-Award Processes
(1) Do you see a role for an aid institution to be involved in post-award processes (e.g., collecting
on adverse cost awards)? If so, what types of support would be useful after the conclusion of a
dispute process?
(2) Should recipients of service from an aid institution be bound to accept and enforce the results
of ISDS awards? Would any such requirement decrease the legitimacy and usefulness of the
institution?

e. Services for Investors
(1) Do you believe that an aid institution should make available services for small and medium sized
enterprises (SMEs)?
(2) What do you think about an aid institution providing any of the following to SMEs?
· Specific technical assistance (e.g., providing a hotline for answering idiosyncratic
questions about IIA obligations).
· Access to ADR (e.g., providing mediation services).
· Access to legal training and capacity-building services provided by the Facility.
· Legal assistance in the pursuit of claims
· Legal assistance in the defense of counterclaims.
· A small claims facility to help fund cases by SMEs for low damage amounts
· Specific rules for small claims to help speed processes.
· An SME-specific facility to help fund cases for low damage amounts.
(3) Would you be comfortable with an aid institution providing assistance to both States and SMEs
that bring claims against those States? If so in what contexts? And if not, why?

III. General Questions
(1) Outcomes of Negotiations
a. Do you feel that outcomes in negotiations are good and fair?
b. If you see issues, do they arise due to a lack of capacity of/support for one or more of
the negotiating states?
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(2) Outcomes of ISDS
a. Do you feel that outcomes of ISDS are good and fair?
b. If you see issues, do they arise due to a lack of capacity of/support for one of the
disputing parties?
(3) If the answer to 1(b) or 2(b) is yes, do you feel that issues would be best addressed by (1) directly
assisting disadvantaged parties (e.g., through external advice), or (2) building in-house capacity
in affected nation-states. (Solicit other thoughts here?)
(4) How do you feel about the current situation regarding international investment agreements?
Do you think that the current international investment regime is fair?
(5) What do you think about legitimacy challenges that international investment treaties, international
investment law and the investor-State arbitration system are currently facing?
(6) What do you feel are the primary legitimacy challenges international investment agreements
face?
(7) Do you feel that your country receives benefits from IIAs?
a. What benefits do you feel your country receives?
b. Do you feel that the resources and technical capacity your country has devoted towards
IIA disputes are proportionate to the benefits of international investment agreements
that your country and its residents receive?
(8) Do you believe that ISDS procedurally disadvantages any of the following stakeholders (e.g.,
lack of technical or financial capacity to use ISDS mechanisms, lack of access to impartial
arbitrators, conflicts of interest between arbitral counsel and clients, etc.)? If so, what are the
procedural mechanisms (including costs, forum selection, etc.) that you believe generate this
disadvantage?
a. Sovereign countries (either developed or less developed)
b. Citizens of sovereign countries
c. Subnational government entities, like municipalities
d. Domestic companies
e. Foreign investors
(9) Do you believe that the substance of IIAs disproportionately disadvantage any of the following
stakeholders? If so, what are the substantive rules (arbitral definitions of “takings,” for example)
that generate this disadvantage?
a. Sovereign countries (either developed or less developed)
b. Citizens of sovereign countries
c. Subnational government entities, like municipalities
d. Domestic companies
e. Foreign investors
(10) What changes to either the procedure or substance of IIAs do you believe would have the
greatest impact on the concerns that you have expressed about the IIA system?
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Developed Countries, <https://www.idlo.int/Investment-Support-Programme-LDCs> accessed 22 July
2019.
Interview with individual with experience with existing Assistance Mechanism for states in ISDS conducted on 26 April 2019 (on file with authors).
Interview with individual with experience with
existing Assistance Mechanism for states in ISDS
conducted on 26 April 2019 (on file with authors).
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<https://islp.org/> accessed 22 July 2019.
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Permanent Court of Arbitration Financial Assistance Fund for Settlement of International
Disputes, Terms of Reference and Guidelines (as
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Assistance Fund for Settlement of International
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of Justice, Financial Assistance to Parties, <https://
www.icj-cij.org/en/financial-assistance-to-parties>
accessed 22 July 2019.
International Court of Justice, The Court, <https://
www.icj-cij.org/en/court> accessed 22 July 2019.
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icj-cij.org/en/cases> accessed 22 July 2019.
United Nations, ‘Terms of Reference, Guidelines and
Rules of the Secretary-General’s Trust Fund to Assist
States in the Settlement of Disputes through the
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Rules of the Secretary-General’s Trust Fund to Assist
States in the Settlement of Disputes through the
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States in the Settlement of Disputes through the
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Disputes through the International Court of Justice,
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Rules of the Secretary-General’s Trust Fund to Assist
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org/> accessed 22 July 2019.
United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia, Defence, <http://www.icty.
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award is insufficient to cover costs advanced
International Council for Commercial Arbitration
(ICCA), ‘Report of the ICCA–Queen Mary task force
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TradeLab, About TradeLab, <https://www.tradelab.org/about> accessed 22 July 2019.
Joost Pauwelyn and Theresa Carpenter,
‘The TradeLab Network of Legal Clinics: Capacity Building for a More Inclusive Globalization’ in
Joost Pauwelyn and Mengyi Weng (eds), Building
Legal Capacity for a More Inclusive Globalization:
Barriers to and Best Practices for Integrating Developing Countries into Global Economic Regulation (The Graduate Institute 2019), 85.
Joost Pauwelyn and Theresa Carpenter, ‘The TradeLab Network of Legal Clinics: Capacity Building
for a More Inclusive Globalization’ in Joost Pauwelyn and Mengyi Weng (eds), Building Legal Capacity for a More Inclusive Globalization: Barriers
to and Best Practices for Integrating Developing
Countries into Global Economic Regulation (The
Graduate Institute 2019), 86.
Joost Pauwelyn and Theresa Carpenter, ‘The TradeLab Network of Legal Clinics: Capacity Building
for a More Inclusive Globalization’ in Joost Pauwelyn and Mengyi Weng (eds), Building Legal Capacity for a More Inclusive Globalization: Barriers
to and Best Practices for Integrating Developing
Countries into Global Economic Regulation (The
Graduate Institute 2019), 88.
Joost Pauwelyn and Theresa Carpenter, ‘The TradeLab Network of Legal Clinics: Capacity Building
for a More Inclusive Globalization’ in Joost Pauwelyn and Mengyi Weng (eds), Building Legal Capacity for a More Inclusive Globalization: Barriers
to and Best Practices for Integrating Developing
Countries into Global Economic Regulation (The
Graduate Institute 2019), 89.
TradeLab, About TradeLab, <https://www.tradelab.org/about> accessed 22 July 2019.
Interview with an academic conducted on 29 April
2019 (on file with authors).
Joost Pauwelyn and Theresa Carpenter, ‘The TradeLab Network of Legal Clinics (The Grty Building
for a More Inclusive Globalization’ in Joost Pauwelyn and Mengyi Weng (eds), Building Legal Capacity for a More Inclusive Globalization: Barriers
to and Best Practices for Integrating Developing
Countries into Global Economic Regulation (The
Graduate Institute 2019), 86.
TradeLab, About TradeLab, <https://www.trade-
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lab.org/about> accessed 22 July 2019.
TradeLab, About TradeLab, <https://www.tradelab.org/about> accessed 22 July 2019.
International Senior Lawyers Project, Home,
<https://islp.org/> accessed 22 July 2019.
Thomas Reuters Foundation, Trust Law, <http://
www.trust.org/trustlaw/> accessed 22 July 2019.
ICSID, Events and Training, <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Events-and-Training.
aspx> accessed 31 July 2019.
Interview with lower middle-income government
official conducted on 25 April 2019 (on file with
authors).
IISD, Annual Forum of Development Country
Investment Negotiators, < https://www.iisd.org/
project/annual-forum-developing-country-investment-negotiators> accessed 1 August 2019.
Georgetown Law, Center for the Advancement of the Rule of Law in the Americas (CAROLA) Sponsors Workshop for Latin American
Officials on Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Reform, < https://www.law.georgetown.edu/
news/center-for-the-advancement-of-the-rule-oflaw-in-the-americas-carola-sponsors-workshopfor-latin-american-officials-on-investor-state-dispute-settlement-reform/> accessed 1 August 2019.
Interview with individual with experience with
existing Assistance Mechanism for states in ISDS
conducted on 7 June 2019 (on file with authors).
Interview with individual with experience with
existing Assistance Mechanism for states in ISDS
conducted on 7 June 2019 (on file with authors).
Interview with individual with experience with
existing Assistance Mechanism for states in ISDS
conducted on 7 June 2019 (on file with authors).
Interview with high income government official
conducted on 13 June 2019 (on file with authors).
Interview with high income government official
conducted on 13 June 2019 (on file with authors).
Interview with high income government official
conducted on 13 June 2019 (on file with authors).
Interview with high income government official
conducted on 13 June 2019 (on file with authors).
Interview with high income government official
conducted on 13 June 2019 (on file with authors).
Interview with high income government official
conducted on 13 June 2019 (on file with authors).
Interview with high income government official
conducted on 13 June 2019 (on file with authors).
Interview with high income government official
conducted on 31 May 2019 (on file with authors).
Interview with high income government official
conducted on 31 May 2019 (on file with authors);
Interview with a private practitioner conducted on
26 April 2019 (on file with authors); Interview conducted with upper middle-income government official on 2 May 2019 (on file with authors); Interview
with an NGO conducted on 4 April 2019 (on file
with authors); Interview with a private practitioner
conducted on 26 April 2019 (on file with authors).
Information about CCIS’s 2020 training is available
here: Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment,
Executive Training on Investment Treaties and
Arbitration for Government Officials, <http://ccsi.
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columbia.edu/work/projects/arbitration-training/> accessed 22 July 2019.
International Institute for Sustainable Development, Training Courses for Developing Countries
on International Investment <https://www.iisd.
org/project/training-courses-developing-countries-international-investment-treaties> accessed
22 July 2019.
Based on CCSI’s experience, financing a fulllength MOOC can be estimated to cost well
over $100,000 in costs, not including time needed to create content.
edX, International Investment Law, <https://
www.edx.org/course/international-investment-law-2> accessed 25 July 2019.
UNCITRAL, Transparency Registry, <https://
www.uncitral.org/transparency-registry/registry/
index.jspx> accessed 25 July 2019.
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (adopted by
the General Assembly on 16 December 2013).
United Nations Convention on Transparency
in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (the
“Mauritius Convention on Transparency”) (adopted by the General Assembly on 10 December 2014).
UNCITRAL, Working Group III: Investor-State
Dispute Settlement Reform, < https://uncitral.
un.org/en/working_groups/3/investor-state>
accessed 30 October 2019.
UNCITRAL, Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Reform: Online Resources, < https://uncitral.un.org/en/library/online_resources/investor-state_
dispute> accessed 30 October 2019.
UNCITRAL, Bibliography of recent writings
related to the work of UNCITRAL, < https://www.
zotero.org/groups/282978/bibliography_of_recent_writings_related_to_the_work_of_uncitral/
items/collectionKey/CTC8J7YE/order/creator/
sort/asc> accessed 30 October 2019.
UNCTAD, Investment Policy Hub, <https://
investmentpolicy.unctad.org/> accessed 25 July
2019.
UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, Investment
Policy Monitor, <https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-policy-monitor> accessed 25
July 2019.
UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, Investment
Policy Monitor, <https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-policy-monitor> accessed 25
July 2019.
UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, Laws Navigator, <https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-laws> accessed 25 July 2019.
UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, Laws Navigator, <https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-laws> accessed 25 July 2019.
UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, International
Investment Agreements Navigator, <https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements> accessed 25 July 2019.
UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, International
Investment Agreements Navigator, <https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-invest-
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UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, International Investment Agreements Navigator, <https://
investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements> accessed 25 July 2019.
UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, <https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement>
accessed 25 July 2019.
UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, <https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement>
accessed 25 July 2019.
University of Oslo: PluriCourts – Centre for the Study
of the Legitimate Roles of the Judiciary in the Global
Order, PluriCourts Investment Treaty Arbitration Database (PITAD), <https://www.jus.uio.no/pluricourts/
english/topics/investment/research-projects/database.html> accessed 25 July 2019.
Italaw, Home, <https://www.italaw.com/> accessed
20 September 2019.
Jus Mundi, Home, <https://jusmundi.com/en/>
accessed 20 September 2019.
Jus Mundi, Pricing, <https://jusmundi.com/en/pricing> accessed 20 September 2019.
International Arbitration Case Law, Home, <http://
www.internationalarbitrationcaselaw.com/> accessed
25 July 2019.
International Arbitration Case Law, Home, <http://
www.internationalarbitrationcaselaw.com/> accessed
25 July 2019;
See also Joost Pauwelyn and Theresa Carpenter,
‘The TradeLab Network of Legal Clinics: Capacity
Building for a More Inclusive Globalization’ in Joost
Pauwelyn and Mengyi Weng (eds), Building Legal
Capacity for a More Inclusive Globalization: Barriers
to and Best Practices for Integrating Developing
Countries into Global Economic Regulation (The
Graduate Institute 2019).
TradeLab, Uganda: Reference Guide for Legal
Issues facing Social Entrepreneurs, < https://www.
tradelab.org/single-post/2019/07/14/Uganda-Reference-Guide-for-Legal-Issues-facing-Social-Entrepreneurs?v=1392752313000%2F_%2Fjcr%3Asyst>
accessed 22 July 2019.
Joost Pauwelyn and Theresa Carpenter, ‘The TradeLab Network of Legal Clinics: Capacity Building for
a More Inclusive Globalization’ in Joost Pauwelyn
and Mengyi Weng (eds), Building Legal Capacity for
a More Inclusive Globalization: Barriers to and Best
Practices for Integrating Developing Countries into
Global Economic Regulation (The Graduate Institute
2019) 85.
Joost Pauwelyn and Theresa Carpenter, ‘The TradeLab Network of Legal Clinics: Capacity Building for
a More Inclusive Globalization’ in Joost Pauwelyn
and Mengyi Weng (eds), Building Legal Capacity for
a More Inclusive Globalization: Barriers to and Best
Practices for Integrating Developing Countries into
Global Economic Regulation (The Graduate Institute
2019).
An idea advanced by Jeremy Sharpe in ‘An International Investment Advisory Center: Beyond the
WTO Mode’ (EJIL: Talk! July 26, 2019) < https://www.
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ejiltalk.org/an-international-investment-advisory-center-beyond-the-wto-model/> accessed July
31, 2019.
Interview with upper middle-income country
conducted on 9, 10 May 2019 (on file with authors); Interview with lower middle-income country
conducted on 25 April 2019 (on file with authors);
Interview with individual with experience with
existing Assistance Mechanism for states in ISDS
conducted on 22 April 2019 (on file with authors).
Interview with individual with experience with
existing Assistance Mechanism for states in ISDS
conducted on 22 April 2019 (on file with authors);
Interview with individual with experience with
existing Assistance Mechanism for states in ISDS
conducted on 26 April 2019 (on file with authors);
Interview with individual with experience with
existing Assistance Mechanism for states in ISDS
conducted on 7 June 2019 (on file with authors).
Interview with upper middle-income country conducted on 9, 10 May 2019 (on file with authors).
Interview with upper middle-income government
official conducted on 2 May 2019 (on file with authors).
Interview with lower middle-income government
official conducted on 25 April 2019 (on file with
authors); Interview with upper middle-income government official conducted on 2 May 2019 (on file
with authors); Interview with upper middle-income
country conducted on 9, 10 May 2019 (on file with
authors); Interview with individual with experience
with existing Assistance Mechanism for states in
ISDS conducted on 22 April 2019 (on file with authors).
Interview with individual with experience with
existing Assistance Mechanism for states in ISDS
conducted on 26 April 2019 (on file with authors).
Interview with upper middle-income government
official conducted on 2 May 2019; Interview with
lower middle-income government official conducted on 25 April 2019 (on file with authors).
Interview with upper middle-income government
official conducted on 2 May 2019; Interview with
lower middle-income government official conducted on 25 April 2019 (on file with authors).
Interview with upper middle-income government
official conducted on 2 May 2019; Interview with
lower middle-income government official conducted on 25 April 2019 (on file with authors); Interview
with upper middle-income country conducted on
9, 10 May 2019 (on file with authors).
Interview with upper middle-income country conducted on 9, 10 May 2019 (on file with authors).
Interview with lower middle-income country conducted on 25 April 2019 (on file with authors).
Interview with individual with experience with
existing Assistance Mechanism for states in ISDS
conducted on 7 June 2019 (on file with authors).
Interview with individual with experience with
existing Assistance Mechanism for states in ISDS
conducted on 7 June 2019 (on file with authors).
Interview with individual with experience with
existing Assistance Mechanism for states in ISDS
conducted on 7 June 2019 (on file with authors);
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Interview with individual with experience with
existing Assistance Mechanism for states in ISDS
conducted on 22 April 2019 (on file with authors).
Interview with individual with experience with
existing Assistance Mechanism for states in ISDS
conducted on 7 June 2019 (on file with authors).
Interview with individual with experience with
existing Assistance Mechanism for states in ISDS
conducted on 7 June 2019 (on file with authors).
Nora Plaisier and Paul Wijmenga, ‘Evaluation
of Trade-Related Technical Assistance, Three
Geneva Based Organizations: ACWL, AITC, and
QUNO’(2004) IOB Working Document, 33 (“A
number of delegates noted that ACWL looks at
the WTO rules from a development perspective
when providing legal advice, which distinguishes
them from most other legal advisors.”) Users also
recognized the extent to which the legal arguments raised reflected policy and political determinations and appreciated the ACWL’s understanding of relevant political dynamics. Ibid at 21.
Interview with individual familiar with existing Assistance Mechanism conducted on April 25, 2019
(on file with authors).
Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on
Treaties, ‘Report 115 tabled on 21 March 2011’
(2011).
Interview with individual with experience with
existing Assistance Mechanism for states in ISDS
conducted on 22 April 2019 (on file with authors).
One issue to keep in mind is that costs presently associated with international investment law
including, in particular, costs of ISDS proceedings,
are products of the current system. These costs
may fall or rise depending on what, if any, reforms
to IIAs and their dispute settlement mechanisms
are adopted in connection with ongoing reform
discussions.
An early study, published in June 2004, reported
that to that time the time budget had never been
exceeded. The time budgets were nevertheless
increased slightly after that study. Nora Plaisier
and Paul Wijmenga, ‘Evaluation of Trade-Related
Technical Assistance, Three Geneva Based Organizations: ACWL, AITC, and QUNO’(2004) IOB Working Document.
See ACWL, ‘Decision 2007/7 Adopted by the
Management Board on 19 November 2007:
Billing Policy and Time Budget’ (2007) ACWL/
MB/D/2007/7. That document also contains more
detailed information on the hours budgeted for
each phase.
Data is even more difficult to find regarding the
hours expended by level of experience. In light of
the lack of relevant publicly available information,
and for the purpose of conducting this Scoping
Study, CCSI sent a survey to a large number of private practitioners seeking to collect data on hours
expended on ISDS cases. The survey included
questions about total hours expended per case,
and hours expended based on qualification of the
staff member working on the case (e.g., paralegal
v attorney) and level of experience (e.g., junior
associate v partner). CCSI received no responses
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United Nations International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia, Legal Aid, <http://
www.icty.org/en/sid/163> accessed 22 July 2019.
These amounts do not include travel and daily
subsistence amount, which are separately covered.
United Nations International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia, Legal Aid, <http://
www.icty.org/en/sid/163> accessed 22 July 2019.
United Nations International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia, Legal Aid, <http://
www.icty.org/en/sid/163> accessed 22 July 2019.
Data on the number of ISDS cases brought
between 1 January 2009 and 31 December
2018 is drawn from UNCTAD, ICSD Case No.
UNCT/14/2, <https://investmentpolicy.unctad.
org/investment-dispute-settlement> accessed
30 July 2019.
There are also opportunity costs that can arise
from law firms’ or other pro bono providers’
decisions to support IIA-related activities as
opposed to other pro bono clients (an issue
that cuts across many other topics and models
discussed in this paper).
For instance, the General Assembly of the
ACWL adopted in 2015 a decision aiming to
make it easier for developed countries to contribute to the ACWL as ‘Associate Members’ or
‘Contributing Observers’, instead of requiring
countries to go through the process of acceding
to the ACWL in order to contribute. The decision provided that any “Contributing observer
shall have the right to participate in the General
Assembly and to have access to or receive all
documents that are available or circulated to
ACWL Members,” but “does not have the right
to make proposals, unless invited to do so, nor
participate in decision-making.” See ACWL, ‘Report on the Thirty-Third Meeting of the General
Assembly, held 9 December 2015’ (2015) ACWL/
GA/R/2015/2, fn 3.
Interview with private practitioner conducted on
21 May 2019 (on file with authors).
Interview with private practitioner conducted on
21 May 2019 (on file with authors).
This issue is discussed further in the sections
on existing examples. Those issues of financial
viability, however, could change depending on
outcomes of ISDS reform discussions. Under
each of the funding models, in some contexts,
the person or entity bearing the cost can potentially subsequently recover it from an adverse
party in litigation. If, for instance, a legal clinic
supports a case on a pro bono basis, it may be
able to recover from a losing claimant the costs
it incurred in providing that support; similarly, if
a law firm supports a case at discounted rates
(paid for by the respondent state or a third-party
donor), fees paid for that defense may also be
recoverable from the claimant. Yet at present,
recoverability of fees is uncertain (especially so
for respondent states). ISDS reform that addresses fee shifting and recoverability could have
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important consequences for the viability of some
funding models covered briefly above and discussed
in more detail below.
Interview with individual with experience with existing Assistance Mechanism for states in ISDS conducted on 7 June 2019 (on file with authors).
ACWL, ‘Report of the Task Force’ (2015) ACWL/
GA/W/2015/5, 17.
ACWL, ‘Report of the Task Force’ (2015) ACWL/
GA/W/2015/5, 19.
ACWL, ‘Report of the Task Force’ (2015) ACWL/
GA/W/2015/5, 19.
ACWL, ‘Budget for 2016: Proposal of the Management Board’ (2015) ACWL/MB/W/2015/18, 1.
ACWL, ‘Budget for 2019: Proposal of the Management Board’ (2018) ACWL/MB/W/2018/6, 1.
ACWL, ‘Report on the Thirty-Third Meeting of the
General Assembly’ (2015) ACWL/GA/R/2015/2, 6.
Interview with individual with experience with existing Assistance Mechanism for states in ISDS conducted on 26 April 2019 (on file with authors).
Interview with individual with experience with
existing Assistance Mechanism for states in ISDS
conducted on 26 April 2019 (on file with authors).
IDLO, Launch of the Investment Support Programme
for the Least Developed Countries: Summary of
the Debate, <https://www.idlo.int/news/highlights/
launch-investment-support-programme-least-developed-countries-summary-debate> accessed 22 July
2019.
Email from David Tanenbaum, Director, ISP/LDCs, to
undisclosed recipients, 3 December 2019 (on file with
authors).
Interview with individual with experience working for
an arbitral institution conducted on 22 October 2019
(on file with authors).
Interview with individual with experience working for
an arbitral institution conducted on 22 October 2019
(on file with authors).
Interview with individual with experience working for
an arbitral institution conducted on 22 October 2019
(on file with authors).
Interview with individual with experience working for
an arbitral institution conducted on 22 October 2019
(on file with authors).
Interview with individual with experience working for
an arbitral institution conducted on 22 October 2019
(on file with authors).
Reports available at United Nations, Secretary-General’s Trust Fund to Assist States in the Settlement of
Disputes through the International Court of Justice,
<https://www.un.org/law/trustfund/trustfund.htm>
accessed 22 July 2019.
Gbenga Oduntan, ‘Access to Justice in International Courts for Indigent States, Persons and Peoples’
(2019) Indian Journal of International Law.
Gbenga Oduntan, ‘Access to Justice in International Courts for Indigent States, Persons and Peoples’
(2019) Indian Journal of International Law Section 3
(citing Richard J. Rogers, ‘Assessment of the ICC’s
Legal Aid System’ (2017) Global Diligence LLP, 9-10).
Gbenga Oduntan, ‘Access to Justice in International
Courts for Indigent States, Persons and Peoples ’
(2019) Indian Journal of International Law Section 3
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(citing Richard J. Rogers, ‘Assessment of the ICC’s
Legal Aid System,’ (2017) Global Diligence LLP,
9-10).
ACWL, ‘Report of the Task Force’ (2015) ACWL/
GA/W/2015/5, 19. See also Table 10 above.
For a discussion of some of these issues, see
ACWL, ‘The Governance of the ACWL: A Note
By The Management Board’ (2015) AWWL/
MB/W/2015/20.
It was said, for instance, that because the ACWL
supports cases against developed donor governments, that can raise some nearer term issues for
those governments. Nevertheless, its longer-term
objectives were in line with the interests of developed country governments in that, overall, the
ACWL aimed to help support developing country
governments participate in and enforce the rules
of the WTO system, including by bringing claims.
By enabling claims to be brought, the ACWL, can
help advance the WTO’s market opening function.
Nora Plaisier and Paul Wijmenga, ‘Evaluation
of Trade-Related Technical Assistance, Three
Geneva Based Organizations: ACWL, AITC, and
QUNO’(2004) IOB Working Document, 33. In 2017,
the Canadian representative at an ACWL General
Assembly meeting stated that “the Canadian government had recently launched its new Feminist
International Assistance Policy (FIAP), positioning
gender equality and the empowerment of women
and girls at the heart of Canada’s international
assistance efforts. … He stated that any decision
by Canada to financially contribute to the ACWL
activities would have to be made in accordance
with the FIAP.” United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, ‘Voluntary National Review
of Progress Toward the Sustainable Development
Goals’ (2019) 202, citing funding for the ACWL as
one of the activities advancing SDG Target 16.8.
See Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade, ‘National Interest Analysis [2010] ATNIA
24: Accession to the Agreement Establishing the
Advisory Centre on WTO Law, done at Seattle on
30 November 1999’ (1999), para 8.
See Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade, ‘National Interest Analysis [2010] ATNIA
24: Accession to the Agreement Establishing the
Advisory Centre on WTO Law, done at Seattle on
30 November 1999’ (1999), para 10 (noting that
becoming a member of the ACWL would enable
Australia to ‘promote Australian foreign and trade
policy interests’ and contribute to the work of the
ACWL by participating in deliberations and engaging in decision-making); see also Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on Treaties, ‘Report 115
tabled on 21 March 2011’ (2011), paras 11.7, 11.18,
11.23.
One state said that it could not financially support
a mechanism engaged in dispute resolution for
this reason. Interview with high income country
conducted on 13 June 2019 (on file with authors).
One interviewee from an international organization said, for instance: “A lot of these cases also
involve corruption; would a Center go out and represent the most corrupt governments because they
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have the most cases against them, and then other
less-corrupt states pay for that aid? What if states
are funding defense against their own investors?”
Interview with a private practitioner conducted on
4 April 2019 (on file with authors).
See, e.g. Damien Charlotin and Jarrod Hepburn, ‘US Courts Diverge from ICSID Annulment
Committee on Venezuela’s Representation in
International Disputes’ Investment Arbitration
Reporter (23 May 2019). Also illustrating these
issues, in a recent ISDS case against Libya, the
tribunal retracted a settlement agreement that it
had previously entered as an ISDS award between
the claimant investor and, purportedly, the government of Libya. The retraction decision was based
on the tribunal’s post-award determination that the
settlement agreement had not been agreed by the
appropriate Libyan authorities. Damien Charlotin,
‘Revealed: Reasons Why Bit Tribunal Retracted
2016 Consent Award; Confusion Swirling Around
Libya’s True Government had Offered Opportunity
for Investor to Strike What Tribunal Initially Viewed
as a Respondent-Authorized Settlement’ Investment Arbitration Reporter (25 July 2019).
See Haley J. Swedlund, ‘Can Foreign Aid Donors
Credibly Threaten to Suspend Aid? Evidence From
a Cross-National Survey of Officials’ (2017) 24
Review of International Political Economy 454-496
(discussing circumstances in which some donors
might suspend aid).
Tied aid is aid offered on the condition that it be
used to procure goods or services from the provider of the aid. It is criticized for its negative impacts
on sustainable development objectives. See e.g.
OECD, Untied Aid <https://www.oecd.org/dac/
financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/untied-aid.htm> accessed
6 August 2019.
ACWL, ‘Report on the Thirty-Third Meeting of the
General Assembly’ (2015) ACWL/GA/R/2015/2,
7-9. See also Nora Plaisier and Paul Wijmenga,
‘Evaluation of Trade-Related Technical Assistance,
Three Geneva Based Organizations: ACWL, AITC,
and QUNO’(2004) IOB Working Document, at 31
(assessing the ACWL based on the extent to which
it has contributed to the formulation of a national
policy of the developing country at the interface of
trade and development), and 32 (noting different
questions for evaluating the ACWL, based on the
extent to which they supported Dutch funding
objectives and/or the objectives of the ACWL,
thereby also signaling that the two sets of objectives are not necessarily the same).
ACWL, ‘Report on the Thirty-Third Meeting of the
General Assembly’ (2015) ACWL/GA/R/2015/2, 8-9.
Nora Plaisier and Paul Wijmenga, ‘Evaluation
of Trade-Related Technical Assistance, Three
Geneva Based Organizations: ACWL, AITC, and
QUNO’(2004) IOB Working Document, 7 (noting
that a “number of developed countries cannot be
convinced of the benefits of funding ACWL; they
feel that they would fund their opponents in the
dispute settlement system”).
Some of the issues relating to the nature of cases

SECURING ADEQUATE LEGAL DEFENSE IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS A SCOPING STUDY

644

645
646
647
648
649

650

651

and outcomes supported may be particularly
relevant to development agency support. In
2017, for instance, the Canadian representative
at an ACWL General Assembly meeting stated
that “the Canadian government had recently
launched its new Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP), positioning gender equality
and the empowerment of women and girls at
the heart of Canada’s international assistance efforts. … He stated that any decision by Canada
to financially contribute to the ACWL activities
would have to be made in accordance with the
FIAP.” The representative from Australia similarly
stated that Australia’s “decision on the funding
of the ACWL … would be taken on the basis of
the development outcomes resulting from the
ACWL’s work ACWL.” ACWL, ‘Report on the
Thirty-Sixth Meeting of the General Assembly’
(2017) ACWL/GA/R/2017/1, 4. For some discussions of issues and indicators relevant for
monitoring and evaluating the ACWL see e.g.
Nora Plaisier and Paul Wijmenga, ‘Evaluation
of Trade-Related Technical Assistance, Three
Geneva Based Organizations: ACWL, AITC, and
QUNO’(2004) IOB Working Document, 5 (noting
challenges with using number of cases supported by the ACWL and outcomes of disputes as
indicators of success), and 31 (evaluating the
ACWL based on whether it has contributed to
developing country policy-making at the interface of trade and development).
During one consultation with governments, it
was said, “We often see that firms don’t want to
bring certain arguments because internally they
also represent claimants. You need to know what
other claims the lawyer is managing and whether
there are issue conflicts. Firms in multiple cases
might not bring effective arguments because
they might be undercut.”
See Section 5.1.1, supra.
Interview with individual with experience with
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